CONDOM Nationality
Troubled Galaxy Destroyed Dreams: Chapter 21
Palash Biswas
Political developments in the capital are gaining momentum with President Pratibha Patil meeting Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the Rashtrapati Bhawan on Thursday even as Congress managers feel that the government would pass the trust vote in Lok Sabha later this month with a "reasonable" margin.The PM is expected to inform the President of his government's readiness to face Lok Sabha and consult her on a confidence vote, likely to be held on July 21 or 22.
He is also expected to brief her about the government's plans to proceed with the India-US nuclear deal after having established a majority in Parliament.
US will do 'whatever it can' if India moves forward on deal
Sridhar Krishnaswami
Washington, Jul 10 (PTI) Amidst the political turmoil in India, the United States has said it was committed to Indo-US nuclear deal and if New Delhi moves forward, Washington will do "whatever it can" to fulfill its commitments.
"The position of the United States government is, we are committed to this (Indo-US nuclear) deal," State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said at his briefing here.
"If the Indian government completes the discussions it has been having about moving forward on a variety of different fronts regarding this deal, the United States government has committed to doing whatever it can to fulfill its commitments here domestically," he said.
The Spokesman was responding to a query on a report in The Washington Post that made the point that although hurdles may have been crossed in India, the deal faces difficulty in Congress on account of the time factor and in the stipulations of the enabling legislation, the Hyde Act of 2006.
"Now, of course, we have the Congress, but we have the Congress to work with on this issue. They have an important role to play in it. But we have been in close contact with the Congress and key members of Congress on this issue really throughout this period to keep them updated on it," he added.
"And there are, of course, other aspects to the agreement that would require actions by others, for example, the IAEA," McCormack said.
"That is not under our control," he replied when asked about the prospect of a Lame Duck session of the 110th Congress. "That is solely under the control of the leadership in Congress," he added. PTI
To save men the blushes, the MCD is going to provide space for putting up condom vending machines across the Capital. In one go, 2,000 brightly-coloured condom vending machines will be installed Monday onwards at parking lots, cinema halls, community toilets, shopping areas, petrol pumps, hospitals and even office complexes.
Yes, this is all about the nationalism provoked by Indo US Nuclear deal.
Foreign Investment fed,Indian Media adocates the sovereignty of Market deleting geopolitics, political border, everything Indigenous. It creates sensational hypes with all the rubbish like style, vogue, consumerism, Icon, cricket, brand, drink and hard Sex with mobile and computor, soap opera, Reality shows, cinema and midnight parties. It focuses on credit boom created middle class five star life style.
This Indian media has focused on unprecedented nationalism which turns Saffron so soon to justify the Ruling Hegemony theory that the Indo US Nuclear deal as well as Indo Us strategic alliance happen to be the most wanted Viagra for national Interest. Edit pages are being gang raped by all the nonsense Economists, the followers of so called Nobel laureate Dr Amartya sen. The deal is now auto saved thanks to the Perfect slaves of Washington and vicious opportunism of Indian communists.
What remains is nothing but CONDOM NATIONALITY. It is all about abortions, copulations, crimes, voyeurism, Viagra, contraceptives, blue films and chatting!
Yes, it is the culture of the Global ruling class which dismisses anything called nationality and shifts immediately to Nationalism provoking all the good spirits and Incarnations. All Myths and legends being called back to justify the death of nation, sacrifice of Freedom and sovereignty. Imperialism is so funny and Americanism is so enjoyable! Why anyone is annoyed if the Indian Nation is mad a colony by all colored Political Parties of the Ruling Hegemony represented and led by the Lion comrador Dr Manmohan singh, the most elite Brahmin Pranab Mukherjee, the Hindu Nation Pedlar RSS and Shiv Sena, the hypocrite Marxists and socialists, the Feudal Socialist Oxides and Zionist Gandhians!
In Kolkata, Anandbazar is leading the race with crying Headlines invoking Nationalism and masturbating edits declaring anti Imperialism a child play. Mind you, this Anand bazar has no space for SC, ST and OBCs. It is against all things Indigenous. It projects Brand Buddha and advocates most all the ways of capitalist Marxist development. This Anand Bazar Patrika leads the Anti Hindi movement and uses Bengali for Prostitution with its hard Porn soft porn metro Literature. It supported every action of US Imperialism including gulf War. It justifies Price rise as global lifestyle. It denies any role for the state and is committed to the sovereignty of market.
Anandbazar is best known for Vending West Bengal Brand Elite Bangla nationality and celebrates global Banga sammelan. It treats other nationalities and languages as substandard.It is against all the partition victim dalit East Bengal refugees.
And now, this Anand bazar Group is doing everything to invoke the CONDOM NATIONALITY and NATIONALISM amusingly discarding freedom, democracy and sovereignty.
It is all for the Nuclear Hindutva deal!
Thus, the Left is caught red handed to finalise the minutes of floor coordination for a No confidence vote in parliament. a rare example of reality show to contribute their anti imperialism anti congress masks. They have other ways also to appease respective vote Banks.
We have known the Buddha Bush combination all the way as Anandbazar supported the Indiscriminate Urbanisation and industrialisation, MNCs and foreign Capital, SEZ and Chemical Hub and nuclear Plant! It justified Singur and Nandigram repression!
Now, you see once again the Bermuda triangle of Adwani, Buddha and Pranab surfacing . Mind, you all the anti People legislation has been enabled and activated by this Trio. The Bengali elite Brahmins capture all the Power centres in past four years sidelining RSS. Now, the RSS Marxist combine is leading all the promos of CONDOM Nationalism!
For Bengali media all these years nationalism meant Indian Cricket, Bollywood, fashion show, Tata and MNCS, Reliance and Retail chain, IT, Salem and builders, Buddha and the gestapo with promoter muscles, Saurabh Ganguli and CAB, Sushmita sen and Jaya Bhaduri studded Bacchans and Sharmila Tagore with Nawab Pataudi. Bengali media saw nationalism in pro imperialism globalisation and sought Bengali Icons from Abroad. Sunil Gangopaddhya with all Bengali sentiments captured Sahitya academy. The premium Anand bazar publications never published anything from Mahashweta Devi or Nabarun Bhattacharya and always kept intact its Slave caravan of writers, poets, artists and stars! No place for anything Indigenous.
Thus this Nuclear Nationalism of super Power Hindu Nation is minus the eighty five percent Indigenous people deprived of life and livelihood.
What is it ?
It may be best defined as condom nationality! The Entertainment Consumer Culture with perfect purchasing power!
See the perfect equation for this brand of Nationalism!
The HIV prevention programme at Sonagachi in Kolkata has become a global model; India has led the way to move forward. The Sonagachi model has been applied in the Dominican Republic and in other parts of India. The principles are the same though, of course, the programme is not identical because that is the whole point — that communities develop and run their own programme of empowerment and HIV prevention. ICRW is working with sex workers’ programmes in Andhra Pradesh on the Andhra Pradaesh-Karnataka border where we are applying the principles of community processes for HIV prevention.
Just read this item!
Kolkata, July 2 (ANI): Hundreds of sex workers took to streets here against the Immoral Trafficking (Prevention) Act (ITPA) as they alleged that implementation of the Act would ruin the sex trade if implemented.
Members of a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) 'Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee' and National Network for the Sex Workers' Forum took out a procession to make common people aware of the act.
Sex workers alleged that ITPA criminalises most aspects of sex work by equating voluntary adult sex work with trafficking. They also fear that, all that they have achieved, like use of condom, awareness of AIDS, education for sex workers children, through long movement would go down the drain.
"Section 3 of ITPA law says that anybody who will rent place to us will be arrested and will be penalized for 10,000 rupees. If nobody will give us premises then how will we continue our trade. We will come on the road, and this profession will become an underground trade. Then we won't use condom as well, thus the diseases will spread further. Section 5C punishes clients of sex workers, but we can continue with our trade. When the customers are arrested then how will we earn and the trade will shut down completely," said Asha Banerjee, Secretary, Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee.
The Central Government has reportedly proposed an amendment to the ITPA to punish the clients of sex workers. Sex workers have alleged that this process would deny sex workers basic rights for survival and livelihood.
Sex workers claimed that government should have consulted all concerned including affected people before amending any law, but the Union Government has been ignoring the voices of the sex workers in the ITPA amendment process.
"This law has been made for us and nobody even consulted us that whether it will be beneficial for us or not. We have been staging protests and demonstrations against it from a long time.
But if it gets passed in Parliament in July then we won't just stop with such rallies and protests. We will go to parliament as well and stage demonstration there. And if still nothing happens then we will sit on hunger strike as well," said Swapna Gyen, sex worker.
Although prostitution is still illegal in India, it is a thriving underground industry.urbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee, a forum of 65,000 sex workers based in West Bengal, is active in challenging and addressing the structural barriers that form the everyday reality of sex workers' lives.
They have submitted a memorandum to the governor of West Bengal and have sought his intervention in the matter.
Sex workers are a marginalized lot in India and have very few rights. Both their customers and the police exploit them.
High levels of violence in the sex industry, the presence of child sex workers, lack of access to health care, and high levels of HIV infection are some of the key issues affecting the sex workers in India.
Prostitution is outlawed in India, but the country has over two million sex workers, most of them living on the fringes of the society. (ANI)
Almost as frequent as the predictions of India’s economic momentum is a reference to its demographic dividend. By 2050, predict economists at Goldman Sachs, for instance, India will be one of the world’s four leading economies. By 2050, agree demographers, India will indisputably be the world’s most-populous country, with 1.63 billion people, followed by China with 1.44 billion, and the US a ‘poor’ third with a mere 420 million people. In the new India, this is largely seen as an advantage. Population stabilisation no longer seems a relevant issue, let alone a burning one.According to Ministry of Health and Family Welfare data, 42 per cent of these babies are born to families that already have two children. Five million are born to teenage mothers — adolescent pregnancies (15-19 years) contribute to 19 per cent of total fertility in India and record the highest maternal mortality rates. According to the Third National Family Health Survey or NFHS-3 (2005-06) 32 per cent of these mothers have had no education, implying low socio-economic status.
The basic criteria for an efficient contraceptive drug are reliability, effectiveness and reversibilty. In the absence of a wholly satisfactory contraceptive for women, and none at all for men, the market will always remain hungry for the perfect pill.According to the report titled Contraceptives—A Global Strategic Business Report published by Global Industry Analysts, the world market for contraceptive implants/injections is forecast to grow the strongest in Asia-Pacific over the period 2000 to 2015, and will reach $359.60 million by the year 2015. The world oral contraceptives market is dominated by the United States and Europe with a combined 75.82 percent share estimated in the year 2007. While India has the second-largest population in the world, the market for hormonal contraceptives is small, because of a low contraceptive-prevalence rate (CPR) (42.8 percent) and a high reliance to sterilisation. Female and male sterilisation comprises more than 80 percent of contraceptive use, states an assessment report produced in March 2006 by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In addition, the report states that there has been little growth in the CPR; the majority of what growth there has been involves sterilisation, resulting in a flat market for hormonal contraceptives.Indian manufacturers of generic hormonal contraceptives (oral contraceptive pills (OCPs)), emergency contraception (EC), and injectable contraceptives (ICs) and intrauterine devices (IUDs) have a prominent role in supplying products to family-planning programmes in many developing countries. The buyers for these programmes are governmental or multilateral institutions, such as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA); multilateral and bilateral donors; ministries of health; and social-marketing organisations. In India, large and small players are Hindustan Latex, TTK-LIG, TTK-Biomed, Contech Devices, Cupid Rubber, Polar, JK Chemicals, London Rubber Company, Win-Medicare, Famy Care, Pregna International, Pfizer, GlaxoSmithKline, Organon India, Cipla, Mankind Pharma, Natco Pharma among others.
THE WORLD Economic Forum’s annual Global Gender Gap report for the year 2007 has shown India at a dismal 120th position. The gender gap report looks at the closing of the disparities in terms of health, education, economic status and political participation between men and women. India is facing the toughest test when it comes to bridging the existing disparities: Gender, economic, rights, health and nutrition and many more. If we consider the gender gap alone, then the biggest challenge that India faces today is of female foeticide. Sex selective abortions and increase in the number of female infanticide cases have become a significant social phenomenon in several parts of India. It transcends all castes, class and communities and even the north-south dichotomy.
Reacting to the unveiling of the IAEA safeguards draft text, CPM leader Prakash Karat has lashed out at the UPA government saying it has lost credibility over the issue. Speaking to journalists in New Delhi, Karat said it is strange the government, that was till Wednesday convinced that the text of the draft was confidential, had now put it up on the Ministry of External Affairs website. He wondered what had happened between Wednesday and now that warranted such a turnaround.
On the other hand, amidst speculation over his continuance in office following Left withdrawal of support to the Government, Lok Sabha Speaker Somnath Chatterjee today gave broad hints that he has no plans to resign saying he was not elected as the nominee of any party.
"The Honourable Speaker does not represent any political party in the discharge of his duties and functions.... Since his election as Speaker, Somnath Chatterjee has scrupulously kept himself away from all political activities," a Lok Sabha secretariat release said.
Noting that attention of Chatterjee has been drawn to various reports, it requested the media not to drag the "highest legislative office of the country into controversies by speculative reports and undeserved innuendos.
US ambassador to India David C Mulford on Thursday met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh discuss the progress on the Indo-US nuclear deal. Mulford had a meeting with Prime Minister at his 7 Race Course Road residence in the morning hours after Singh returned from his three-day visit to Japan.
Later, Mulford drove down to the South Block and had a meeting with senior officials at the Prime Minister's Office.
Mulford on Thursday met the envoys of member states of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group in New Delhi and sought their support for the nuclear accord. Mulford impressed upon the diplomats that their countries should back the deal as it was in the interest of nuclear non-proliferation system.
Meanwhile,IAEA Spokesperson Melisa Fleming spoke to NDTV on phone from Vienna about the IAEA safeguards draft.
Meliasa said, ''At the request of the Government of India, we were able to circulate the draft safeguards agreement to the members of the IAEA board of governors for consideration. What will happen now is that the members of the board have to check, chairman of the board will consult each and every one of them to agree on a date for a meeting of the board at which this agreement will be considered.''
When asked if the reports that the IAEA Board of Governors meet will take place on the 28th of July are correct she said, ''There are countries who feel that they need sometime and some want to consider the document so that they will be in a position to meet, to agree to it, to study the document before they be in a position to meet, to consider it. It is possible that the meeting could take place in the last week of July, it also is possible that it could be delayed beyond that''.
On Wednesday, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee had categorically said that Parliament would be taken into confidence before making such a move.
"There are no reasons to doubt the integrity of Pranab Mukherjee. He publicly committed on behalf of the government after consulting the PM. But what happened in Japan? He (PM) went back on this commitment," Karat told a crowded press conference at his party headquarters.
"The government's decision to go ahead with the nuclear deal is nothing but shocking betrayal of commitment to the country and the people," he said.
Saying that he had great respect for Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Anil Kakodkar, Karat expressed surprise that even though Kakodkar had said on wednesday that the draft was not yet final, how could the government go ahead with it so fast.
He ridiculed the government by saying that even before the MEA site put up the text, some website in the US had put it up. "It is a shame," he said.
Karat said the Left would do everything politically possible to stop the deal from going through.
The UPA Government has reportedly unveiled the text of safeguards agreement reached with the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA).
The agreement envisages support for Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.
India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.
India undertakes that none of the items produced in the safeguarded facilities shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose. Such items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the manufacture of any nuclear explosive device, says the draft.
The draft nuclear safeguards pact that India submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency on Wednesday has ambiguities that must be clarified before the UN watchdog approves the deal, a leading expert said.
The draft, which was circulated by Washington-based thinktanks, contained several points that "raise questions that board members need to get clarity on" because they would restrict international monitoring of India's atomic programmes, said Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association.
He said a key red flag is raised by a clause in the draft that says India "may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies." Disruption of fuel supplies would happen only if India were to resume testing of nuclear weapons and that loophole would blunt any IAEA effort to keep that country's civil nuclear power programme from being used to augment its atomic arsenal.
"Does that mean that India intends to withdraw from what are supposed to be permanent safeguards if it tests and other states decide to terminate fuel supplies?" asked Kimball. "If so, that is a big problem and the Indian government has not clarified what that means," he said.
India, one of just three nations outside the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, developed atomic bombs in secret and conducted a nuclear test in 1974, prompting the United States to ban sale of nuclear fuel and reactor technology.
The draft, which is many respects resembles IAEA agreements with other countries, also omits a list of nuclear facilities that India has voluntarily agreed to place under IAEA safeguards, said Kimball, calling that "abnormal".
India's motives were not clear, he said, but added that it appeared "they're trying to preserve their options to put some reactors in or take some out" from IAEA scrutiny, depending on future bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements.
Nuclear Verification
The Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols
An Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities
Recommended Action
It is recommended that the Board authorize the Director General to conclude with the Government of India, and subsequently implement, the draft Safeguards Agreement reproduced in the Attachment hereto.
Atoms for Peace
GOV/2008/30 Page 1
Nuclear Verification
The Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols
An Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities
1. Referring to its desire to expand civil nuclear cooperation with other Member States of the Agency and to the relevance in this context of the understanding between India and the United States of America expressed in the India-U.S. Joint Statement of 18 July 2005, the Government of India requested the Agency to conclude with it an agreement for the application of safeguards with respect to its civilian nuclear facilities.
2. A draft safeguards agreement was accordingly negotiated with India (attached) using the relevant guidance documents that have been adopted by the Board of Governors for the purposes of concluding INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreements.
3. The draft agreement provides for the application of safeguards to facilities, nuclear material, nonnuclear material, equipment and components as set out in paragraph 11 of the agreement.
4. At the request of India the draft text includes provisions for the use of the agreement as an "umbrella agreement". Paragraph 14 thereof provides that any facility notified by India to the Agency will become subject to safeguards under this agreement. Such facilities will be listed on the Annex to the agreement, which will be published, and updated, as India notifies the Agency of additional facilities. In addition, paragraph 22 provides for the possibility of safeguarding under the agreement items that are already subject to safeguards under other Safeguards Agreements concluded by India with the Agency, subject to agreement by the parties to such other Safeguards Agreements. As a consequence, the application of safeguards under those Safeguards Agreements would be suspended for so long as this agreement remains in force.
5. Paragraph 99 provides that India shall take all suitable measures for the physical protection of facilities and nuclear material subject to the agreement, taking into account the recommendations made in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, as may be amended from time to time.
6. In paragraph 100 of the draft agreement India undertakes to establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all items subject to safeguards under the agreement, in accordance with provisions to be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
7. It will be also noted that the draft agreement includes an undertaking by India and the Agency that in the event that India decides to offer an enrichment plant in the future as a facility subject to the agreement, India and the Agency shall consult and agree on the application of the Agency's safeguards procedures before any such facility is subject to the agreement (paragraph 86).
GOV/2008/30 Page 2
8. When safeguards are applied to new facilities under this agreement, the Agency will incur additional expenses. On the assumption that 2009 will be the first year that the Agency will start implementing this agreement at new facilities, a supplementary appropriation to the regular budget will be requested as agreed by the Board of Governors at its 9 July 2007 session. The estimated cost for the first year for one new facility would be in the order of € 1.2 million.
GOV/2008/30 Attachment
Coming under attack from the opposition and its estranged Left allies over the flip-flop on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) India-specific safeguards pact, the ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) says it is ready to face parliament although it is still uncertain about winning a majority.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's government was severely criticised for approaching the IAEA board of governors Wednesday to finalise the India-specific safeguards pact, a day after External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee announced that the step would be taken only after winning the floor test in the Lok Sabha.
While the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) termed it a "midnight deceit", the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M)-led Left parties, which pulled out their support of the government over the India-US civilian nuclear deal Wednesday, said it was "expected".
The Communists alleged that there was a "communication gap" and "contradiction" between the prime minister and the external affairs minister.
"It (the government's move to approach the IAEA) is shocking. It is a betrayal to not just the Left parties but the country and the people. It is a sad state of affairs. The prime minister has to answer," CPI-M general secretary Prakash Karat told reporters here.
"The UPA has cheated the nation once again. They have lost majority as the Left has withdrawn. It is a constitutional mandate that to take the deal further they should go for a trust vote," BJP spokesperson Rajiv Pratap Rudy said.
"The Congress and the prime minister are treating it as a private agreement and deal. They are tackling it like a family affair. There is no constitutional propriety in it. They are not taking parliament and country into confidence," Rudy alleged.
However, the ruling Congress justified the move, saying there was nothing strange about the move. Party spokesperson Manish Tewari said: "This is just an extension of what the prime minister was saying. There is a fine distinction between circulation and ratification (of the draft). As far as the latter is concerned, the government is absolutely committed to what the external affairs minister has said."
The four Left parties also took strong exception to the government's argument that the IAEA safeguards pact was a "classified pact" and that it could not be made available to the Communists, who were members of the UPA-Left nuclear committee.
Mukherjee has written a letter to Communists, who had alleged that the government had hidden the text of the pact from them, that the government could not share as it was a classified document.
"Before the government released it today (Thursday) it was available on the US website. This is the plight of the country," Karat said.
The communist leader also added that the Left would "fight every step to stop this deal and make it impossible for the government to go ahead with the deal".
However, the government claims things were fine with it. According to government sources, the UPA was assured of support by 280 MPs -- eight more than the magical number 272 to prove majority in the Lok Sabha.
Manmohan Singh, who returned from Japan where he met US President George Bush, is expected to meet President Pratibha Patil Thursday evening. He is likely to convey that he would face parliament to prove majority for his coalition government.
The Indo-US civil nuclear deal provides for a consultative mechanism if termination of the pact is warranted due to any reason, including "changed security environment", apparently a fallback arrangement if New Delhi were to conduct an atomic test.
The 123 agreement, whose text was unveiled on Friday, is silent on nuclear testing by India but makes it clear that the pact will not hinder or hamper New Delhi's military nuclear programme.
The 40-year agreement, extendable by 10 years, commits the US to ensure uninterrupted fuel supplies to Indian reactors even if it terminates its cooperation and to help create strategic fuel reserve for Indian safeguarded nuclear reactors.
It makes it incumbent upon the US to work with other Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to ensure that India can have nuclear cooperation with the international community.
"Either party (country) shall have the right to terminate this agreement prior to its expiration on one year's written notice to the other party," says the 22-page text of the pact reached last month.
"A party giving notice of termination shall provide the reasons for seeking such termination," it says, adding the termination can be cancelled if the notice is withdrawn before the end of one-year notice period.
Before the agreement is terminated, the two countries "shall consider the relevant circumstances and promptly hold consultations" to "address the reasons cited by the party (country) seeking termination", it says.
Under the pact, the two countries "agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation.
"They further agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a party's (country's) serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security."
This apparently refers to a possible situation wherein India might be compelled to conduct a nuclear test if it is convinced that its security interests are threatened.
"The party (country) seeking termination (of agreement) has the right to cease further cooperation under this agreement if it determines that a mutually-acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations," the pact says.
"If a party seeking termination cites a violation of this agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, the parties (India and the US) shall consider whether the action was caused inadvertantly or otherwise and whether the violation could be considered as material," the agreement says.
"If a party, seeking termination cites a violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, a crucial factor will be whether the IAEA Board of Governors has made a finding of non-compliance," it says.
If the agreement is terminated, the US will have the right to require the return of "any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transfered" under the agreement as also any special fissionable material produced through their use.
A notice by the country that is invoking the right of return shall be delivered to the other on or before the date of termination of the agreement.
But recognising that exercising of the right of return would have "profound implications" on their relations, the two countries would undertake consultations prior to such a step.
"Such consultations shall give special consideration to the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors of the party (country) concerned with respect to the availability of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security," the agreement says.
Both countries shall "take into account the potential negative consequences of such termination on the ongoing contracts and projects initiated under the agreement of significance for respective nuclear programmes of either party."
However, if the US exercises its right of return, it shall "compensate promptly" India for the "fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal".
In Viena, A top US envoy welcomed Thursday India's decision to open up some of its civilian nuclear reactors to UN inspections as a pre-condition for a controversial nuclear cooperation deal between the United States and India.
But analysts said the so-called safeguards agreement between India and the International Atomic Energy Agency -- expected to be approved by the UN atomic watchdog's 35-member board at the end of July or early August -- contains major loopholes.
"We welcome India's willingness to move forward with this historic initiative," the US ambassador to the IAEA Gregory Schulte told journalists in a telephone conference call.
He was speaking a day after India submitted the draft safeguards agreement to the IAEA's board of governors. Their approval is one of the crucial hurdles the US-India deal must pass before it can go ahead.
Much of the restricted 23-page document, a copy of which was obtained by AFP, is in line with safeguard agreements signed between the IAEA and other countries.
But critics are worried that a clause in the agreement's preamble may make it possible for India to end inspections on certain plants and use them to manufacture fissile material for atomic weapons instead of nuclear fuel.
The draft clause states that India "may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies."
The IAEA "should clarify for the record what 'corrective actions' India might be contemplating before taking a decision on the agreement," said Daryll Kimball, executive director of the Washington-based think tank, the Arms Control Association.
"If India interprets the agreement as allowing it to remove facilities or materials from safeguards in the event of a fuel supply interruption (which would only likely happen in the event that India resumes testing), this would violate the principle of permanent safeguards over all nuclear materials and facilities."
Furthermore, the document does not contain the usual list of facilities -- 14 out of India's total 22 reactors -- to be under IAEA supervision.
Admittedly, they have been listed in a separate and widely circulated Civil Nuclear Separation Plan drawn up two years ago by India.
But eyebrows were raised by their omission in the IAEA safeguards agreement.
"It is ordinary practice that such agreement list the facility or facilities that would be covered by the agreement at the time the board of governors considers them for approval. IAEA member states should not take a decision until that list is made available," said Kimball of the Arms Control Association.
US envoy Schulte was adamant that the US-India deal "will help strengthen the global non-proliferation regime and help India meet its growing energy demands in an environmentally friendly way."
Proponents of the US-India accord say it will bring India -- which has not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) -- into the non-proliferation mainstream.
In addition, it will bring India, which is running out of uranium to fuel its reactors, into the fold of global nuclear commerce after being shut out for decades.
But critics argue the US-India deal undermines international nuclear non-proliferation efforts because it gives a country outside the NPT, and which developed atomic bombs in secret and conducted a nuclear test in 1974, access to US nuclear fuel and reactor technology.
In addition to securing IAEA approval, India must also obtain a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a group of 45 states that export nuclear fuel and technology whose rules ban trade with non-NPT states.
Finally, the US Congress must then ratify the deal.
"There is much that needs to be done," US envoy Schulte said.
"We will work closely with India, our NSG partners and the US Congress to ensure that the initiative is implemented as expeditiously as possible," he said.
The NSG is not expected to discuss an exemption to its rules for India until September and that could mean the US-India deal may not be ratified before President George W Bush leaves office in January.
Globalization
Globalization or (globalisation) in its literal sense is the process of making, transformation of some things or phenomena into global ones. It can be described as a process by which the people of the world are unified into a single society and function together. This process is a combination of economic, technological, sociocultural and political forces.[1] Globalization is often used to refer to economic globalization, that is, integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, foreign direct investment, capital flows, migration, and the spread of technology.
Indian nationalism refers to the consciousness and expression of political, social, religious and ethnic influences that help mould Indian national consciousness.
Condom
condom is a device most commonly used during sexual intercourse. It is put on a man's erect penis and physically blocks ejaculated semen from entering the body of a sexual partner. Condoms are used to prevent pregnancy and transmission of sexually transmitted diseases (STDs—such as gonorrhea, syphilis, and HIV). Because condoms are waterproof, elastic, and durable, they are also used in a variety of secondary applications. These range from creating waterproof microphones to protecting rifle barrels from clogging.
Most condoms are made from latex, but some are made from other materials. A female condom is also available. As a method of contraception, male condoms have the advantage of being inexpensive, easy to use, having few side-effects, and of offering protection against sexually transmitted diseases.[1][2] With proper knowledge and application technique—and use at every act of intercourse—users of male condoms experience a 2% per-year pregnancy rate.[3]
Condoms have been used for at least 400 years.[4] Since the nineteenth century, they have been one of the most popular methods of contraception in the world.[5] While widely accepted in modern times, condoms have generated some controversy. Improper disposal of condoms contributes to litter problems, and the Roman Catholic Church generally opposes condom use
Indian Nationalism
Indian Nationalism describes the many underlying forces that moulded the Indian independence movement, and strongly continue to influence the politics of India, as well as being the heart of many contrasting ideologies that have caused ethnic and religious conflict in Indian society. It should be noted that Indian nationalism often imbibes the consciousness of Indians that prior to 1947, India embodied the broader Indian subcontinent and influenced a part of Asia, known as Greater India.
Sovereignty is the exclusive right to have control over an area of governance, people, or oneself. A sovereign is the supreme lawmaking authority. Enlightenment philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in Book III, Chapter III of his 1762 treatise Of the Social Contract, argued, "the growth of the State giving the trustees of public authority more and means to abuse their power, the more the Government has to have force to contain the people, the more force the Sovereign should have in turn in order to contain the Government," with the understanding that the Sovereign is "a collective being" (Book II, Chapter I) resulting from "the general will" of the people, and that "what any man, whoever he may be, orders on his own, is not a law" (Book II, Chapter VI) – and furthermore predicated on the assumption that the people have an unbiased means by which to ascertain the general will. Thus the legal maxim, "there is no law without a sovereign."
In this model, national sovereignty is of an eternal origin, such as nature, or a god, legitimizing the divine right of kings in absolute monarchies or a theocracy.
A more formal distinction is whether the law is held to be sovereign, which constitutes a true state of law: the letter of the law (if constitutionally correct) is applicable and enforceable, even when against the political will of the nation, as long as not formally changed following the constitutional procedure. Strictly speaking, any deviation from this principle constitutes a revolution or a coup d'état, regardless of the intentions.
In constitutional and international law, the concept also pertains to a government possessing full control over its own affairs within a territorial or geographical area or limit, and in certain context to various organs possessing legal jurisdiction in their own chief, rather than by mandate or under supervision. Determining whether a specific entity is sovereign is not an exact science, but often a matter of diplomatic dispute.
Nationality
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Nationality is a relationship between a person and their state of origin, culture, association, affiliation and/or loyalty. Nationality affords the state jurisdiction over the person, and affords the person the protection of the state.
Traditionally under international law and conflict of laws principles, it is the right of each state to determine who its nationals are. Today the law of nationality is increasingly coming under more international regulation by various conventions on statelessness, as well as some multilateral treaties such as the European Convention on Nationality.
Generally, nationality is established at birth by a child's place of birth (jus soli) and/or bloodline (jus sanguinis). Nationality may also be acquired later in life through naturalization. Corporations, ships, and other legal persons also have a nationality, generally in the state under whose laws the legal person was formed.
The legal sense of nationality, particularly in the English speaking world, may often mean citizenship, although they do not mean the same thing everywhere in the world; for instance, in the UK, citizenship is a branch of nationality which in turn ramifies to include other subcategories (see British nationality law). Citizens have rights to participate in the political life of the state of which they are a citizen, such as by voting or standing for election. Nationals need not immediately have these rights; they may often acquire them in due time.
Nationality can also mean membership in a cultural/historical group related to political or national identity, even if it currently lacks a formal state. This meaning is said by some authorities to cover many groups, including Kurds, Basques, Catalans, English, Welsh, Scots, Palestinians, Tamils, Quebecers and many others.
Nation state
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from Nation-state)
The nation state is a certain form of state that gets its legitimacy from serving as a sovereign entity for a nation as a sovereign territorial unit. The state is a political and geopolitical entity; the nation is a cultural and/or ethnic entity. The term "nation state" implies that they geographically coincide, and this distinguishes the nation state from the other types of state, which historically preceded it. If successfully implemented, this implies that the citizens share a common language, culture, and values — which was not the case in many historical states. A world of nation states also implements the claim to self-determination and autonomy for every nation, a central theme of the ideology of nationalism. (For ambiguities in the usage of terms such as nation, international, state, and country, see Nation).
Nationalism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Nationalism is a term referring to a doctrine[1] or political movement[2] that holds a nation, usually defined in terms of ethnicity or culture, has the right to constitute an independent or autonomous political community based on a shared history and common destiny.[3] Most nationalists believe the borders of the state should be congruent with the borders of the nation (A Nation-State).[4]
Nationalist efforts such as those propagated by fascist movements in the twentieth century, held the nationalist concept that nationality is the most important aspect of one's identity, while some of them have attempted to define the nation in terms of race or genetics. Some contemporary nationalists reject the racist chauvinism of these groups, and remain confident that national identity supersedes biological attachment to an ethnic group.
Nationalism has had an enormous influence on Modern history, in which the nation-state has become the preferred form of societal organization, however, by no means universal. Historians use the term nationalism to refer to this historical transition and to the emergence and predominance of nationalist ideology. Nationalism is closely associated with patriotism.
IAEA pact unveiled, strong on fuel guarantees
10 Jul, 2008, 1647 hrs IST, IANS
NEW DELHI : The government on Thursday unveiled the draft of the India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA that meets three of its key concerns: uninterrupted fuel supply for its reactors, strategic fuel reserve, and right to take corrective steps if fuel supply is disrupted.
The safeguards text, finalised early this year after several rounds of negotiations between Indian officials and the IAEA secretariat, provides for "reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access" to the international fuel market after New Delhi puts its identified civilian facilities under permanent safeguards.
The agreement, which recognizes India's unique status as de facto nuclear weapon power, also meets its key demand in so far as it allows New Delhi the right to take "take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of fuel supplies".
The conclusion of the IAEA pact will pave the way for a consideration by the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to allow the resumption of global civil nuclear commerce with India. The IAEA board is expected to meet in Vienna July 28 to decide on ratification of the India-specific safeguards pact.
The agreement also "supports an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over a lifetime of India's reactors".
This clause could come in handy for India if it decides to conduct a nuclear test leading to suspension of global civil nuclear cooperation as it gives New Delhi freedom to take "corrective action".
The safeguards pact leaves India's military facilities out of its purview, but seeks an undertaking from India not to divert reactors and fuel bought from the international market for military use.
Although the IAEA is not a guarantor of fuel supply, the text of this agreement has broken new ground by recognising the unique nature of India's nuclear programme that require a separation of civilian and military facilities and provides assurance for "reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations".
The agreement, the text notes, provides assurance against any withdrawal of the safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use by India.
The draft text envisages India placing 14 of its civilian nuclear reactors in phases in return for global civil nuclear cooperation.
India's civilian and military nuclear facilities will be separated in accordance with the March 2, 2006 separation plan agreed between New Delhi and Washington.
According to the text, India has stated "its willingness to file with the agency a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities and to place volunatarily its civilian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards".
The government made the contentious text public after giving a green signal to the IAEA to submit it to the agency's 35-member board in Vienna for ratification Wednesday night, and after some US websites put it up earlier.
The government decision to unveil the text surprised many. Only two days ago it had insisted that the text couldn't be shared with its Communist allies because it was a privileged document between the Indian government and the IAEA secretariat.
The government on Thursday also announced that it would approach the IAEA for ratification of the pact only after it wins a trust vote in parliament.
New Delhi's decision to approach the UN nuclear watchdog came hours after the meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President George W. Bush on the sidelines of the G8 summit in Japan. The IAEA board will meet on July 28 and decide on the ratification of the safeguards agreement.
The draft text makes it clear that the safeguards will become operational only after "the conclusion of international cooperation arrangements creating necessary conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in several nations".
According to the draft, India has said that none of the items produced in the safeguarded facilities will be used for manufacturing any nuclear weapon or to further any military purpose.
The text makes it clear that India's decision to place its civilian nuclear facilities under safeguards will not detract from its commitment to "the full development of its national three-stage programme".
The safeguards text recognises India as "a state with advanced nuclear technology", which has "a sovereign and inalienable right to carry out nuclear research and development activities for the welfare of its people and other peaceful purposes".
The safeguards text clarifies that India is entering into this agreement with the IAEA and its member states with "the objective of the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes on a stable, reliable and predictable basis".
The proposed pact also assures India that in the course of implementing the safeguards agreement, it would "protect commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to its knowledge".
'IAEA safeguards applies only to civilian nuke facilities'
New Delhi (PTI): The IAEA safeguards agreement were put on the MEA website to ensure transparency, said Anil Kakodkar.
He said that once the agreement process was completed with IAEA it was decided to make it public.
The safeguards condition applies only to civilian nuclear facilities, said Kakodkar.
Kakodkar added that India-specific Safeguards Agreement will not affect domestic nuclear technology development programme.
He also said that India-specific Safeguards Agreement the first of its kind.
He stated that the draft safeguards agreement allows India to proceed step-by-step after ensuring that the nuclear cooperation has indeed opened up.
He said that draft of agreements cannot be changed. The Indian Atomic Energy Act not to undergo any change, Kakodkar said.
Kakodkar also added that if amendments are suggested by US Congress, then the civil nuclear deal could be re-evaluated and the Indian interests will be protected.
Draft Safeguards Agreement with IAEA - Full Text
Text of Left parties' statement on withdrawal of support to UPA Govt
Deal important for both India and US: Bush
India hopeful of China’s support
Left: why keep draft text of IAEA Safeguards Agreement secret?
It’s a privileged document, says Congress
Arms expert claims some flaws in India's safeguarads text
Washington (PTI): A leading US Arms expert has picked holes in the draft nuclear safeguards accord submitted by India to IAEA saying there are some clauses which may raise questions on the effectiveness of the nuclear watchdog to monitor the country's civilian nuclear programme.
Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, said the provisions needed clarity before the IAEA gives its seal of approval to the safeguards pact which is the next step in the operationalisation of the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal. The draft was circulated to IAEA's Board of Governors in Vienna on Wednesday.
Though much of the 23-page document is in line with other standard safeguard agreements. Kimball especially picked out the clause in the draft which said India "may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies."
Kimball said this provision could open the possibility of restricting IAEA monitoring of the country's civilian atomic power programme.
"The board should ask what 'corrective measures' are supposed to mean," Kimball said, adding, it could mean "we will withdraw from safeguards those facilities that we need to withdraw from and we will use in those facilities other, unsupervised fuel sources."
-8 Summit Highlights Disparities About Global Warming
By Kurt Achin
Rusutsu, Japan
10 July 2008
Achin report - Download (MP3)
Achin report - Listen (MP3)
This week's summit of advanced economy leaders in Japan produced first steps toward a global climate agreement. However, it also spotlighted gaps on the issue both between rich and poor nations and between the world's biggest polluters and several nations who are rapidly catching up. VOA's Kurt Achin has more from Hokkaido, Japan.
Tradition and policy prohibit the host country of the so-called "G-8" summit from naming specific leaders when briefing the media about summit discussions. However, Japanese Foreign Ministry Press Secretary Kazuo Kodama could easily have been citing the leaders of India or China in the week's key climate meeting.
"One leader mentioned that, 'We have a great many people living in poverty," said Kodama. "We cannot accept measures that would hinder our economic growth.'"
That is the key dilemma leaders of the richest nations in the world confronted this week in seeking support among leaders of emerging economies for their "vision" to reduce carbon emissions by 50 percent by the year 2050.
Rich nations have enjoyed unprecedented prosperity using fossil fuels and have been the biggest emitters of carbon pollution from the past. China and India's emerging economies, and the more than two billion people living in them, stand to become the biggest emitters of the future.
Hindu devotees offer prayers in the polluted water, as polythene bags and garbage is littered on the banks of River Ganges (File)
There is wide agreement any deal on reducing the carbon emissions that cause global warming is doomed to fail without emerging economies on board. However, with hundreds of millions of people living in abject poverty, China and India say the immediate need for basic human services, like sanitation, outweighs concerns about carbon emissions. They say the rich nations that made the carbon mess should take bold action first to start cleaning it up.
This week's 50 percent reduction pledge is vague about how to start that cleanup. It does not specify a base year for calculating the 50 percent, nor does it include any numerical reduction targets.
Ben Wikler represents the non-governmental advocacy group, Avaaz.org. He says the G-8 leaders had a major opportunity, but "blew it."
"What the G-8 could have done is to seize leadership and say, 'hey, world. Let's take this thing on. Here's some numbers we're going to go at. The rich countries are going to do their part, come along with us.'"
Max Lawson, a policy advisor for Oxfam International, agrees the deal is weak, but says the fact the United States signed on is significant.
"Three or four years ago, President Bush was saying global warming didn't exist. So, in relation to that, we have seen quite a lot of movement. But in relation to what's needed, it's way, way, off the mark," said Lawson.
Lawson says the United States emits about four times more carbon, per capita, than China. Alden Meyer is an environmental specialist with the Union of Concerned Scientists. He says rich nations are wrong to shift the burden for global warming onto developing countries.
"China, for example, has fuel economy standards for new vehicles in place today that are stronger than the ones [the U.S.] Congress adopted for 2020," said Meyer. "So, there's a lot happening in these countries that belies the rhetoric that they're doing nothing and just sitting back."
Scientists warn the threat of global warming is urgent and that aggressive and specific cuts in emissions are needed long before 2050 to curb its negative effects on world weather patterns and food production. They suggest 80-95 percent cuts by 2050 and 25 to 40 percent cuts by 2020.
This week's agreement states that shorter range cuts are needed, but leaves the specifics up for interpretation by individual countries.
Some observers are criticizing the G-8 as ineffective in dealing with climate change. Philip Clapp, with the American-based Pew Environmental Group, disagrees, saying the annual gathering still has a role to play.
"The decisions that have to be made in re-engineering the entire world's energy economy are not decisions that can be taken by environment ministers," said Clapp. "The G-8 [meeting] is the only time that world leaders get together and look each other in the eye and recognize that they have to address global problems. And, they have to address them together."
Still, the lack of specificity in this week's climate vision means the hard talk about targets is left for future meetings, especially a United Nations-led climate agreement conference scheduled for late next year.
US Increases Security in Persian Gulf as Iran Tests More Missiles
By VOA News
10 July 2008
In a handout released on the news website of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, long- and medium-range missiles rise into the air after being test-fired at an undisclosed location in Iran, 09 Jul 2008
The United States says it has increased its security presence in the Persian Gulf, as Iran tests a barrage of missiles.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned Iran Thursday, that Washington will not hesitate to defend its interests or its allies against any aggression.
Speaking in Georgia's capital, Tbilisi, Rice said the U.S. is working closely with its allies to make sure they can defend themselves. She did not offer further details.
Iran tested missiles that could reach as far as Israel on Wednesday, then launched another round of medium and long-range missiles early Thursday.
Iran says the exercises show it can defend itself against an attack by Israel or the United States.
Israeli officials say they are concerned Iran's missiles could be equipped with nuclear warheads.
Israel has grown increasingly alarmed about Iran's nuclear program since late 2005, when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad threatened to wipe the Jewish state "off the map."
Israel has threatened a preemptive strike if sanctions fail to stop Iran's uranium enrichment, a key part of nuclear bomb making.
In a show of strength Thursday, Israel publicly displayed its newest spy plane equipped with sophisticated intelligence-gathering technology and electronic warfare systems.
Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, but the U.S. and other Western countries worry Iran is trying to build nuclear weapons.
Some information for this report was provided by AFP.
Pakistani Government Strikes New Truce Deal With Militants
By Barry Newhouse
Islamabad
10 July 2008
Pakistan's government has reached a new peace agreement aimed at stopping a militant group from threatening the northwestern city Peshawar. VOA's Barry Newhouse reports from Islamabad on the latest in a series of controversial agreements that critics say have mainly strengthened pro-Taliban fighters in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Government representatives released details of the agreement on Thursday, after tribal leaders agreed to guarantee that the local extremist group would leave a key town just outside the provincial capital Peshawar and stop hostilities against the government.
Tribal elder Malik Hashim was a member of the delegation and spoke to VOA by telephone from Khyber agency, where the talks took place.
He said the leader, Mangal Bagh, promised that his people will not attack official government offices or paramilitary forces in both the settled and rural areas of Khyber.
Pakistani paramilitary solider stands guard in Pakistan's tribal area of Khyber near Peshawar, 28 Jun 2008
Pakistani paramilitary forces launched operations in Khyber in late June after locals complained bands of extremist fighters had moved into settled areas and began harassing people and enforcing strict moral codes. There were also increased sightings of Taliban militants in Peshawar during this time.
The paramilitary forces met little resistance but have since stayed in the region during the talks to provide security. The head of Pakistan's interior ministry, Rehman Malik, said Thursday that some of those troops would now begin leaving.
He said not all of the paramilitary forces will withdraw - those who remain will ensure the militants do not return.
Afghan, NATO and U.S. officials have been critical of similar peace agreements the Pakistani government has struck in recent months, saying withdrawing troops and striking peace deals have mainly allowed Taliban fighters safe refuge to launch attacks in Afghanistan.
Most of the concern has focused on militants in North and South Waziristan, where Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud has vowed to launch attacks on coalition forces in Afghanistan. In Khyber agency, northeast of Waziristan, there has been concern over militants threatening an important overland transit route for commercial trade as well as supplies for NATO forces in Afghanistan.
Rice Warns Iran That U.S. Will Defend Allies
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/11/world/middleeast/11iran.html?ref=middleeast
By MICHAEL SCHWIRTZ and ALAN COWELL
Published: July 11, 2008
MOSCOW — The confrontation between Tehran and Washington seemed to sharpen on Thursday as Iran said it tested missiles for a second day and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said the United States would defend its allies and protect its interests against an attack.
The Lede: In an Iranian Image, a Missile Too Many (July 10, 2008) Ms. Rice was speaking in the former Soviet republic of Georgia at the end of a three-day tour of Eastern Europe. Shortly after she spoke, state-run media in Iran began reporting the new missile tests, which followed a warning from an Iranian official earlier this week that Tehran would strike Tel Aviv and United States interests if Washington attacked it first.
Iranian state television showed a missile blasting off in darkness, trailed by a fiery exhaust plume. The television said the new tests took place during the night into Thursday. A commander in the Revolutionary Guards had said earlier that night missile maneuvers would take place but did not give details.
“Deep in the Persian Gulf waters, the launch of different types of ground-to-sea, surface-to-surface, sea-to-air and the powerful launch of the Hoot missile successfully took place,” state radio said, without giving further details of the missiles. The missile’s name is sometimes spelled Hout.
The Iranian satellite channel Press-TV said Hoot was a torpedo, Reuters reported.
The latest tests came a day after Iran said it test-fired nine missiles, including one with the range to strike Israel.
At a news conference in Georgia with President Mikheil Saakashvili, Ms. Rice declared:
“We will defend our interests and defend our allies.”
“We take very, very strongly our obligations to defend our allies and no one should be confused of that,” she said.
The remarks come amid increasingly tense exchanges between Iran and the United States over Iran’s civilian nuclear program, which Washington and many Western governments have warned could be used to cloak the development of a nuclear weapon, a charge Tehran has denied repeatedly.
The United States has hinted that it could use military force against Iran, but officials have made diplomacy a priority. Negotiations between Iran and the West on Iran’s nuclear ambitions are scheduled to resume this month.
Washington has been pushing the deployment of an antiballistic missile shield in Eastern Europe that officials say will help defend against a possible missile attack from Iran. Ms. Rice was in the Czech Republic on Tuesday, where she signed a landmark agreement to allow the Pentagon to begin construction of the first elements of this system.
The accord provoked strong criticism from Russia, which has said that the system could undermine Russia’s nuclear response capabilities. After the signing, Moscow threatened to respond militarily if the missile shield is deployed.
Ms. Rice’s remarks seemed to go further than comments on Wednesday by Gordon D. Johndroe, the deputy White House press secretary, who said in a statement at the Group of 8 meeting in Japan that Iran’s development of ballistic missiles was a violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions.
He urged Iran’s leaders to “refrain from further missile tests if they truly seek to gain the trust of the world,” and said, “The Iranians should stop the development of ballistic missiles which could be used as a delivery vehicle for a potential nuclear weapon immediately.”
Some in the United States saw the Iranian tests on Wednesday as essentially deterrent in nature. A senior American intelligence official said the missile tests, together with belligerent comments by Iranian officials, seemed part of a strategy to warn Iran’s neighbors of its “capacity to inflict pain.”
“I think Iran has a hedgehog strategy: mess with me and you’ll get stuck,” said the official, Thomas Fingar, the deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and head of the National Intelligence Council, during remarks at the Center for National Policy, in Washington.
Iran’s Arabic-language Al Alam television said the missiles launched on Wednesday included a “Shahab-3 with a conventional warhead weighing one ton and a 2,000-kilometer range,” about 1,250 miles. Cairo, Athens, Istanbul, New Delhi and the Arabian peninsula are within that distance of Iranian territory.
Iranian television showed what appeared to be two Shahabs lifting off within seconds of each other.
“That’s surprising,” Charles P. Vick, an expert on the Iranian rocket program at GlobalSecurity.org, a research group in Alexandria, Va., said in a telephone interview. “Historically, it’s always been single launches.”
Mr. Vick added, however, that the Shahab display might be less formidable than Iran had claimed. The missile’s conic warhead appeared to resemble an older Shahab model with a range of about 1,500 kilometers, or about 900 miles, rather than the newest one.
The Iranians fired their first Shahab a decade ago, Mr. Vick said, and are now replacing all models with a more advanced missile that burns solid propellants, which are considered better for quick launchings.
Hossein Salami, a commander of the Revolutionary Guards, was quoted as saying: “The aim of these war games is to show we are ready to defend the integrity of the Iranian nation.”
Michael Shwirtz reported from Moscow, and Alan Cowell from Paris. Reporting was contributed by William J. Broad from New York, Myra Noveck from Jerusalem, Sheryl Gay Stolberg from Rusutsu, Japan, and Mark Mazzetti from Washington.
More Articles in World »
Indo-US deal and Muslims
BY AIJAZ ZAKA SYED (View from Dubai)
10 July 2008 Print E-mail
As the debate over India's controversial nuclear deal with the United States heats up, a new and totally unexpected angle has been added to the controversy: Whether the deal is "anti-Muslim" and if the Muslims, India's largest minority and the world's largest Muslim population, support or oppose the accord with the US.
So the poor Indian Muslim, who often keeps his head down and is ever grateful for the empty rhetoric and promises of calculating politicians, finds himself yet again at the heart of the so-called petty vote bank politics.
From Congress politicians like Salman Khurshed to media pundits like Barkha Dutt, just about everybody seems to be debating if the nuclear accord with Washington is acceptable to Indian Muslims or not.
Mulayam Singh Yadav, a veteran North Indian politician who once claimed to champion the cause of the religious minority and took pride in being called Maulana Mulayam, is making much song and dance about "protecting the interests" of his Muslim constituency.
Mulayam's Samajwadi Party consulted experts and community leaders like the illustrious former president and father of India's nuclear-missile programme Dr APJ Kalam before coming forward to rescue the governing Congress Party. After the Left parties walked out of the coalition protesting the nuclear deal, the Samajwadis have offered their own crutches to prop up the government tottering on the brink.
What I find most amusing about this whole debate is the hypocrisy of politicians like Mulayam and the pretension that the Indian government and leaders somehow make their policies and decisions, as crucial as these, in accordance with the wishes and concerns of the Muslim community.
Frankly speaking, who gives a damn what Indian Muslim thinks? Not this government. For that matter, no government in the past has ever lost any sleep over the sentiments of the 200-million-strong Muslim community.
The Muslim sentiments were hardly of any concern to the government of Narasimha Rao when it went ahead ignoring the community's protests — and those of others — to establish full-fledged diplomatic relations with Israel.
In any case, who are we to protest India's love affair with Israel when many Arab and Muslim countries are bending over backwards to hug our Zionist friends?
Returning to the US deal, many in the Muslim community have been alarmed by the Indian media's dangerous attempts to give a religious spin to the issue. The other day my talented friend, Barkha Dutt of NDTV, hosted a very lively debate on the US deal and how Muslims look at the whole business.
And everyone involved obsessed over the so-called Muslim stance on the issue as if it was crucial to the success or failure of nuclear arrangement with the US.
No wonder the Muslims are concerned. Given the long history of such innocuous issues turning into explosives in the hands of militant anti-Muslim organisations such as Shiv Sena and RSS-VHP-BJP combine, their concern is not unjustified.
Alarmed by the dangerous direction the whole debate has taken, and even as the Congress-led government fights for survival thanks to Manmohan's delusions of grandeur, Muslim organisations and groups are trying hard to distance themselves from the issue.
Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind, a staunch Congress ally, has passed a resolution dissociating the Muslim community from the controversy. The organisation, which played a leading role in the struggle for India's independence, has condemned political parties for using the issue for Muslim vote bank.
The party has reasonably argued that the decision if the deal is in national interest or not is for the country's leaders and scientists to decide. A party functionary, Kalimullah Khan Quasmi, has complained that there is a concerted effort to link the deal with the Muslim vote bank. "This is not a religious issue," pointed out Quasmi.
Exactly! What has a nuclear deal between India and the US got to do with the Muslims and their religious convictions? And why those opposed to the deal are doing so in the name of Muslims? And for God's sake, don't give us this crap about secularism.
This has nothing to do with Samajwadis' endless love for Muslims either.
That said, I believe the Muslims as well as other communities in India must oppose this unholy nuclear alliance with the neocons. Not because this accord is against the Muslims, as some of our politician friends in their excessive enthusiasm seem to suggest, but because this is against India's long-term interests.
I am no expert on nuclear energy or finer points of strategic cooperation between the two nuclear weapons states like India and the US. I don't know and I don't care if this will help India meet its growing energy needs, as some enthusiastic supporters of the arrangement claim.
All I know is this is a well-calibrated plot by big powers to ensnare and use the world's largest democracy to promote their own agenda.
India's enterprising Muslim community does not have to withdraw itself into its defensive shell if it is being dragged into this debate. Indian Muslim does NOT have to be apologetic in opposing this deal because this country belongs to him as much as it does to the next Indian.
In fact, anyone who really cares for this great country should and would oppose this dubious deal.
We must oppose this arrangement for two reasons:
First and foremost, this deal will undermine and compromise India's historical independence and political sovereignty. I am not suggesting that by inking this pact, India will become a US colony and White House will station its viceroy in Delhi.
But by offering this carrot, the reigning superpower is seeking to enlist Gandhi's nation as a client state and as a junior cop to police this part of the world.
Having given up on an increasingly hostile and unpredictable Pakistan, the US badly needs India to contain emerging China on the one hand and the Islamists of Iran and Central Asia on the other.
More importantly, there is now evidence to suggest that the US neocons and the Zionists are trying to form an axis of the US, Israel and India to check the rising force of Islam.
It's a grand conspiracy against the Muslim world as well as India. I call it a conspiracy because India and Muslim world have been historically close allies and friends. These are ties that are as old as Islam. In fact, they go way back in time — long before the advent of Islam. And India has been a home of Islam and Muslims for more than a millennium.
This is perhaps why the inimitable Iqbal called India 'saare jahaan se achha' (best in the whole world). And the neocons and Zionists want to sabotage this historical relationship.
Secondly, this opportunistic alliance goes against everything that secular and democratic India has believed in and championed; ideals like peace, non-violence, non-alignment and always, always standing with the disadvantaged, oppressed and the vulnerable people everywhere.
This is why the world looked to India for leadership even when it was not a nuclear power and half of its population lived below the so-called poverty line.
Which is why it's a tragic irony that the party that once led the struggle for India's independence should now be seeking to enslave this great land once again.
It is time for the Indians to decide whether they want to continue leading the world as a peaceful and progressive nation of Gandhi and Nehru or want to end up as yet another Third World colony of Pax Americana.
Aijaz Zaka Syed is a senior editor of Khaleej Times. The views expressed here are his own. Write to him at aijazsyed@khaleej
July 9, 2008, 4:10 pm
Manmohan Singh wins the first stage of his nuke gamble
http://ridingtheelephant.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2008/07/09/manmohan-singh-wins-the-first-stage-of-his-nuke-gamble/
At last, he has done it - after looking like a weak prime minister of India for most of his four years in the job, Manmohan Singh has exerted some authority and forced his Congress Party-led government to go ahead on its long-delayed, proposed nuclear deal with the United States. In the process, he has driven Communist-led Leftist parties from their government-supporting role and is actively courting new allies so that the administration can stay in power.
This has been going through the works for the past week or so, but was visibly confirmed today in Toyako when, on the margins of the G8 meeting, Singh discussed with President George W. Bush how the deal can be brought to conclusion before the U.S. elections in November.
“I am very pleased with the state of our relationship, which has truly acquired the characteristic of a genuine strategic partnership,” Singh said after the meeting, using words that underlined the main point on which the anti-U.S. Leftist parties base their opposition to the deal. He had threatened not to go to the G8 meeting if he did not have the draft deal in his pocket.
India’s next step is to seek approval from the United Nations’ Geneva-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which confirmed today that the deal’s draft nuclear safeguards have been submitted to the agency’s board of governors. There have been reports that it will be formally considered on July 28.
Then India will need approval from the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), where there might be some opposition because India has not signed the international nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and finally approval from the U.S. Congress. There will be opponents at each stage - including China at the IAEA and NSG.
The government is pinning its not unrealistic hopes of survival on support from the Uttar Pradesh-based Samajwadi Party, which has suddenly become a friend of the Congress Party after four years of bitter personal animosity between its leaders and Sonia Gandhi, who heads the Congress Party and governing coalition.
But the Samajwadi’s 39 MPs will not be sufficient on their own to make up for the 59 Leftists, so the government is pulling in other smaller parties to make up the numbers. Some of the 39 are showing signs of defecting and other parties are playing hard-to-get. Extensive horse-trading in terms of personal favors, policy changes, election deals, and what are euphemistically called “suitcases” (of money) is already under way to secure the votes.
The support will probably be tested in a parliamentary confidence vote sometime in the next two weeks so that Singh can demonstrate he heads a stable administration in advance of the IAEA formal meeting. President Pratibha Patil is meeting Singh on July 10 to discuss a confidence vote.
If the government were defeated, India would have an early general election - maybe in November - instead of on its due date of April-May next year.
The deal would lead to contracts worth billions of dollars for European and U.S. nuclear power companies, with France and Russia currently in the lead alongside the United States. Slowly, it would help India to expand its currently tiny nuclear power generation at the same time as maintaining a controversial nuclear weapons program.
Singh is probably privately pleased to be rid of the Leftists. In addition to trying to scupper the nuclear deal, they have blocked many economic policies including cutting subsidies, allow foreign direct investment in general retailing and in defense manufacturing, as well as raising foreign investment limits in insurance companies.
The Left’s exit does not mean that all these policies will now be implemented. In each case, it has been allied with vested interests such as big Indian retail groups and the defense establishment which still wield blocking power.
Some people however will benefit quickly. Anil Ambani, who heads ADAG Reliance companies is close to Samajwadi leaders and has lost out to his rival brother, Mukesh Ambani who runs the RIL Reliance companies, while the Samajwadi has been at loggerheads with Gandhi. He might well now find it easier to iron out any foreign direct investment wrinkles on his proposed merger with MTN, the South African telecoms company, and he might also gain an advantage on other government projects.
It has always been arguable whether the deal is good for India because, as the Left and others say, there is a serious risk that India will have to toe the U.S. line on foreign policy. That would be tested quickly if the international confrontation with Iran escalates because India does not believe in the use of force against its ally.
Most of the nuclear power gains will take many years to be realized, although India’s current nuclear power stations will be able to obtain supplies of much needed uranium. There will be other gains for Indian companies involved in nuclear-linked technology because they will find it easier to obtain components, and tender for contracts, internationally.
But before all this can happen, the government has to get through the next couple of weeks and prove it has a parliamentary majority. My bet is that it will succeed - although it will probably be a last minute cliff-hanger as potential supporters hold out for as many benefits as possible.
Thursday, July 10, 2008
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE
Board of Governors
GOV
/2008/30
Date: 9 July 2008
Restricted Distribution
Original: English
For official use only
Nuclear Verification
The Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and
Additional Protocols
An Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of
Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities
Recommended Action
•
It is recommended that the Board authorize the Director General to conclude with the
Government of India, and subsequently implement, the draft Safeguards Agreement reproduced
in the Attachment hereto.
Atoms for Peace
GOV/2008/30
Page 1
Nuclear Verification
The Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and
Additional Protocols
An Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of
Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities
1. Referring to its desire to expand civil nuclear cooperation with other Member States of the
Agency and to the relevance in this context of the understanding between India and the United States
of America expressed in the India-U.S. Joint Statement of 18 July 2005, the Government of India
requested the Agency to conclude with it an agreement for the application of safeguards with respect
to its civilian nuclear facilities.
2. A draft safeguards agreement was accordingly negotiated with India (attached) using the relevant
guidance documents that have been adopted by the Board of Governors for the purposes of concluding
INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreements.
3. The draft agreement provides for the application of safeguards to facilities, nuclear material, nonnuclear
material, equipment and components as set out in paragraph 11 of the agreement.
4. At the request of India the draft text includes provisions for the use of the agreement as an
"umbrella agreement". Paragraph 14 thereof provides that any facility notified by India to the Agency
will become subject to safeguards under this agreement. Such facilities will be listed on the Annex to
the agreement, which will be published, and updated, as India notifies the Agency of additional
facilities. In addition, paragraph 22 provides for the possibility of safeguarding under the agreement
items that are already subject to safeguards under other Safeguards Agreements concluded by India
with the Agency, subject to agreement by the parties to such other Safeguards Agreements. As a
consequence, the application of safeguards under those Safeguards Agreements would be suspended
for so long as this agreement remains in force.
5. Paragraph 99 provides that India shall take all suitable measures for the physical protection of
facilities and nuclear material subject to the agreement, taking into account the recommendations
made in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, as may be amended from time to time.
6. In paragraph 100 of the draft agreement India undertakes to establish and maintain a system of
accounting for and control of all items subject to safeguards under the agreement, in accordance with
provisions to be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
7. It will be also noted that the draft agreement includes an undertaking by India and the Agency
that in the event that India decides to offer an enrichment plant in the future as a facility subject to the
agreement, India and the Agency shall consult and agree on the application of the Agency’s safeguards
procedures before any such facility is subject to the agreement (paragraph 86).
GOV/2008/30
Page 2
8. When safeguards are applied to new facilities under this agreement, the Agency will incur
additional expenses. On the assumption that 2009 will be the first year that the Agency will start
implementing this agreement at new facilities, a supplementary appropriation to the regular budget
will be requested as agreed by the Board of Governors at its 9 July 2007 session. The estimated cost
for the first year for one new facility would be in the order of € 1.2 million.
GOV/2008/30
Attachment
DRAFT
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO CIVILIAN
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
RECOGNIZING the significance India attaches to civilian nuclear energy as an efficient,
clean and sustainable energy source for meeting global energy demand, in particular for meeting
India’s growing energy needs;
WHEREAS India is committed to the full development of its national three-stage nuclear
programme to meet the twin challenges of energy security and protection of the environment;
WHEREAS India has a sovereign and inalienable right to carry out nuclear research and
development activities for the welfare of its people and other peaceful purposes;
WHEREAS India, a State with advanced nuclear technology, wishes to expand civil
nuclear cooperation for its national development;
WHEREAS India is desirous of further expanding cooperation with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") and its Member States with the
objective of the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, on a stable, reliable
and predictable basis;
WHEREAS India supports the role of the Agency in the promotion of the safe and
peaceful uses of nuclear energy as set forth in the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the
"Statute");
WHEREAS India and the Agency have long standing cooperation in various aspects of
the Agency’s activities;
RECOGNIZING that such cooperation between India and the Agency must be carried
out with full respect for the objectives of the Statute and with due observance of the sovereign rights
of India;
WHEREAS the Statute authorizes the Agency to apply safeguards, at the request of the
parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State to any of the State’s
activities in the field of atomic energy and, in this context:
Noting the relevance for this Agreement of the understandings between India and the
United States of America expressed in the India-U.S. Joint Statement of 18 July 2005,
in which India, inter alia, has stated its willingness:
•
to identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes
in a phased manner;
2
•
to file with the Agency a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities
(hereinafter referred to as "the Declaration");
•
to take a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency
safeguards;
Noting also for the purposes of this Agreement that:
•
India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards so as to
facilitate full civil nuclear cooperation between India and Member States of the
Agency and to provide assurance against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear
material from civilian use at any time;
•
An essential basis of India’s concurrence to accept Agency safeguards under an
India-specific safeguards agreement (hereinafter referred to as "this Agreement")
is the conclusion of international cooperation arrangements creating the necessary
conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including
reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in
several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic
reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime
of India’s reactors; and
•
India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its
civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies;
WHEREAS India is desirous of expanding civil nuclear cooperation with other Member
States of the Agency;
WHEREAS the conclusion of this Agreement is intended to facilitate the broadest
possible cooperation between India and Member States of the Agency in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy and ensure international participation in the further development of India’s civilian nuclear
programme on a sustained and long–term basis;
RECALLING that the Agency in accordance with its Statute and safeguards system must
take into account, in the implementation of safeguards in India, the need to avoid hampering the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, economic and technological development or international
cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; respect health, safety and physical
protection and related security provisions in force in India; and take every precaution to protect
commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to
its knowledge;
WHEREAS the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Agreement shall be
kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of effective and efficient Agency safeguards;
WHEREAS India has requested the Agency to apply safeguards with respect to items
subject to this Agreement;
WHEREAS the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the
"Board") acceded to that request on …………;
NOW THEREFORE, taking into account the above, India and the Agency have agreed as
follows:
3
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS
1. India undertakes that none of the items subject to this Agreement, as defined in paragraph 11,
shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose
and that such items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the
manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.
2. The Agency undertakes to apply safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, to
the items subject to this Agreement, as defined in paragraph 11, so as to ensure, as far as it is able,
that no such item is used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other
military purpose and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for the
manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.
B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
3. The purpose of safeguards under this Agreement is to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded
nuclear material from civilian use at any time.
4. The application of safeguards under this Agreement is intended to facilitate implementation of
relevant bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party, which are essential to the
accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement.
5. Bearing in mind Article II of the Statute, the Agency shall implement safeguards in a manner
designed to avoid hampering India’s economic or technological development, and not to hinder or
otherwise interfere with any activities involving the use by India of nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by
India independent of this Agreement for its own purposes.
6. The safeguards procedures set forth in this document shall be implemented in a manner designed
to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of
nuclear activities.
7. In implementing safeguards, the Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and
industrial secrets. No member of the Agency’s staff shall disclose, except to the Director General
and to such other members of the staff as the Director General may authorize to have such
information by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, any commercial or
industrial secret or any other confidential information coming to his knowledge by reason of the
implementation of safeguards by the Agency.
8. The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any
information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of safeguards in India, except
that:
(a) Specific information relating to such implementation in India may be given to the Board and
to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in
connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its
safeguards responsibilities;
(b) Summarized lists of items being safeguarded by the Agency may be published upon decision
of the Board; and
(c) Additional information may be published upon decision of the Board and if all States directly
concerned agree.
4
9. In the light of Article XII.A.5 of the Statute, safeguards shall continue with respect to produced
special fissionable material and to any materials substituted therefor.
10. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect other rights and obligations of India under international
law.
II. CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING SAFEGUARDS
A. ITEMS SUBJECT TO THIS AGREEMENT
11. The items subject to this Agreement shall be:
(a) Any facility listed in the Annex to this Agreement, as notified by India pursuant to
paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement;
(b) Any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India
which are required to be safeguarded pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to
which India is a party;
(c) Any nuclear material, including subsequent generations of special fissionable material,
produced, processed or used in or by the use of a facility listed in the Annex or in or by the
use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in
paragraph 11(b);
(d) Any nuclear material substituted in accordance with paragraph 27 or 30(d) of this Agreement
for nuclear material referred to in paragraph 11(b) or 11(c) of this Agreement;
(e) Any heavy water substituted in accordance with paragraph 32 of this Agreement for heavy
water subject to this Agreement;
(f) Any facility other than a facility identified in paragraph 11(a) above, or any other location in
India, while producing, processing, using, fabricating or storing any nuclear material,
non-nuclear material, equipment or components referred to in paragraph 11(b), (c), (d) or (e)
of this Agreement, as notified by India pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of this Agreement.
12. The scope of this Agreement is limited to the items subject to this Agreement as defined in
paragraph 11 above.
Declaration
13. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, and a determination by India that all conditions
conducive to the accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement are in place, India shall file
with the Agency a Declaration, based on its sovereign decision to place voluntarily its civilian
nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards in a phased manner.
Notifications
14.
(a) India, on the basis of its sole determination, shall notify the Agency in writing of its decision
to offer for Agency safeguards a facility identified by India in the Declaration referred to in
paragraph 13, or any other facility to be determined by India. Any facility so notified by
India to the Agency will be included in the Annex, and become subject to this Agreement, as
of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India.
(b) Should India, on the basis of its sole determination, decide to import or transfer any nuclear
5
material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components subject to this Agreement to any
facility or other location in India provided for in paragraph 11(f) of this Agreement, it shall so
notify the Agency. Any such facility or location so notified by India pursuant to this
sub-paragraph shall become subject to this Agreement as of the date of receipt by the Agency
of such written notification from India.
15. India shall notify the Agency of the receipt of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material,
equipment and components referred to in paragraph 11(b) of this Agreement within four weeks of
the arrival in India of such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components.
Provision of Information to the Agency
16. In the event that India’s notification pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement relates to a
facility subject to Agency safeguards under another Safeguards Agreement or Agreements in
India at the time of entry into force of this Agreement, India shall provide the Agency, along with
the relevant notification, such information as is required pursuant to the other Safeguards
Agreement or Agreements as relates to any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and
components subject to safeguards thereunder.
17. With respect to any other facility listed in the Annex pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this
Agreement, India shall provide the Agency, within four weeks of the relevant notification, with:
(a) a list of all nuclear material at each such facility; and
(b) where relevant, and if required pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to which
India is party, information relating to:
(i) Any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India
for production , processing, storage or use in such facility;
(ii) Any nuclear material, including subsequent generations of special fissionable material,
produced, processed or used in or by the use of such facility or in or by the use of any
nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India for
production, processing or use in such facility.
18. Each notification pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Agreement shall include all information relevant
to the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components so notified, including
the facility or location where the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and
components so notified will be received.
19. The information provided by India pursuant to paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of this Agreement shall
specify, inter alia, to the extent relevant, the nuclear and chemical composition, physical form and
quantity of the nuclear material; the date of shipment; the date of receipt; the identity of the
consigner and the consignee; and any other relevant information, such as the type and capacity of
any facility (or parts thereof), components or equipment; and the type and quantity of non-nuclear
material. In the case of a facility or other location subject to this Agreement, the information to be
provided shall include the type and capacity of that facility or location, and any other relevant
information.
20. India shall thereafter notify the Agency by means of reports, in accordance with this Agreement,
of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in paragraph
11(b), (c), (d) or (e) of this Agreement. The Agency may verify the calculations of the amounts
and/or quantities of such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components, and
appropriate adjustments shall be made by agreement between India and the Agency.
6
21. The Agency shall maintain an inventory of items subject to this Agreement. The Agency shall
send a copy of the inventory it maintains with respect to such information to India every twelve
months and also at any other times specified by India in a request communicated to the Agency at
least two weeks in advance.
B. SAFEGUARDS UNDER OTHER AGREEMENTS
22. The application of Agency safeguards under other Safeguards Agreements concluded by India
with the Agency and in force at the time of entry into force of this Agreement may, subject to
agreement by the Parties to such other Safeguards Agreements and following notification by India
of the relevant facilities pursuant to paragraph 14(a), be suspended while this Agreement is in
force. The application of safeguards under this Agreement to nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment or components subject to safeguards under such other Agreements shall
commence as of the date of receipt by the Agency of India’s notification. India’s undertaking not
to use items subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose, and its undertaking
that such items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the
manufacture of any nuclear explosive device, shall continue to apply.
C. EXEMPTIONS FROM SAFEGUARDS
General Exemptions
23. Nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards shall be exempted from safeguards
at the request of India, provided that the material so exempted in India may not at any time
exceed:
(a) 1 kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the
following:
(i) Plutonium;
(ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20 %) and above, taken account of by multiplying its
weight by its enrichment;
(iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20 %) and above that of natural uranium, taken
account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment;
(b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above
0.005 (0.5 %);
(c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below; and
(d) 20 metric tons of thorium.
Exemptions Related to Reactors
24. Produced or used nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards because it is
being or has been produced, processed or used in a reactor which has been supplied wholly or
substantially under a project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by
the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under
a safeguards agreement; or because it is being or has been produced in or by the use of
safeguarded nuclear material, shall be exempted from safeguards if:
(a) It is plutonium produced in the fuel of a reactor whose rate of production does not exceed 100
grams of plutonium per year; or
7
(b) It is produced in a reactor determined by the Agency to have a maximum calculated power for
continuous operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts, or is used in such a reactor and would
not be subject to safeguards except for such use, provided that the total power of the reactors
with respect to which these exemptions apply in any State may not exceed 6 thermal
megawatts.
25. Produced special fissionable material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards only because
it has been produced in or by the use of safeguarded nuclear material shall in part be exempted
from safeguards if it is produced in a reactor in which the ratio of fissionable isotopes within
safeguarded nuclear material to all fissionable isotopes is less than 0.3 (calculated each time any
change is made in the loading of the reactor and assumed to be maintained until the next such
change). Such fraction of the produced material as corresponds to the calculated ratio shall be
subject to safeguards.
D. SUSPENSION OF SAFEGUARDS
26. Safeguards with respect to nuclear material may be suspended while the material is transferred,
under an arrangement or agreement approved by the Agency, for the purpose of processing,
reprocessing, testing, research or development, within India or to any other Member State or to an
international organization, provided that the quantities of nuclear material with respect to which
safeguards are thus suspended in India may not at any time exceed:
(a) 1 effective kilogram of special fissionable material;
(b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment 0.005
(0.5 %);
(c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below; and
(d) 20 metric tons of thorium.
27. Safeguards with respect to nuclear material in irradiated fuel which is transferred for the purpose
of reprocessing may also be suspended if the State or States concerned have, with the agreement
of the Agency, placed under safeguards substitute nuclear material in accordance with paragraph
30(d) of this Agreement for the period of suspension. In addition, safeguards with respect to
plutonium contained in irradiated fuel which is transferred for the purpose of reprocessing may be
suspended for a period not to exceed six months if the State or States concerned have, with the
agreement of the Agency, placed under safeguards a quantity of uranium whose enrichment in the
isotope uranium-235 is not less than 0.9 (90%) and the uranium-235 content of which is equal in
weight to such plutonium. Upon expiration of the said six months or the completion of
reprocessing, whichever is earlier, safeguards shall, with the agreement of the Agency, be applied
to such plutonium and shall cease to apply to the uranium substituted therefor.
28. Under conditions specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency shall suspend safeguards
with respect to any parts of the facilities listed in the Annex which are removed for maintenance
or repair.
E. TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS
29. The termination of safeguards on items subject to this Agreement shall be implemented taking
into account the provisions of GOV/1621 (20 August 1973).
30. Nuclear material shall no longer be subject to safeguards under this Agreement after:
8
(a) It has been returned to the State that originally supplied it (whether directly or through the
Agency), if it was subject to safeguards only by reason of such supply and if:
(i) It was not improved while under safeguards; or
(ii) Any special fissionable material that was produced in it under safeguards has been
separated out, or safeguards with respect to such produced material have been terminated
; or
(b) The Agency has determined that:
(i) It was subject to safeguards only by reason of its use in a principal nuclear facility which
has been supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement, submitted to
safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral
arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement;
(ii) It has been removed from such a facility; and
(iii) Any special fissionable material that was produced in it under safeguards has been
separated out, or safeguards with respect to such produced material have been terminated;
or
(c) The Agency has determined that it has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that
it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or
has become practicably irrecoverable; or
(d) India has, with the agreement of the Agency, placed under safeguards, as a substitute, such
amount of the same element, not otherwise subject to safeguards, as the Agency has
determined contains fissionable isotopes:
(i) Whose weight (with due allowance for processing losses) is equal to or greater than the
weight of the fissionable isotopes of the material with respect to which safeguards are to
terminate; and
(ii) Whose ratio by weight to the total substituted element is similar to or greater than the
ratio by weight of the fissionable isotopes of the material with respect to which
safeguards are to terminate to the total weight of such material;
provided that the Agency may agree to the substitution of plutonium for uranium-235
contained in uranium whose enrichment is not greater than 0.05 (5.0 %); or
(e) It has been transferred out of India under paragraph 33(d) of this Agreement, provided that
such material shall again be subject to safeguards if it is returned to India; or
(f) The terms of this Agreement, pursuant to which it was subject to safeguards under this
Agreement, no longer apply, by expiration of this Agreement or otherwise.
31. If India wishes to use safeguarded source material for non-nuclear purposes, such as the
production of alloys or ceramics, it shall agree with the Agency on the circumstances under which
the safeguards on such material may be terminated.
32. Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have
jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the
point of view of safeguards. Safeguards on non-nuclear material, equipment and components
subject to this Agreement may be terminated as and when the non-nuclear material, equipment or
9
components have been returned to the supplier or arrangements have been made by the Agency to
safeguard the non-nuclear material, equipment or components in the State to which it is being
transferred, or when India and the Agency have jointly determined that the non-nuclear material,
equipment or component in question has been consumed, is no longer usable for any nuclear
activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards or has become practicably irrecoverable.
Safeguards may be terminated on heavy water upon India’s placing under safeguards as substitute
the same amount of heavy water of equivalent or better heavy water concentration.
F. TRANSFERS
33. No safeguarded nuclear material shall be transferred outside the jurisdiction of India until the
Agency has satisfied itself that one or more of the following conditions apply:
(a) The material is being returned, under the conditions specified in paragraph 30(a) of this
Agreement, to the State that originally supplied it; or
(b) The material is being transferred subject to the provisions of paragraph 26 or 27 of this
Agreement; or
(c) Arrangements have been made by the Agency to safeguard the material in the State to which
it is being transferred; or
(d) The material was not subject to safeguards pursuant to a project agreement and will be
subject, in the State to which it is being transferred, to safeguards other than those of the
Agency but generally consistent with such safeguards and accepted by the Agency.
34. India shall notify the Agency of its intention to transfer within its jurisdiction any nuclear
material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component subject to this Agreement to any facility
or location in India to which paragraph 11(f) applies and shall provide to the Agency, before such
transfer is effected, the necessary information to enable the Agency to make arrangements for the
application of safeguards to such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component
after its transfer. The Agency shall also be given the opportunity as early as possible in advance of
such a transfer to review the design of the facility for the sole purpose of determining that the
arrangements provided for in this Agreement can be effectively applied. India may transfer the
nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component only after the Agency has
confirmed that it has made such arrangements.
35. India shall notify the Agency of its intention to transfer any nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment or component subject to this Agreement to a recipient which is not under the
jurisdiction of India. Except as provided for in paragraph 30(a) of this Agreement, such nuclear
material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component shall be so transferred only after the
Agency has informed India that it has satisfied itself that Agency safeguards will apply with
respect to the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component in the recipient
country. Upon receipt by the Agency of the notification of transfer from India and the
confirmation of receipt by the recipient country, safeguards on such nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment or component shall be terminated under this Agreement.
36. The notifications referred to in paragraphs 34 and 35 of this Agreement shall be made to the
Agency sufficiently in advance to enable it to make the arrangements required before the transfer
is effected. The Agency shall promptly take any necessary action. The time limits for and the
contents of these notifications shall be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
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III. SAFEGUARDS PROCEDURES
A. GENERAL PROCEDURES
Introduction
37. The safeguards procedures to be applied by the Agency are those specified in this Agreement, as
well as such additional procedures as result from technological developments, and other
procedures as may be agreed to between the Agency and India. The safeguards procedures set
forth below shall be followed, as far as relevant, with respect to any item subject to this
Agreement.
38. The Agency shall conclude with India Subsidiary Arrangements concerning the implementation
of the safeguards procedures referred to above. The Subsidiary Arrangements shall also include
any necessary arrangements for the application of safeguards to any item subject to this
Agreement, including such containment and surveillance measures as are required for the
effective implementation of safeguards. The Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force no
later than six months after entry into force of this Agreement.
Design Review
39. The Agency shall review the design of principal nuclear facilities, for the sole purpose of
satisfying itself that a facility will permit the effective application of safeguards.
40. The design review of a principal nuclear facility shall take place at as early a stage as possible. In
particular, such review shall be carried out in the case of:
(a) An Agency project, before the project is approved;
(b) A bilateral or multilateral arrangement under which the responsibility for administering
safeguards is to be transferred to the Agency, or an activity or facility unilaterally submitted
by India, before the Agency assumes safeguards responsibilities with respect to the facility;
(c) A transfer of safeguarded nuclear material to a principal nuclear facility whose design has not
previously been reviewed, before such transfer takes place; and
(d) A significant modification of a principal nuclear facility whose design has previously been
reviewed, before such modification is undertaken.
41. To enable the Agency to perform the required design review, India shall submit to it relevant
design information sufficient for the purpose, including information on such basic characteristics
of the principal nuclear facility as may bear on the Agency's safeguards procedures. The Agency
shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its
responsibility under this section. It shall complete the review promptly after the submission of this
information by India and shall notify the latter of its conclusions without delay.
42. If the Agency wishes to examine design information which India regards as sensitive, the Agency
shall, if India so requests, conduct the examination on premises in India. Such information should
not be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remains readily available for
examination by the Agency in India.
Records
43. India shall arrange for the keeping of records with respect to principal nuclear facilities and also
with respect to all safeguarded nuclear material outside such facilities. For this purpose India and
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the Agency shall agree on a system of records with respect to each facility and also with respect to
such material, on the basis of proposals to be submitted by India in sufficient time to allow the
Agency to review them before the records need to be kept.
44. All records shall be kept in English.
45. The records shall consist, as appropriate, of:
(a) Accounting records of all safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Operating records for principal nuclear facilities.
46. All records shall be retained for at least two years.
Reports
General Requirements
47. India shall submit to the Agency reports with respect to the production, processing and use of
safeguarded nuclear material in or outside principal nuclear facilities. For this purpose, India and
the Agency shall agree on a system of reports with respect to each facility and also with respect to
safeguarded nuclear material outside such facilities, on the basis of proposals to be submitted by
India in sufficient time to allow the Agency to review them before the reports need to be
submitted. The reports need include only such information as is relevant for the purpose of
safeguards.
48. All reports shall be submitted in English.
Routine Reports
49. Routine reports shall be based on the records compiled in accordance with paragraphs 43 to 46 of
this Agreement and shall consist, as appropriate, of:
(a) Accounting reports showing the receipt, transfer out, inventory and use of all safeguarded
nuclear material. The inventory shall indicate the nuclear and chemical composition and
physical form of all material and its location on the date of the report; and
(b) Operating reports showing the use that has been made of each principal nuclear facility since
the last report and, as far as possible, the programme of future work in the period until the
next routine report is expected to reach the Agency.
50. The first routine report shall be submitted as soon as:
(a) There is any safeguarded nuclear material to be accounted for; or
(b) The principal nuclear facility to which it relates is in a condition to operate.
Progress in Construction
51. The Agency may request information as to when particular stages in the construction of a
principal nuclear facility have been or are to be reached.
Special Reports
52. India shall report to the Agency without delay:
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(a) If any unusual incident occurs involving actual or potential loss or destruction of, or damage
to, any safeguarded nuclear material or principal nuclear facility;
(b) If there is good reason to believe that safeguarded nuclear material is lost or unaccounted for
in quantities that exceed the normal operating and handling losses that have been accepted by
the Agency as characteristic of the facility; or
(c) Disruption of operation of facilities listed in the Annex on account of material violation or
breach of bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party.
53. India shall report to the Agency, as soon as possible, and in any case within two weeks, any
transfer not requiring advance notification that will result in a significant change (to be defined by
the Agency in agreement with India) in the quantity of safeguarded nuclear material in a principal
nuclear facility. Such report shall indicate the amount and nature of the material and its intended
use.
Amplification of Reports
54. At the Agency's request, India shall submit amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far
as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
Inspections
General Procedures
55. The Agency may inspect any items subject to this Agreement.
56. The purpose of safeguards inspections under this Agreement shall be to verify compliance by
India with this Agreement and to assist India in complying with this Agreement and in resolving
any questions arising out of the implementation of safeguards.
57. The number, duration and intensity of inspections actually carried out shall be kept to the
minimum consistent with the effective implementation of safeguards, and if the Agency considers
that the authorized inspections are not all required, fewer shall be carried out.
58. Inspectors shall neither operate any facility themselves nor direct the staff of a facility to carry out
any particular operation.
Routine Inspections
59. Routine inspections may include, as appropriate:
(a) Audit of records and reports;
(b) Verification of the amount of safeguarded nuclear material by physical inspection,
measurement and sampling;
(c) Examination of principal nuclear facilities, including a check of their measuring instruments
and operating characteristics; and
(d) Check of the operations carried out at principal nuclear facilities.
60. Whenever the Agency has the right of access to a principal nuclear facility at all times, it may
perform inspections of which notice as required by paragraph 4 of the Inspectors Document need
13
not be given, in so far as this is necessary for the effective application of safeguards. The actual
procedures to implement these provisions shall be agreed upon between India and the Agency.
Initial Inspections of a Principal Nuclear Facility
61. To verify that the construction of a principal nuclear facility is in accordance with the design
reviewed by the Agency, an initial inspection or inspections of the facility may be carried out:
(a) As soon as possible after the facility has come under Agency safeguards, in the case of a
facility already in operation; and
(b) Before the facility starts to operate, in other cases.
62. The measuring instruments and operating characteristics of the facility shall be reviewed to the
extent necessary for the purpose of implementing safeguards. Instruments that will be used to
obtain data on the nuclear materials in the facility may be tested to determine their satisfactory
functioning. Such testing may include the observation by inspectors of commissioning or routine
tests by the staff of the facility, but shall not hamper or delay the construction, commissioning or
normal operation of the facility.
Special Inspections
63. The Agency may carry out special inspections if:
(a) The study of a report indicates that such inspection is desirable; or
(b) Any unforeseen circumstance requires immediate action.
The Board shall subsequently be informed of the reasons for and the results of each such
inspection.
64. The Agency may also carry out special inspections of substantial amounts of safeguarded nuclear
material that are to be transferred outside the jurisdiction of India, for which purpose India shall
give the Agency sufficient advance notice of any such proposed transfer.
B. SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR REACTORS
Reports
65. The frequency of submission of routine reports shall be agreed between the Agency and India,
taking into account the frequency established for routine inspections. However, at least two such
reports shall be submitted each year and in no case shall more than 12 such reports be required in
any year.
Inspections
66. One of the initial inspections of a reactor shall if possible be made just before the reactor first
reaches criticality.
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67. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of a reactor and of the safeguarded nuclear
material in it shall be determined from the following table:
Whichever is the largest of:
(a) Facility inventory (including loading);
(b) Annual throughput;
(c) Maximum potential annual production of special
fissionable material
(Effective kilograms of nuclear material)
Maximum number
of routine inspections
annually
Up to 1
More than 1 and up to 5
More than 5 and up to 10
More than 10 and up to 15
More than 15 and up to 20
More than 20 and up to 25
More than 25 and up to 30
More than 30 and up to 35
More than 35 and up to 40
More than 40 and up to 45
More than 45 and up to 50
More than 50 and up to 55
More than 55 and up to 60
More than 60
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Right of access at all times
68. The actual frequency of inspection of a reactor shall take account of:
(a) The fact that India possesses irradiated fuel reprocessing facilities:
(b) The nature of the reactor; and
(c) The nature and amount of the nuclear material produced or used in the reactor.
C. SPECIAL PROCEDURES RELATING TO SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR
MATERIAL OUTSIDE PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR FACILITIES
Nuclear Material in Research and Development Facilities
Routine Reports
69. Only accounting reports need be submitted in respect of nuclear material in research and
development facilities. The frequency of submission of such routine reports shall be agreed
between the Agency and India, taking into account the frequency established for routine
inspections; however, at least one such report shall be submitted each year and in no case shall
more than 12 such reports be required in any year.
Routine Inspections
70. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of safeguarded nuclear material in a research and
development facility shall be that specified in the table in paragraph 67 of this Agreement for the
total amount of material in the facility.
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Source Material in Sealed Storage
71. The following simplified procedures for safeguarding stockpiled source material shall be applied
if India undertakes to store such material in a sealed storage facility and not to remove it
therefrom without previously informing the Agency.
Design of Storage Facilities
72. India shall submit to the Agency information on the design of each sealed storage facility and
agree with the Agency on the method and procedure for sealing it.
Routine Reports
73. Two routine accounting reports in respect of source material in sealed storage shall be submitted
each year.
Routine Inspections
74. The Agency may perform one routine inspection of each sealed storage facility annually.
Removal of Material
75. India may remove safeguarded source material from a sealed storage facility after informing the
Agency of the amount, type and intended use of the material to be removed, and providing
sufficient other data in time to enable the Agency to continue safeguarding the material after it has
been removed.
Nuclear Material in Other Locations
76. Except to the extent that safeguarded nuclear material outside of principal nuclear facilities is
covered by any of the provisions set forth in paragraphs 69 to 75 of this Agreement, the following
procedures shall be applied with respect to such material (for example, source material stored
elsewhere than in a sealed storage facility, or special fissionable material used in a sealed neutron
source in the field).
Routine Reports
77. Routine accounting reports in respect of all safeguarded nuclear material in this category shall be
submitted periodically. The frequency of submission of such reports shall be agreed between the
Agency and India, taking into account the frequency established for routine inspections; however,
at least one such report shall be submitted each year and in no case shall more than 12 such
reports be required in any year.
Routine Inspections
78. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of safeguarded nuclear material in this category
shall be one inspection annually if the total amount of such material does not exceed five effective
kilograms, and shall be determined from the table in paragraph 67 of this Agreement if the
amount is greater.
D. PROVISIONS FOR REPROCESSING PLANTS
Introduction
79. Additional procedures applicable to the safeguarding of reprocessing plants are set out below.
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Special Procedures
Reports
80. The frequency of submission of routine reports shall be once each calendar month.
Inspections
81. A reprocessing plant having an annual throughput not exceeding 5 effective kilograms of nuclear
material, and the safeguarded nuclear material in it, may be routinely inspected twice a year.
A reprocessing plant, having an annual throughput exceeding 5 effective kilograms of nuclear
material, and the safeguarded nuclear material in it, may be inspected at all times. The
arrangements for inspections set forth in paragraph 60 of this Agreement shall apply to all
inspections to be made under this paragraph. It is understood that for plants having an annual
throughput of more than 60 effective kilograms, the right of access at all times would be normally
be implemented by means of continuous inspection.
82. When a reprocessing plant is under Agency safeguards only because it contains safeguarded
nuclear material, the inspection frequency shall be based on the rate of delivery of safeguarded
nuclear material.
83. India and the Agency shall cooperate in making all the necessary arrangements to facilitate the
taking, shipping or analysis of samples, due account being taken of the limitations imposed by the
characteristics of a plant already in operation when placed under Agency safeguards.
Mixtures of Safeguarded and Unsafeguarded Nuclear Material
84. India and the Agency may agree on the following special arrangements in the case of a
reprocessing plant which has not been supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement,
submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral
arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement, and in which
safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear materials are present:
(a) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) below, the Agency shall restrict its safeguards
procedures to the area in which irradiated fuel is stored, until such time as all or any part of
such fuel is transferred out of the storage area into other parts of the plant. Safeguards
procedures shall cease to apply to the storage area or plant when either contains no
safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Where possible, safeguarded nuclear material shall be measured and sampled separately from
unsafeguarded material, and at as early a stage as possible. Where separate measurement,
sampling or processing are not possible, the whole of the material being processed in that
campaign shall be subject to the safeguards procedures set out in Part III.D of this Agreement.
At the conclusion of the processing the nuclear material that is thereafter to be safeguarded
shall be selected by agreement between India and the Agency from the whole output of the
plant resulting from that campaign, due account being taken of any processing losses accepted
by the Agency.
E. PROVISIONS FOR CONVERSION PLANTS, ENRICHMENT PLANTS AND
FABRICATION PLANTS
Introduction
85. Additional procedures applicable to conversion plants and fabrication plants are set out below.
This terminology is synonymous with the term "a plant for processing or fabricating nuclear
17
material (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant)" which is used in paragraph 117 of this
Agreement.
86. In the event that India decides to offer an enrichment plant in the future as a facility subject to this
Agreement, the Agency and India shall consult and agree on the application of the Agency’s
safeguards procedures for enrichment plants before any such facility is added to the Annex.
Special Procedures
Reports
87. The frequency of submission of routine reports shall be once each calendar month.
Inspections
88. A conversion plant or a fabrication plant which has been supplied wholly or substantially under a
project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a
bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards
agreement, and the nuclear material in it, may be inspected at all times if the plant inventory at
any time, or the annual input, of nuclear material exceeds five effective kilograms. Where neither
the inventory at any time, nor the annual input, exceeds five effective kilograms of nuclear
material, the routine inspections shall not exceed two a year. The arrangements for inspections set
forth in paragraph 57 of this Agreement shall apply to all inspections to be made under this
paragraph. It is understood that, for plants having an inventory at any time, or an annual input, of
more than 60 effective kilograms, the right of access at all times would normally be implemented
by means of continuous inspection. Where neither the inventory at any time nor the annual input
exceeds one effective kilogram of nuclear material, the plant would not normally be subject to
routine inspection.
89. When a conversion plant or a fabrication plant which has not been supplied wholly or
substantially under a project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by
the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under
a safeguards agreement contains safeguarded nuclear material, the frequency of routine
inspections shall be based on the inventory at any time and the annual input of safeguarded
nuclear material. Where the inventory at any time, or the annual input, of safeguarded nuclear
material exceeds five effective kilograms the plant may be inspected at all times. Where neither
the inventory at any time, nor the annual input, exceeds five effective kilograms of safeguarded
nuclear material, the routine inspections shall not exceed two a year. The arrangements for
inspection set forth in paragraph 60 shall apply to all inspections to be made under this paragraph.
It is understood that, for plants having an inventory at any time, or an annual input, of more than
60 effective kilograms, the right of access at all times would normally be implemented by means
of continuous inspection. Where neither the inventory at any time nor the annual input exceeds
one effective kilogram of nuclear material, the plant would not normally be subject to routine
inspection.
90. The intensity of inspection of safeguarded nuclear material at various steps in a conversion plant
or a fabrication plant shall take account of the nature, isotopic composition and amount of
safeguarded nuclear material in the plant. Safeguards shall be applied in accordance with the
general principles set forth in paragraphs 4 to 8 of this Agreement. Emphasis shall be placed on
inspection to control uranium of high enrichments and plutonium.
91. Where a plant may handle safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material, India shall notify the
Agency in advance of the programme for handling safeguarded batches to enable the Agency to
make inspections during these periods, due account being also taken of the arrangements under
paragraph 92 of this Agreement.
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92. India and the Agency shall cooperate in making all the necessary arrangements to facilitate the
preparation of inventories of safeguarded nuclear material and the taking, shipping and/or analysis
of samples, due account being taken of the limitations imposed by the characteristics of a plant
already in operation when placed under Agency safeguards.
Residues, Scrap and Waste
93. India shall ensure that safeguarded nuclear material contained in residues, scrap or waste created
during conversion or fabrication is recovered, as far as is practicable, in its facilities and within a
reasonable period of time. If such recovery is not considered practicable by India, India and the
Agency shall cooperate in making arrangements to account for and dispose of the material.
Safeguarded and Unsafeguarded Nuclear Material
94. India and the Agency may agree on the following special arrangements in the case of a conversion
plant or a fabrication plant which has not been supplied wholly or substantially under a project
agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or
multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement,
and in which safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material are both present:
(a) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) below, the Agency shall restrict its safeguards
procedures to the area in which safeguarded nuclear material is stored, until such time as all
or any part of such nuclear material is transferred out of the storage area into other parts of the
plant. Safeguards procedures shall cease to be applied to the storage area or plant when it
contains no safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Where possible, safeguarded nuclear material shall be measured and sampled separately from
unsafeguarded nuclear material, and at as early a stage as possible. Where separate
measurement, sampling or processing is not possible, any nuclear material containing
safeguarded nuclear material shall be subject to the safeguards procedures set out in Part III.E
of this Agreement. At the conclusion of processing, the nuclear material that is thereafter to
be safeguarded shall be selected, in accordance with paragraph 96 of this Agreement when
applicable, by agreement between India and the Agency, due account being taken of any
processing losses accepted by the Agency.
Blending of Nuclear Material
95. When safeguarded nuclear material is to be blended with either safeguarded or unsafeguarded
nuclear material, India shall notify the Agency sufficiently in advance of the programme of
blending to enable the Agency to exercise its right to obtain evidence, through inspection of the
blending operation or otherwise, that the blending is performed according to the programme.
96. When safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material are blended, if the ratio of fissionable
isotopes in the safeguarded component going into the blend to all the fissionable isotopes in the
blend is 0.3 or greater, and if the concentration of fissionable isotopes in the unsafeguarded
nuclear material is increased by such blending, then the whole blend shall remain subject to
safeguards. In other cases, the following procedures shall apply:
(a) Plutonium/plutonium blending: The quantity of the blend that shall continue to be
safeguarded shall be such that its weight, when multiplied by the square of the weight fraction
of contained fissionable isotopes, is not less than the weight of originally safeguarded
plutonium multiplied by the square of the weight fraction of fissionable isotopes therein,
provided however that:
19
(i) In cases where the weight of the whole blend, when multiplied by the square of the
weight fraction of contained fissionable isotopes, is less than the weight of originally
safeguarded plutonium multiplied by the square of the weight fraction of fissionable
isotopes therein, the whole of the blend shall be safeguarded; and
(ii) The number of fissionable atoms in the portion of the blend that shall continue to be
under safeguards shall in no case be less than the number of fissionable atoms in the
originally safeguarded plutonium;
(b) Uranium/uranium blending: The quantity of the blend that shall continue to be safeguarded
shall be such that the number of effective kilograms is not less than the number of effective
kilograms in the originally safeguarded uranium, provided however that:
(i) In cases where the number of effective kilograms in the whole blend is less than in the
safeguarded uranium, the whole of the blend shall be safeguarded; and
(ii) The number of fissionable atoms in the portion of the blend that shall continue to be
under safeguards shall in no case be less than the number of fissionable atoms in the
originally safeguarded uranium;
(c) Uranium/plutonium blending: The whole of the resultant blend shall be safeguarded until the
uranium and the plutonium constituents are separated. After separation of the uranium and
plutonium, safeguards shall apply to the originally safeguarded component; and
(d) Due account shall be taken of any processing losses agreed upon between India and the
Agency.
IV. AGENCY INSPECTORS
97. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 10 and 12 to 14, inclusive, of the Inspectors Document shall
apply to Agency inspectors performing functions pursuant to this Agreement. However,
paragraph 4 of the Inspectors Document shall not apply with regard to any facility or to nuclear
material to which the Agency has access at all times. The actual procedures to implement
paragraph 60 of this Agreement shall be agreed to between the Agency and India.
98. The relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency
(INFCIRC/9/Rev.2) shall apply to the Agency, its inspectors performing functions under this
Agreement and to any property of the Agency used by them in the performance of their functions
under this Agreement.
V. PHYSICAL PROTECTION
99. India shall take all suitable measures necessary for the physical protection of the facilities and
nuclear material subject to this Agreement, taking into account the recommendations made in
Agency's document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, as may be amended from time to time.
VI. SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL
100. India shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all items subject
to safeguards under this Agreement, in accordance with provisions to be set out in the Subsidiary
Arrangements.
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VII. FINANCE
101. India and the Agency shall each bear any expense incurred in the implementation of their
responsibilities under this Agreement. The Agency shall reimburse India for any special expenses,
including those referred to in paragraph 6 of the Inspectors Document, incurred by India or
persons under its jurisdiction at the written request of the Agency, if India notified the Agency
before the expense was incurred that reimbursement would be required. These provisions shall not
prejudice the allocation of expenses attributable to a failure by either India or the Agency to
comply with this Agreement.
102. India shall ensure that any protection against third party liability, including any insurance or
other financial security, in respect of a nuclear incident occurring in a facility under its
jurisdiction shall apply to the Agency and its inspectors when carrying out their functions under
this Agreement as that protection applies to nationals of India.
VIII. NON-COMPLIANCE
103. If the Board determines in accordance with Article XII.C of the Statute of the Agency that
there has been any non-compliance by India with this Agreement, the Board shall call upon India
to remedy such non-compliance forthwith, and shall make such reports as it deems appropriate. In
the event of failure by India to take full remedial action within a reasonable time, the Board may
take any other measures provided for in Article XII.C of the Statute. The Agency shall promptly
notify India in the event of any determination by the Board pursuant in this regard.
IX. COOPERATION, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE AGREEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
104. The Agency and India shall cooperate to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement.
105. At the request of either India or the Agency, there shall be consultations about any question
arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement. India and the Agency shall
endeavour to settle by negotiation any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this
Agreement. India shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation
or application of the Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board shall invite India to
participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board.
106. In the event of any question or questions arising from the implementation of this Agreement,
the Agency shall provide India with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of such
questions. The Agency shall not draw any conclusions in connection with the question or
questions until India has had an opportunity to provide clarifications.
X. FINAL CLAUSES
107. India and the Agency shall, at the request of either of them, consult about amending this
Agreement.
108. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from India
written notification that India’s statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force
have been met.
109. This Agreement shall remain in force until, in accordance with its provisions, safeguards have
been terminated on all items subject to this Agreement, or until terminated by mutual agreement
of the parties to this Agreement.
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XI. DEFINITIONS
110. "Agency" means the International Atomic Energy Agency.
111. "Board" means the Board of Governors of the Agency.
112. "Campaign" means the period during which the chemical processing equipment in a
reprocessing plant is operated between two successive wash-outs of the nuclear material present
in the equipment.
113. "Conversion plant" means a facility (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant) to improve
unirradiated nuclear material, or irradiated nuclear material that has been separated from fission
products, by changing its chemical or physical form so as to facilitate further use or processing.
The term conversion plant includes the facility's storage and analytical sections. The term does
not include a plant intended for separating the isotopes of nuclear material.
114. "Director General" means the Director General of the Agency.
115. "Effective kilograms" means:
(i) In the case of plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
(ii) In the case of uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1 %) and above, its weight in
kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment;
(iii) In the case of uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1 %) and above 0.005 (0.5 %), its
weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and
(iv) In the case of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below, and in the
case of thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.
116. "Enrichment plant" means a plant for separating the isotopes of nuclear material.
117. "Facility" means, for the purposes of this Agreement:
(i) A "principal nuclear facility", which means a reactor, a plant for processing nuclear
material irradiated in a reactor, a plant for separating the isotopes of a nuclear material, a
plant for processing or fabricating nuclear material (excepting a mine or ore-processing
plant) or a facility or plant of such other type as may be designated by the Board from
time to time, including associated storage facilities, as well as a critical facility or a
separate storage installation;
(ii) A research and development facility as defined in paragraph 127 of this Agreement;
(iii) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is
customarily used;
(iv) A plant for the upgrading of heavy water or a separate storage installation for heavy
water.
118. "Fabrication plant" means a plant to manufacture fuel elements or other components
containing nuclear material and includes the plant’s storage and analytical sections.
119. "Improved" means, with respect to nuclear material, that either:
22
(i) The concentration of fissionable isotopes in it has been increased; or
(ii) The amount of chemically separable fissionable isotopes in it has been increased; or
(iii) Its chemical or physical form has been changed so as to facilitate further use or
processing.
120. "Inspector" means an Agency official designated in accordance with the Inspectors
Document.
121. "Inspectors Document" means the Annex to the Agency's document GC(V)/INF/39.
122. "Nuclear material" means any source or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX
of the Statute.
123. "Produced, processed or used" means any utilization or any alteration of the physical or
chemical form or composition, including any change of the isotopic composition, of nuclear
material;
124. "Project agreement" means a safeguards agreement relating to an Agency project and
containing provisions as foreseen in Article XI.F.4.(b) of the Statute.
125. "Reactor" means any device in which a controlled, self-sustaining fission chain-reaction can
be maintained.
126. "Reprocessing plant" means a facility to separate irradiated nuclear materials and fission
products, and includes the facility’s head-end treatment section and its associated storage and
analytical sections. This term is synonymous with the term "a plant for processing nuclear
material irradiated in a reactor" which is used in paragraph 117 of this Agreement.
127. "Research and development facility" means a facility, other than a principal nuclear facility,
used for research or development in the field of nuclear energy.
128. "Statute" means the Statute of the Agency.
129. "Throughput" means the rate at which nuclear material is introduced into a facility operating
at full capacity.
130. "Unilaterally submitted" means submitted by India to Agency safeguards.
DONE at Vienna, on the day of 2008, in duplicate, in the English language.
For the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA: For the INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY:
23
ANNEX
LIST OF FACILITIES SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS UNDER THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE
APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO CIVILIAN NUCLEAR
FACILITIES
FACILITY OFFERED FOR
SAFEGUARDS BY INDIA
DATE OF RECEIPT OF
NOTIFICATION
GOV
/2008/30
Date: 9 July 2008
Restricted Distribution
Original: English
For official use only
Nuclear Verification
The Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and
Additional Protocols
An Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of
Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities
Recommended Action
•
It is recommended that the Board authorize the Director General to conclude with the
Government of India, and subsequently implement, the draft Safeguards Agreement reproduced
in the Attachment hereto.
Atoms for Peace
GOV/2008/30
Page 1
Nuclear Verification
The Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements and
Additional Protocols
An Agreement with the Government of India for the Application of
Safeguards to Civilian Nuclear Facilities
1. Referring to its desire to expand civil nuclear cooperation with other Member States of the
Agency and to the relevance in this context of the understanding between India and the United States
of America expressed in the India-U.S. Joint Statement of 18 July 2005, the Government of India
requested the Agency to conclude with it an agreement for the application of safeguards with respect
to its civilian nuclear facilities.
2. A draft safeguards agreement was accordingly negotiated with India (attached) using the relevant
guidance documents that have been adopted by the Board of Governors for the purposes of concluding
INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreements.
3. The draft agreement provides for the application of safeguards to facilities, nuclear material, nonnuclear
material, equipment and components as set out in paragraph 11 of the agreement.
4. At the request of India the draft text includes provisions for the use of the agreement as an
"umbrella agreement". Paragraph 14 thereof provides that any facility notified by India to the Agency
will become subject to safeguards under this agreement. Such facilities will be listed on the Annex to
the agreement, which will be published, and updated, as India notifies the Agency of additional
facilities. In addition, paragraph 22 provides for the possibility of safeguarding under the agreement
items that are already subject to safeguards under other Safeguards Agreements concluded by India
with the Agency, subject to agreement by the parties to such other Safeguards Agreements. As a
consequence, the application of safeguards under those Safeguards Agreements would be suspended
for so long as this agreement remains in force.
5. Paragraph 99 provides that India shall take all suitable measures for the physical protection of
facilities and nuclear material subject to the agreement, taking into account the recommendations
made in INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, as may be amended from time to time.
6. In paragraph 100 of the draft agreement India undertakes to establish and maintain a system of
accounting for and control of all items subject to safeguards under the agreement, in accordance with
provisions to be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
7. It will be also noted that the draft agreement includes an undertaking by India and the Agency
that in the event that India decides to offer an enrichment plant in the future as a facility subject to the
agreement, India and the Agency shall consult and agree on the application of the Agency’s safeguards
procedures before any such facility is subject to the agreement (paragraph 86).
GOV/2008/30
Page 2
8. When safeguards are applied to new facilities under this agreement, the Agency will incur
additional expenses. On the assumption that 2009 will be the first year that the Agency will start
implementing this agreement at new facilities, a supplementary appropriation to the regular budget
will be requested as agreed by the Board of Governors at its 9 July 2007 session. The estimated cost
for the first year for one new facility would be in the order of € 1.2 million.
GOV/2008/30
Attachment
DRAFT
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY
FOR THE APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO CIVILIAN
NUCLEAR FACILITIES
RECOGNIZING the significance India attaches to civilian nuclear energy as an efficient,
clean and sustainable energy source for meeting global energy demand, in particular for meeting
India’s growing energy needs;
WHEREAS India is committed to the full development of its national three-stage nuclear
programme to meet the twin challenges of energy security and protection of the environment;
WHEREAS India has a sovereign and inalienable right to carry out nuclear research and
development activities for the welfare of its people and other peaceful purposes;
WHEREAS India, a State with advanced nuclear technology, wishes to expand civil
nuclear cooperation for its national development;
WHEREAS India is desirous of further expanding cooperation with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter referred to as "the Agency") and its Member States with the
objective of the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, on a stable, reliable
and predictable basis;
WHEREAS India supports the role of the Agency in the promotion of the safe and
peaceful uses of nuclear energy as set forth in the Statute of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the
"Statute");
WHEREAS India and the Agency have long standing cooperation in various aspects of
the Agency’s activities;
RECOGNIZING that such cooperation between India and the Agency must be carried
out with full respect for the objectives of the Statute and with due observance of the sovereign rights
of India;
WHEREAS the Statute authorizes the Agency to apply safeguards, at the request of the
parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at the request of a State to any of the State’s
activities in the field of atomic energy and, in this context:
Noting the relevance for this Agreement of the understandings between India and the
United States of America expressed in the India-U.S. Joint Statement of 18 July 2005,
in which India, inter alia, has stated its willingness:
•
to identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes
in a phased manner;
2
•
to file with the Agency a declaration regarding its civilian nuclear facilities
(hereinafter referred to as "the Declaration");
•
to take a decision to place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency
safeguards;
Noting also for the purposes of this Agreement that:
•
India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards so as to
facilitate full civil nuclear cooperation between India and Member States of the
Agency and to provide assurance against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear
material from civilian use at any time;
•
An essential basis of India’s concurrence to accept Agency safeguards under an
India-specific safeguards agreement (hereinafter referred to as "this Agreement")
is the conclusion of international cooperation arrangements creating the necessary
conditions for India to obtain access to the international fuel market, including
reliable, uninterrupted and continuous access to fuel supplies from companies in
several nations, as well as support for an Indian effort to develop a strategic
reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime
of India’s reactors; and
•
India may take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its
civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies;
WHEREAS India is desirous of expanding civil nuclear cooperation with other Member
States of the Agency;
WHEREAS the conclusion of this Agreement is intended to facilitate the broadest
possible cooperation between India and Member States of the Agency in the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy and ensure international participation in the further development of India’s civilian nuclear
programme on a sustained and long–term basis;
RECALLING that the Agency in accordance with its Statute and safeguards system must
take into account, in the implementation of safeguards in India, the need to avoid hampering the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, economic and technological development or international
cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy; respect health, safety and physical
protection and related security provisions in force in India; and take every precaution to protect
commercial, technological and industrial secrets as well as other confidential information coming to
its knowledge;
WHEREAS the frequency and intensity of activities described in this Agreement shall be
kept to the minimum consistent with the objective of effective and efficient Agency safeguards;
WHEREAS India has requested the Agency to apply safeguards with respect to items
subject to this Agreement;
WHEREAS the Board of Governors of the Agency (hereinafter referred to as the
"Board") acceded to that request on …………;
NOW THEREFORE, taking into account the above, India and the Agency have agreed as
follows:
3
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. BASIC UNDERTAKINGS
1. India undertakes that none of the items subject to this Agreement, as defined in paragraph 11,
shall be used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other military purpose
and that such items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the
manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.
2. The Agency undertakes to apply safeguards, in accordance with the terms of this Agreement, to
the items subject to this Agreement, as defined in paragraph 11, so as to ensure, as far as it is able,
that no such item is used for the manufacture of any nuclear weapon or to further any other
military purpose and that such items are used exclusively for peaceful purposes and not for the
manufacture of any nuclear explosive device.
B. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
3. The purpose of safeguards under this Agreement is to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded
nuclear material from civilian use at any time.
4. The application of safeguards under this Agreement is intended to facilitate implementation of
relevant bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party, which are essential to the
accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement.
5. Bearing in mind Article II of the Statute, the Agency shall implement safeguards in a manner
designed to avoid hampering India’s economic or technological development, and not to hinder or
otherwise interfere with any activities involving the use by India of nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by
India independent of this Agreement for its own purposes.
6. The safeguards procedures set forth in this document shall be implemented in a manner designed
to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of
nuclear activities.
7. In implementing safeguards, the Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and
industrial secrets. No member of the Agency’s staff shall disclose, except to the Director General
and to such other members of the staff as the Director General may authorize to have such
information by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, any commercial or
industrial secret or any other confidential information coming to his knowledge by reason of the
implementation of safeguards by the Agency.
8. The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any
information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of safeguards in India, except
that:
(a) Specific information relating to such implementation in India may be given to the Board and
to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in
connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its
safeguards responsibilities;
(b) Summarized lists of items being safeguarded by the Agency may be published upon decision
of the Board; and
(c) Additional information may be published upon decision of the Board and if all States directly
concerned agree.
4
9. In the light of Article XII.A.5 of the Statute, safeguards shall continue with respect to produced
special fissionable material and to any materials substituted therefor.
10. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect other rights and obligations of India under international
law.
II. CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRING SAFEGUARDS
A. ITEMS SUBJECT TO THIS AGREEMENT
11. The items subject to this Agreement shall be:
(a) Any facility listed in the Annex to this Agreement, as notified by India pursuant to
paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement;
(b) Any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India
which are required to be safeguarded pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to
which India is a party;
(c) Any nuclear material, including subsequent generations of special fissionable material,
produced, processed or used in or by the use of a facility listed in the Annex or in or by the
use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in
paragraph 11(b);
(d) Any nuclear material substituted in accordance with paragraph 27 or 30(d) of this Agreement
for nuclear material referred to in paragraph 11(b) or 11(c) of this Agreement;
(e) Any heavy water substituted in accordance with paragraph 32 of this Agreement for heavy
water subject to this Agreement;
(f) Any facility other than a facility identified in paragraph 11(a) above, or any other location in
India, while producing, processing, using, fabricating or storing any nuclear material,
non-nuclear material, equipment or components referred to in paragraph 11(b), (c), (d) or (e)
of this Agreement, as notified by India pursuant to paragraph 14(b) of this Agreement.
12. The scope of this Agreement is limited to the items subject to this Agreement as defined in
paragraph 11 above.
Declaration
13. Upon entry into force of this Agreement, and a determination by India that all conditions
conducive to the accomplishment of the objective of this Agreement are in place, India shall file
with the Agency a Declaration, based on its sovereign decision to place voluntarily its civilian
nuclear facilities under Agency safeguards in a phased manner.
Notifications
14.
(a) India, on the basis of its sole determination, shall notify the Agency in writing of its decision
to offer for Agency safeguards a facility identified by India in the Declaration referred to in
paragraph 13, or any other facility to be determined by India. Any facility so notified by
India to the Agency will be included in the Annex, and become subject to this Agreement, as
of the date of receipt by the Agency of such written notification from India.
(b) Should India, on the basis of its sole determination, decide to import or transfer any nuclear
5
material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components subject to this Agreement to any
facility or other location in India provided for in paragraph 11(f) of this Agreement, it shall so
notify the Agency. Any such facility or location so notified by India pursuant to this
sub-paragraph shall become subject to this Agreement as of the date of receipt by the Agency
of such written notification from India.
15. India shall notify the Agency of the receipt of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material,
equipment and components referred to in paragraph 11(b) of this Agreement within four weeks of
the arrival in India of such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components.
Provision of Information to the Agency
16. In the event that India’s notification pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this Agreement relates to a
facility subject to Agency safeguards under another Safeguards Agreement or Agreements in
India at the time of entry into force of this Agreement, India shall provide the Agency, along with
the relevant notification, such information as is required pursuant to the other Safeguards
Agreement or Agreements as relates to any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and
components subject to safeguards thereunder.
17. With respect to any other facility listed in the Annex pursuant to paragraph 14(a) of this
Agreement, India shall provide the Agency, within four weeks of the relevant notification, with:
(a) a list of all nuclear material at each such facility; and
(b) where relevant, and if required pursuant to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement to which
India is party, information relating to:
(i) Any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India
for production , processing, storage or use in such facility;
(ii) Any nuclear material, including subsequent generations of special fissionable material,
produced, processed or used in or by the use of such facility or in or by the use of any
nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components supplied to India for
production, processing or use in such facility.
18. Each notification pursuant to paragraph 15 of the Agreement shall include all information relevant
to the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components so notified, including
the facility or location where the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and
components so notified will be received.
19. The information provided by India pursuant to paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of this Agreement shall
specify, inter alia, to the extent relevant, the nuclear and chemical composition, physical form and
quantity of the nuclear material; the date of shipment; the date of receipt; the identity of the
consigner and the consignee; and any other relevant information, such as the type and capacity of
any facility (or parts thereof), components or equipment; and the type and quantity of non-nuclear
material. In the case of a facility or other location subject to this Agreement, the information to be
provided shall include the type and capacity of that facility or location, and any other relevant
information.
20. India shall thereafter notify the Agency by means of reports, in accordance with this Agreement,
of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components referred to in paragraph
11(b), (c), (d) or (e) of this Agreement. The Agency may verify the calculations of the amounts
and/or quantities of such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components, and
appropriate adjustments shall be made by agreement between India and the Agency.
6
21. The Agency shall maintain an inventory of items subject to this Agreement. The Agency shall
send a copy of the inventory it maintains with respect to such information to India every twelve
months and also at any other times specified by India in a request communicated to the Agency at
least two weeks in advance.
B. SAFEGUARDS UNDER OTHER AGREEMENTS
22. The application of Agency safeguards under other Safeguards Agreements concluded by India
with the Agency and in force at the time of entry into force of this Agreement may, subject to
agreement by the Parties to such other Safeguards Agreements and following notification by India
of the relevant facilities pursuant to paragraph 14(a), be suspended while this Agreement is in
force. The application of safeguards under this Agreement to nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment or components subject to safeguards under such other Agreements shall
commence as of the date of receipt by the Agency of India’s notification. India’s undertaking not
to use items subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose, and its undertaking
that such items shall be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not be used for the
manufacture of any nuclear explosive device, shall continue to apply.
C. EXEMPTIONS FROM SAFEGUARDS
General Exemptions
23. Nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards shall be exempted from safeguards
at the request of India, provided that the material so exempted in India may not at any time
exceed:
(a) 1 kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the
following:
(i) Plutonium;
(ii) Uranium with an enrichment of 0.2 (20 %) and above, taken account of by multiplying its
weight by its enrichment;
(iii) Uranium with an enrichment below 0.2 (20 %) and above that of natural uranium, taken
account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its enrichment;
(b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment above
0.005 (0.5 %);
(c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below; and
(d) 20 metric tons of thorium.
Exemptions Related to Reactors
24. Produced or used nuclear material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards because it is
being or has been produced, processed or used in a reactor which has been supplied wholly or
substantially under a project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by
the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under
a safeguards agreement; or because it is being or has been produced in or by the use of
safeguarded nuclear material, shall be exempted from safeguards if:
(a) It is plutonium produced in the fuel of a reactor whose rate of production does not exceed 100
grams of plutonium per year; or
7
(b) It is produced in a reactor determined by the Agency to have a maximum calculated power for
continuous operation of less than 3 thermal megawatts, or is used in such a reactor and would
not be subject to safeguards except for such use, provided that the total power of the reactors
with respect to which these exemptions apply in any State may not exceed 6 thermal
megawatts.
25. Produced special fissionable material that would otherwise be subject to safeguards only because
it has been produced in or by the use of safeguarded nuclear material shall in part be exempted
from safeguards if it is produced in a reactor in which the ratio of fissionable isotopes within
safeguarded nuclear material to all fissionable isotopes is less than 0.3 (calculated each time any
change is made in the loading of the reactor and assumed to be maintained until the next such
change). Such fraction of the produced material as corresponds to the calculated ratio shall be
subject to safeguards.
D. SUSPENSION OF SAFEGUARDS
26. Safeguards with respect to nuclear material may be suspended while the material is transferred,
under an arrangement or agreement approved by the Agency, for the purpose of processing,
reprocessing, testing, research or development, within India or to any other Member State or to an
international organization, provided that the quantities of nuclear material with respect to which
safeguards are thus suspended in India may not at any time exceed:
(a) 1 effective kilogram of special fissionable material;
(b) 10 metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an enrichment 0.005
(0.5 %);
(c) 20 metric tons of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below; and
(d) 20 metric tons of thorium.
27. Safeguards with respect to nuclear material in irradiated fuel which is transferred for the purpose
of reprocessing may also be suspended if the State or States concerned have, with the agreement
of the Agency, placed under safeguards substitute nuclear material in accordance with paragraph
30(d) of this Agreement for the period of suspension. In addition, safeguards with respect to
plutonium contained in irradiated fuel which is transferred for the purpose of reprocessing may be
suspended for a period not to exceed six months if the State or States concerned have, with the
agreement of the Agency, placed under safeguards a quantity of uranium whose enrichment in the
isotope uranium-235 is not less than 0.9 (90%) and the uranium-235 content of which is equal in
weight to such plutonium. Upon expiration of the said six months or the completion of
reprocessing, whichever is earlier, safeguards shall, with the agreement of the Agency, be applied
to such plutonium and shall cease to apply to the uranium substituted therefor.
28. Under conditions specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency shall suspend safeguards
with respect to any parts of the facilities listed in the Annex which are removed for maintenance
or repair.
E. TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS
29. The termination of safeguards on items subject to this Agreement shall be implemented taking
into account the provisions of GOV/1621 (20 August 1973).
30. Nuclear material shall no longer be subject to safeguards under this Agreement after:
8
(a) It has been returned to the State that originally supplied it (whether directly or through the
Agency), if it was subject to safeguards only by reason of such supply and if:
(i) It was not improved while under safeguards; or
(ii) Any special fissionable material that was produced in it under safeguards has been
separated out, or safeguards with respect to such produced material have been terminated
; or
(b) The Agency has determined that:
(i) It was subject to safeguards only by reason of its use in a principal nuclear facility which
has been supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement, submitted to
safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral
arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement;
(ii) It has been removed from such a facility; and
(iii) Any special fissionable material that was produced in it under safeguards has been
separated out, or safeguards with respect to such produced material have been terminated;
or
(c) The Agency has determined that it has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that
it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or
has become practicably irrecoverable; or
(d) India has, with the agreement of the Agency, placed under safeguards, as a substitute, such
amount of the same element, not otherwise subject to safeguards, as the Agency has
determined contains fissionable isotopes:
(i) Whose weight (with due allowance for processing losses) is equal to or greater than the
weight of the fissionable isotopes of the material with respect to which safeguards are to
terminate; and
(ii) Whose ratio by weight to the total substituted element is similar to or greater than the
ratio by weight of the fissionable isotopes of the material with respect to which
safeguards are to terminate to the total weight of such material;
provided that the Agency may agree to the substitution of plutonium for uranium-235
contained in uranium whose enrichment is not greater than 0.05 (5.0 %); or
(e) It has been transferred out of India under paragraph 33(d) of this Agreement, provided that
such material shall again be subject to safeguards if it is returned to India; or
(f) The terms of this Agreement, pursuant to which it was subject to safeguards under this
Agreement, no longer apply, by expiration of this Agreement or otherwise.
31. If India wishes to use safeguarded source material for non-nuclear purposes, such as the
production of alloys or ceramics, it shall agree with the Agency on the circumstances under which
the safeguards on such material may be terminated.
32. Safeguards shall be terminated on a facility listed in the Annex after India and the Agency have
jointly determined that the facility is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the
point of view of safeguards. Safeguards on non-nuclear material, equipment and components
subject to this Agreement may be terminated as and when the non-nuclear material, equipment or
9
components have been returned to the supplier or arrangements have been made by the Agency to
safeguard the non-nuclear material, equipment or components in the State to which it is being
transferred, or when India and the Agency have jointly determined that the non-nuclear material,
equipment or component in question has been consumed, is no longer usable for any nuclear
activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards or has become practicably irrecoverable.
Safeguards may be terminated on heavy water upon India’s placing under safeguards as substitute
the same amount of heavy water of equivalent or better heavy water concentration.
F. TRANSFERS
33. No safeguarded nuclear material shall be transferred outside the jurisdiction of India until the
Agency has satisfied itself that one or more of the following conditions apply:
(a) The material is being returned, under the conditions specified in paragraph 30(a) of this
Agreement, to the State that originally supplied it; or
(b) The material is being transferred subject to the provisions of paragraph 26 or 27 of this
Agreement; or
(c) Arrangements have been made by the Agency to safeguard the material in the State to which
it is being transferred; or
(d) The material was not subject to safeguards pursuant to a project agreement and will be
subject, in the State to which it is being transferred, to safeguards other than those of the
Agency but generally consistent with such safeguards and accepted by the Agency.
34. India shall notify the Agency of its intention to transfer within its jurisdiction any nuclear
material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component subject to this Agreement to any facility
or location in India to which paragraph 11(f) applies and shall provide to the Agency, before such
transfer is effected, the necessary information to enable the Agency to make arrangements for the
application of safeguards to such nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component
after its transfer. The Agency shall also be given the opportunity as early as possible in advance of
such a transfer to review the design of the facility for the sole purpose of determining that the
arrangements provided for in this Agreement can be effectively applied. India may transfer the
nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component only after the Agency has
confirmed that it has made such arrangements.
35. India shall notify the Agency of its intention to transfer any nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment or component subject to this Agreement to a recipient which is not under the
jurisdiction of India. Except as provided for in paragraph 30(a) of this Agreement, such nuclear
material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component shall be so transferred only after the
Agency has informed India that it has satisfied itself that Agency safeguards will apply with
respect to the nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or component in the recipient
country. Upon receipt by the Agency of the notification of transfer from India and the
confirmation of receipt by the recipient country, safeguards on such nuclear material, non-nuclear
material, equipment or component shall be terminated under this Agreement.
36. The notifications referred to in paragraphs 34 and 35 of this Agreement shall be made to the
Agency sufficiently in advance to enable it to make the arrangements required before the transfer
is effected. The Agency shall promptly take any necessary action. The time limits for and the
contents of these notifications shall be set out in the Subsidiary Arrangements.
10
III. SAFEGUARDS PROCEDURES
A. GENERAL PROCEDURES
Introduction
37. The safeguards procedures to be applied by the Agency are those specified in this Agreement, as
well as such additional procedures as result from technological developments, and other
procedures as may be agreed to between the Agency and India. The safeguards procedures set
forth below shall be followed, as far as relevant, with respect to any item subject to this
Agreement.
38. The Agency shall conclude with India Subsidiary Arrangements concerning the implementation
of the safeguards procedures referred to above. The Subsidiary Arrangements shall also include
any necessary arrangements for the application of safeguards to any item subject to this
Agreement, including such containment and surveillance measures as are required for the
effective implementation of safeguards. The Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force no
later than six months after entry into force of this Agreement.
Design Review
39. The Agency shall review the design of principal nuclear facilities, for the sole purpose of
satisfying itself that a facility will permit the effective application of safeguards.
40. The design review of a principal nuclear facility shall take place at as early a stage as possible. In
particular, such review shall be carried out in the case of:
(a) An Agency project, before the project is approved;
(b) A bilateral or multilateral arrangement under which the responsibility for administering
safeguards is to be transferred to the Agency, or an activity or facility unilaterally submitted
by India, before the Agency assumes safeguards responsibilities with respect to the facility;
(c) A transfer of safeguarded nuclear material to a principal nuclear facility whose design has not
previously been reviewed, before such transfer takes place; and
(d) A significant modification of a principal nuclear facility whose design has previously been
reviewed, before such modification is undertaken.
41. To enable the Agency to perform the required design review, India shall submit to it relevant
design information sufficient for the purpose, including information on such basic characteristics
of the principal nuclear facility as may bear on the Agency's safeguards procedures. The Agency
shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its
responsibility under this section. It shall complete the review promptly after the submission of this
information by India and shall notify the latter of its conclusions without delay.
42. If the Agency wishes to examine design information which India regards as sensitive, the Agency
shall, if India so requests, conduct the examination on premises in India. Such information should
not be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remains readily available for
examination by the Agency in India.
Records
43. India shall arrange for the keeping of records with respect to principal nuclear facilities and also
with respect to all safeguarded nuclear material outside such facilities. For this purpose India and
11
the Agency shall agree on a system of records with respect to each facility and also with respect to
such material, on the basis of proposals to be submitted by India in sufficient time to allow the
Agency to review them before the records need to be kept.
44. All records shall be kept in English.
45. The records shall consist, as appropriate, of:
(a) Accounting records of all safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Operating records for principal nuclear facilities.
46. All records shall be retained for at least two years.
Reports
General Requirements
47. India shall submit to the Agency reports with respect to the production, processing and use of
safeguarded nuclear material in or outside principal nuclear facilities. For this purpose, India and
the Agency shall agree on a system of reports with respect to each facility and also with respect to
safeguarded nuclear material outside such facilities, on the basis of proposals to be submitted by
India in sufficient time to allow the Agency to review them before the reports need to be
submitted. The reports need include only such information as is relevant for the purpose of
safeguards.
48. All reports shall be submitted in English.
Routine Reports
49. Routine reports shall be based on the records compiled in accordance with paragraphs 43 to 46 of
this Agreement and shall consist, as appropriate, of:
(a) Accounting reports showing the receipt, transfer out, inventory and use of all safeguarded
nuclear material. The inventory shall indicate the nuclear and chemical composition and
physical form of all material and its location on the date of the report; and
(b) Operating reports showing the use that has been made of each principal nuclear facility since
the last report and, as far as possible, the programme of future work in the period until the
next routine report is expected to reach the Agency.
50. The first routine report shall be submitted as soon as:
(a) There is any safeguarded nuclear material to be accounted for; or
(b) The principal nuclear facility to which it relates is in a condition to operate.
Progress in Construction
51. The Agency may request information as to when particular stages in the construction of a
principal nuclear facility have been or are to be reached.
Special Reports
52. India shall report to the Agency without delay:
12
(a) If any unusual incident occurs involving actual or potential loss or destruction of, or damage
to, any safeguarded nuclear material or principal nuclear facility;
(b) If there is good reason to believe that safeguarded nuclear material is lost or unaccounted for
in quantities that exceed the normal operating and handling losses that have been accepted by
the Agency as characteristic of the facility; or
(c) Disruption of operation of facilities listed in the Annex on account of material violation or
breach of bilateral or multilateral arrangements to which India is a party.
53. India shall report to the Agency, as soon as possible, and in any case within two weeks, any
transfer not requiring advance notification that will result in a significant change (to be defined by
the Agency in agreement with India) in the quantity of safeguarded nuclear material in a principal
nuclear facility. Such report shall indicate the amount and nature of the material and its intended
use.
Amplification of Reports
54. At the Agency's request, India shall submit amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far
as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.
Inspections
General Procedures
55. The Agency may inspect any items subject to this Agreement.
56. The purpose of safeguards inspections under this Agreement shall be to verify compliance by
India with this Agreement and to assist India in complying with this Agreement and in resolving
any questions arising out of the implementation of safeguards.
57. The number, duration and intensity of inspections actually carried out shall be kept to the
minimum consistent with the effective implementation of safeguards, and if the Agency considers
that the authorized inspections are not all required, fewer shall be carried out.
58. Inspectors shall neither operate any facility themselves nor direct the staff of a facility to carry out
any particular operation.
Routine Inspections
59. Routine inspections may include, as appropriate:
(a) Audit of records and reports;
(b) Verification of the amount of safeguarded nuclear material by physical inspection,
measurement and sampling;
(c) Examination of principal nuclear facilities, including a check of their measuring instruments
and operating characteristics; and
(d) Check of the operations carried out at principal nuclear facilities.
60. Whenever the Agency has the right of access to a principal nuclear facility at all times, it may
perform inspections of which notice as required by paragraph 4 of the Inspectors Document need
13
not be given, in so far as this is necessary for the effective application of safeguards. The actual
procedures to implement these provisions shall be agreed upon between India and the Agency.
Initial Inspections of a Principal Nuclear Facility
61. To verify that the construction of a principal nuclear facility is in accordance with the design
reviewed by the Agency, an initial inspection or inspections of the facility may be carried out:
(a) As soon as possible after the facility has come under Agency safeguards, in the case of a
facility already in operation; and
(b) Before the facility starts to operate, in other cases.
62. The measuring instruments and operating characteristics of the facility shall be reviewed to the
extent necessary for the purpose of implementing safeguards. Instruments that will be used to
obtain data on the nuclear materials in the facility may be tested to determine their satisfactory
functioning. Such testing may include the observation by inspectors of commissioning or routine
tests by the staff of the facility, but shall not hamper or delay the construction, commissioning or
normal operation of the facility.
Special Inspections
63. The Agency may carry out special inspections if:
(a) The study of a report indicates that such inspection is desirable; or
(b) Any unforeseen circumstance requires immediate action.
The Board shall subsequently be informed of the reasons for and the results of each such
inspection.
64. The Agency may also carry out special inspections of substantial amounts of safeguarded nuclear
material that are to be transferred outside the jurisdiction of India, for which purpose India shall
give the Agency sufficient advance notice of any such proposed transfer.
B. SPECIAL PROCEDURES FOR REACTORS
Reports
65. The frequency of submission of routine reports shall be agreed between the Agency and India,
taking into account the frequency established for routine inspections. However, at least two such
reports shall be submitted each year and in no case shall more than 12 such reports be required in
any year.
Inspections
66. One of the initial inspections of a reactor shall if possible be made just before the reactor first
reaches criticality.
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67. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of a reactor and of the safeguarded nuclear
material in it shall be determined from the following table:
Whichever is the largest of:
(a) Facility inventory (including loading);
(b) Annual throughput;
(c) Maximum potential annual production of special
fissionable material
(Effective kilograms of nuclear material)
Maximum number
of routine inspections
annually
Up to 1
More than 1 and up to 5
More than 5 and up to 10
More than 10 and up to 15
More than 15 and up to 20
More than 20 and up to 25
More than 25 and up to 30
More than 30 and up to 35
More than 35 and up to 40
More than 40 and up to 45
More than 45 and up to 50
More than 50 and up to 55
More than 55 and up to 60
More than 60
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Right of access at all times
68. The actual frequency of inspection of a reactor shall take account of:
(a) The fact that India possesses irradiated fuel reprocessing facilities:
(b) The nature of the reactor; and
(c) The nature and amount of the nuclear material produced or used in the reactor.
C. SPECIAL PROCEDURES RELATING TO SAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR
MATERIAL OUTSIDE PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR FACILITIES
Nuclear Material in Research and Development Facilities
Routine Reports
69. Only accounting reports need be submitted in respect of nuclear material in research and
development facilities. The frequency of submission of such routine reports shall be agreed
between the Agency and India, taking into account the frequency established for routine
inspections; however, at least one such report shall be submitted each year and in no case shall
more than 12 such reports be required in any year.
Routine Inspections
70. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of safeguarded nuclear material in a research and
development facility shall be that specified in the table in paragraph 67 of this Agreement for the
total amount of material in the facility.
15
Source Material in Sealed Storage
71. The following simplified procedures for safeguarding stockpiled source material shall be applied
if India undertakes to store such material in a sealed storage facility and not to remove it
therefrom without previously informing the Agency.
Design of Storage Facilities
72. India shall submit to the Agency information on the design of each sealed storage facility and
agree with the Agency on the method and procedure for sealing it.
Routine Reports
73. Two routine accounting reports in respect of source material in sealed storage shall be submitted
each year.
Routine Inspections
74. The Agency may perform one routine inspection of each sealed storage facility annually.
Removal of Material
75. India may remove safeguarded source material from a sealed storage facility after informing the
Agency of the amount, type and intended use of the material to be removed, and providing
sufficient other data in time to enable the Agency to continue safeguarding the material after it has
been removed.
Nuclear Material in Other Locations
76. Except to the extent that safeguarded nuclear material outside of principal nuclear facilities is
covered by any of the provisions set forth in paragraphs 69 to 75 of this Agreement, the following
procedures shall be applied with respect to such material (for example, source material stored
elsewhere than in a sealed storage facility, or special fissionable material used in a sealed neutron
source in the field).
Routine Reports
77. Routine accounting reports in respect of all safeguarded nuclear material in this category shall be
submitted periodically. The frequency of submission of such reports shall be agreed between the
Agency and India, taking into account the frequency established for routine inspections; however,
at least one such report shall be submitted each year and in no case shall more than 12 such
reports be required in any year.
Routine Inspections
78. The maximum frequency of routine inspections of safeguarded nuclear material in this category
shall be one inspection annually if the total amount of such material does not exceed five effective
kilograms, and shall be determined from the table in paragraph 67 of this Agreement if the
amount is greater.
D. PROVISIONS FOR REPROCESSING PLANTS
Introduction
79. Additional procedures applicable to the safeguarding of reprocessing plants are set out below.
16
Special Procedures
Reports
80. The frequency of submission of routine reports shall be once each calendar month.
Inspections
81. A reprocessing plant having an annual throughput not exceeding 5 effective kilograms of nuclear
material, and the safeguarded nuclear material in it, may be routinely inspected twice a year.
A reprocessing plant, having an annual throughput exceeding 5 effective kilograms of nuclear
material, and the safeguarded nuclear material in it, may be inspected at all times. The
arrangements for inspections set forth in paragraph 60 of this Agreement shall apply to all
inspections to be made under this paragraph. It is understood that for plants having an annual
throughput of more than 60 effective kilograms, the right of access at all times would be normally
be implemented by means of continuous inspection.
82. When a reprocessing plant is under Agency safeguards only because it contains safeguarded
nuclear material, the inspection frequency shall be based on the rate of delivery of safeguarded
nuclear material.
83. India and the Agency shall cooperate in making all the necessary arrangements to facilitate the
taking, shipping or analysis of samples, due account being taken of the limitations imposed by the
characteristics of a plant already in operation when placed under Agency safeguards.
Mixtures of Safeguarded and Unsafeguarded Nuclear Material
84. India and the Agency may agree on the following special arrangements in the case of a
reprocessing plant which has not been supplied wholly or substantially under a project agreement,
submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or multilateral
arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement, and in which
safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear materials are present:
(a) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) below, the Agency shall restrict its safeguards
procedures to the area in which irradiated fuel is stored, until such time as all or any part of
such fuel is transferred out of the storage area into other parts of the plant. Safeguards
procedures shall cease to apply to the storage area or plant when either contains no
safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Where possible, safeguarded nuclear material shall be measured and sampled separately from
unsafeguarded material, and at as early a stage as possible. Where separate measurement,
sampling or processing are not possible, the whole of the material being processed in that
campaign shall be subject to the safeguards procedures set out in Part III.D of this Agreement.
At the conclusion of the processing the nuclear material that is thereafter to be safeguarded
shall be selected by agreement between India and the Agency from the whole output of the
plant resulting from that campaign, due account being taken of any processing losses accepted
by the Agency.
E. PROVISIONS FOR CONVERSION PLANTS, ENRICHMENT PLANTS AND
FABRICATION PLANTS
Introduction
85. Additional procedures applicable to conversion plants and fabrication plants are set out below.
This terminology is synonymous with the term "a plant for processing or fabricating nuclear
17
material (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant)" which is used in paragraph 117 of this
Agreement.
86. In the event that India decides to offer an enrichment plant in the future as a facility subject to this
Agreement, the Agency and India shall consult and agree on the application of the Agency’s
safeguards procedures for enrichment plants before any such facility is added to the Annex.
Special Procedures
Reports
87. The frequency of submission of routine reports shall be once each calendar month.
Inspections
88. A conversion plant or a fabrication plant which has been supplied wholly or substantially under a
project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a
bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards
agreement, and the nuclear material in it, may be inspected at all times if the plant inventory at
any time, or the annual input, of nuclear material exceeds five effective kilograms. Where neither
the inventory at any time, nor the annual input, exceeds five effective kilograms of nuclear
material, the routine inspections shall not exceed two a year. The arrangements for inspections set
forth in paragraph 57 of this Agreement shall apply to all inspections to be made under this
paragraph. It is understood that, for plants having an inventory at any time, or an annual input, of
more than 60 effective kilograms, the right of access at all times would normally be implemented
by means of continuous inspection. Where neither the inventory at any time nor the annual input
exceeds one effective kilogram of nuclear material, the plant would not normally be subject to
routine inspection.
89. When a conversion plant or a fabrication plant which has not been supplied wholly or
substantially under a project agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by
the parties to a bilateral or multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under
a safeguards agreement contains safeguarded nuclear material, the frequency of routine
inspections shall be based on the inventory at any time and the annual input of safeguarded
nuclear material. Where the inventory at any time, or the annual input, of safeguarded nuclear
material exceeds five effective kilograms the plant may be inspected at all times. Where neither
the inventory at any time, nor the annual input, exceeds five effective kilograms of safeguarded
nuclear material, the routine inspections shall not exceed two a year. The arrangements for
inspection set forth in paragraph 60 shall apply to all inspections to be made under this paragraph.
It is understood that, for plants having an inventory at any time, or an annual input, of more than
60 effective kilograms, the right of access at all times would normally be implemented by means
of continuous inspection. Where neither the inventory at any time nor the annual input exceeds
one effective kilogram of nuclear material, the plant would not normally be subject to routine
inspection.
90. The intensity of inspection of safeguarded nuclear material at various steps in a conversion plant
or a fabrication plant shall take account of the nature, isotopic composition and amount of
safeguarded nuclear material in the plant. Safeguards shall be applied in accordance with the
general principles set forth in paragraphs 4 to 8 of this Agreement. Emphasis shall be placed on
inspection to control uranium of high enrichments and plutonium.
91. Where a plant may handle safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material, India shall notify the
Agency in advance of the programme for handling safeguarded batches to enable the Agency to
make inspections during these periods, due account being also taken of the arrangements under
paragraph 92 of this Agreement.
18
92. India and the Agency shall cooperate in making all the necessary arrangements to facilitate the
preparation of inventories of safeguarded nuclear material and the taking, shipping and/or analysis
of samples, due account being taken of the limitations imposed by the characteristics of a plant
already in operation when placed under Agency safeguards.
Residues, Scrap and Waste
93. India shall ensure that safeguarded nuclear material contained in residues, scrap or waste created
during conversion or fabrication is recovered, as far as is practicable, in its facilities and within a
reasonable period of time. If such recovery is not considered practicable by India, India and the
Agency shall cooperate in making arrangements to account for and dispose of the material.
Safeguarded and Unsafeguarded Nuclear Material
94. India and the Agency may agree on the following special arrangements in the case of a conversion
plant or a fabrication plant which has not been supplied wholly or substantially under a project
agreement, submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement by the parties to a bilateral or
multilateral arrangement or unilaterally submitted to safeguards under a safeguards agreement,
and in which safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material are both present:
(a) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) below, the Agency shall restrict its safeguards
procedures to the area in which safeguarded nuclear material is stored, until such time as all
or any part of such nuclear material is transferred out of the storage area into other parts of the
plant. Safeguards procedures shall cease to be applied to the storage area or plant when it
contains no safeguarded nuclear material; and
(b) Where possible, safeguarded nuclear material shall be measured and sampled separately from
unsafeguarded nuclear material, and at as early a stage as possible. Where separate
measurement, sampling or processing is not possible, any nuclear material containing
safeguarded nuclear material shall be subject to the safeguards procedures set out in Part III.E
of this Agreement. At the conclusion of processing, the nuclear material that is thereafter to
be safeguarded shall be selected, in accordance with paragraph 96 of this Agreement when
applicable, by agreement between India and the Agency, due account being taken of any
processing losses accepted by the Agency.
Blending of Nuclear Material
95. When safeguarded nuclear material is to be blended with either safeguarded or unsafeguarded
nuclear material, India shall notify the Agency sufficiently in advance of the programme of
blending to enable the Agency to exercise its right to obtain evidence, through inspection of the
blending operation or otherwise, that the blending is performed according to the programme.
96. When safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear material are blended, if the ratio of fissionable
isotopes in the safeguarded component going into the blend to all the fissionable isotopes in the
blend is 0.3 or greater, and if the concentration of fissionable isotopes in the unsafeguarded
nuclear material is increased by such blending, then the whole blend shall remain subject to
safeguards. In other cases, the following procedures shall apply:
(a) Plutonium/plutonium blending: The quantity of the blend that shall continue to be
safeguarded shall be such that its weight, when multiplied by the square of the weight fraction
of contained fissionable isotopes, is not less than the weight of originally safeguarded
plutonium multiplied by the square of the weight fraction of fissionable isotopes therein,
provided however that:
19
(i) In cases where the weight of the whole blend, when multiplied by the square of the
weight fraction of contained fissionable isotopes, is less than the weight of originally
safeguarded plutonium multiplied by the square of the weight fraction of fissionable
isotopes therein, the whole of the blend shall be safeguarded; and
(ii) The number of fissionable atoms in the portion of the blend that shall continue to be
under safeguards shall in no case be less than the number of fissionable atoms in the
originally safeguarded plutonium;
(b) Uranium/uranium blending: The quantity of the blend that shall continue to be safeguarded
shall be such that the number of effective kilograms is not less than the number of effective
kilograms in the originally safeguarded uranium, provided however that:
(i) In cases where the number of effective kilograms in the whole blend is less than in the
safeguarded uranium, the whole of the blend shall be safeguarded; and
(ii) The number of fissionable atoms in the portion of the blend that shall continue to be
under safeguards shall in no case be less than the number of fissionable atoms in the
originally safeguarded uranium;
(c) Uranium/plutonium blending: The whole of the resultant blend shall be safeguarded until the
uranium and the plutonium constituents are separated. After separation of the uranium and
plutonium, safeguards shall apply to the originally safeguarded component; and
(d) Due account shall be taken of any processing losses agreed upon between India and the
Agency.
IV. AGENCY INSPECTORS
97. The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 10 and 12 to 14, inclusive, of the Inspectors Document shall
apply to Agency inspectors performing functions pursuant to this Agreement. However,
paragraph 4 of the Inspectors Document shall not apply with regard to any facility or to nuclear
material to which the Agency has access at all times. The actual procedures to implement
paragraph 60 of this Agreement shall be agreed to between the Agency and India.
98. The relevant provisions of the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency
(INFCIRC/9/Rev.2) shall apply to the Agency, its inspectors performing functions under this
Agreement and to any property of the Agency used by them in the performance of their functions
under this Agreement.
V. PHYSICAL PROTECTION
99. India shall take all suitable measures necessary for the physical protection of the facilities and
nuclear material subject to this Agreement, taking into account the recommendations made in
Agency's document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4, as may be amended from time to time.
VI. SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL
100. India shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all items subject
to safeguards under this Agreement, in accordance with provisions to be set out in the Subsidiary
Arrangements.
20
VII. FINANCE
101. India and the Agency shall each bear any expense incurred in the implementation of their
responsibilities under this Agreement. The Agency shall reimburse India for any special expenses,
including those referred to in paragraph 6 of the Inspectors Document, incurred by India or
persons under its jurisdiction at the written request of the Agency, if India notified the Agency
before the expense was incurred that reimbursement would be required. These provisions shall not
prejudice the allocation of expenses attributable to a failure by either India or the Agency to
comply with this Agreement.
102. India shall ensure that any protection against third party liability, including any insurance or
other financial security, in respect of a nuclear incident occurring in a facility under its
jurisdiction shall apply to the Agency and its inspectors when carrying out their functions under
this Agreement as that protection applies to nationals of India.
VIII. NON-COMPLIANCE
103. If the Board determines in accordance with Article XII.C of the Statute of the Agency that
there has been any non-compliance by India with this Agreement, the Board shall call upon India
to remedy such non-compliance forthwith, and shall make such reports as it deems appropriate. In
the event of failure by India to take full remedial action within a reasonable time, the Board may
take any other measures provided for in Article XII.C of the Statute. The Agency shall promptly
notify India in the event of any determination by the Board pursuant in this regard.
IX. COOPERATION, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE AGREEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
104. The Agency and India shall cooperate to facilitate the implementation of this Agreement.
105. At the request of either India or the Agency, there shall be consultations about any question
arising out of the interpretation or application of this Agreement. India and the Agency shall
endeavour to settle by negotiation any dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this
Agreement. India shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation
or application of the Agreement be considered by the Board. The Board shall invite India to
participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board.
106. In the event of any question or questions arising from the implementation of this Agreement,
the Agency shall provide India with an opportunity to clarify and facilitate the resolution of such
questions. The Agency shall not draw any conclusions in connection with the question or
questions until India has had an opportunity to provide clarifications.
X. FINAL CLAUSES
107. India and the Agency shall, at the request of either of them, consult about amending this
Agreement.
108. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Agency receives from India
written notification that India’s statutory and/or constitutional requirements for entry into force
have been met.
109. This Agreement shall remain in force until, in accordance with its provisions, safeguards have
been terminated on all items subject to this Agreement, or until terminated by mutual agreement
of the parties to this Agreement.
21
XI. DEFINITIONS
110. "Agency" means the International Atomic Energy Agency.
111. "Board" means the Board of Governors of the Agency.
112. "Campaign" means the period during which the chemical processing equipment in a
reprocessing plant is operated between two successive wash-outs of the nuclear material present
in the equipment.
113. "Conversion plant" means a facility (excepting a mine or ore-processing plant) to improve
unirradiated nuclear material, or irradiated nuclear material that has been separated from fission
products, by changing its chemical or physical form so as to facilitate further use or processing.
The term conversion plant includes the facility's storage and analytical sections. The term does
not include a plant intended for separating the isotopes of nuclear material.
114. "Director General" means the Director General of the Agency.
115. "Effective kilograms" means:
(i) In the case of plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
(ii) In the case of uranium with an enrichment of 0.01 (1 %) and above, its weight in
kilograms multiplied by the square of its enrichment;
(iii) In the case of uranium with an enrichment below 0.01 (1 %) and above 0.005 (0.5 %), its
weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and
(iv) In the case of depleted uranium with an enrichment of 0.005 (0.5 %) or below, and in the
case of thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.
116. "Enrichment plant" means a plant for separating the isotopes of nuclear material.
117. "Facility" means, for the purposes of this Agreement:
(i) A "principal nuclear facility", which means a reactor, a plant for processing nuclear
material irradiated in a reactor, a plant for separating the isotopes of a nuclear material, a
plant for processing or fabricating nuclear material (excepting a mine or ore-processing
plant) or a facility or plant of such other type as may be designated by the Board from
time to time, including associated storage facilities, as well as a critical facility or a
separate storage installation;
(ii) A research and development facility as defined in paragraph 127 of this Agreement;
(iii) Any location where nuclear material in amounts greater than one effective kilogram is
customarily used;
(iv) A plant for the upgrading of heavy water or a separate storage installation for heavy
water.
118. "Fabrication plant" means a plant to manufacture fuel elements or other components
containing nuclear material and includes the plant’s storage and analytical sections.
119. "Improved" means, with respect to nuclear material, that either:
22
(i) The concentration of fissionable isotopes in it has been increased; or
(ii) The amount of chemically separable fissionable isotopes in it has been increased; or
(iii) Its chemical or physical form has been changed so as to facilitate further use or
processing.
120. "Inspector" means an Agency official designated in accordance with the Inspectors
Document.
121. "Inspectors Document" means the Annex to the Agency's document GC(V)/INF/39.
122. "Nuclear material" means any source or special fissionable material as defined in Article XX
of the Statute.
123. "Produced, processed or used" means any utilization or any alteration of the physical or
chemical form or composition, including any change of the isotopic composition, of nuclear
material;
124. "Project agreement" means a safeguards agreement relating to an Agency project and
containing provisions as foreseen in Article XI.F.4.(b) of the Statute.
125. "Reactor" means any device in which a controlled, self-sustaining fission chain-reaction can
be maintained.
126. "Reprocessing plant" means a facility to separate irradiated nuclear materials and fission
products, and includes the facility’s head-end treatment section and its associated storage and
analytical sections. This term is synonymous with the term "a plant for processing nuclear
material irradiated in a reactor" which is used in paragraph 117 of this Agreement.
127. "Research and development facility" means a facility, other than a principal nuclear facility,
used for research or development in the field of nuclear energy.
128. "Statute" means the Statute of the Agency.
129. "Throughput" means the rate at which nuclear material is introduced into a facility operating
at full capacity.
130. "Unilaterally submitted" means submitted by India to Agency safeguards.
DONE at Vienna, on the day of 2008, in duplicate, in the English language.
For the GOVERNMENT OF INDIA: For the INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY:
23
ANNEX
LIST OF FACILITIES SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS UNDER THE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE
APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO CIVILIAN NUCLEAR
FACILITIES
FACILITY OFFERED FOR
SAFEGUARDS BY INDIA
DATE OF RECEIPT OF
NOTIFICATION
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