How to commercialize Indo US Nuclear Deal,here you are!Government of India has nothing to do with prizm!Why the Obama administration is obsessed with India?
The Brazilian government says US vice president Joe Biden has telephoned President Dilma Rousseff in an effort to ease tensions created by the disclosure that the United States collected data on billions of telephone and email conversations in Latin America's biggest nation.
So what? America has done the same in India with active cooperation from government of India and it defines the strategic partnership very well which amounts to sedition, the charge which is framed against anyone who speaks of resistance against the reforms meaning to defend US stakes in India!
Palash Biswas
Email:palashbiswaskl@gamial.com
Skype:palash.biswas
The cat jumped out of the bag.We have been writing soince beginning that then president Bush was seeking an escape route to bailout the infamous US war civilwar economy.It was the only option which he tried and succeeded. America succeeded to transfer the war zone right into our heart, in South Asia with the nuclear deal which was meant to open up Indian market for US weapons.Commercialisation means the accomplishment of the unfinished task of Indo US strategic relationship. Thus, Joe Bidden has come down from Washington.That is why India and the US on Tuesday discussed how to take forward the commercial aspects of the civil nuclear agreement.US today stressed the need for removal of bottlenecks to enhance trade ties with India and emphasised on the reforms process to encourage business as Vice President Joseph Biden held meetings with top Indian leadership, including Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.It is noteworthy,neither in washington nor in India, the corporate worldbank IMF goverment of India official lodged any protest against surveillance.However,US vice president Joe Biden had to call Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff about surveillance.Government of India has nothing to do with prizm!Rather the corporate government of India is obliged for US surveillance as our internal security is dependent on US feedback.More over,India has opted for digital biometric citizenship for prismalike surveillance.Hence,UID is linked to every essential service and civic and human rights being subjected to suspention.
Why the Obama administration is obsessed with India? Barack Obama will host its leader in the fall: But why is India the subject of such a concerted American charm offensive?
The answer essentially boils down to money, military hardware and a shared love of freedom — to paraphrase the opinions of a number of experts.
Some believe the world's two biggest democracies will ultimately "shape the destiny of the 21st century."
According to the sources, the two sides discussed ways to boost trade ties, with Biden expressing concerns of American companies and stressing on the need to remove hurdles to do business here. On his part, Singh also emphasised the need for greater commercial engagement for India to meet its own quest for economic growth.
The Cumulative FDI Equity Inflows from the US during the period April 2000 to January 2012 amounted to about USD 10.36 billion, constituting 6 per cent of the total FDI into India.Biden also outlined President Obama's and his own personal commitment and interest in expansion of India-US bilateral relations and referred to India's own Look East policy and its complementarity with the US re-balancing towards Asia.
However, it has officially clarified that this was only one of the issues apart from energy, innovation as well as regional issues such as Afghanistan and the neighbourhood which came up for discussions during the one-hour long meeting that the visiting US Vice-President Joe Biden had with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.India and the US have still to work out the commercial details of a contract between Nuclear Power Corporation of India Ltd. (NPCIL) and the US' Westinghouse Electric for setting up the first US reactor in India.US Secretary of State John Kerry, who was in India last month, had said that India and the US were committed to "fully implement" the Indo-US civil nuclear deal and arrive at a common agreement "by September this year" for the first US reactor in India.
Biden, who arrived here yesterday on a four-day maiden visit, held comprehensive talks with Singh after which, sources said, the Prime Minister will undertake a bilateral visit to the US from third week of September and will meet President Barack Obama apart from attending the UN General Assembly in New York.The probable dates mentioned are September 20-26 but there is no confirmation.
The Prime Minister underlined the significance of economic exchange between the two countries in helping India to tackle the host of issues relating to enhancement of the well-being of the Indian people.National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon, Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai, Ambassador Nirupama Rao and Foreign Secretary-designate Sujatha Singh were present during the talks, said sources.
Visting US Vice president Joe Biden today said America and India have common goals in the emerging global scenario as he called on President Pranab Mukherjeein New Delhi. Mukherjee, for his part, said India-US relations "are based on shared fundamental values and a growing convergence of interests".
Biden, on his second day of visit to the country, met Mukherjee at the Rashtrapti Bhawan in the evening.
Earlier in the day, the visiting dignitary also had wide ranging discussions on bilateral relations as well as regional issues with Vice-President Hamid Ansari. Biden outlined US President Obama's and his own personal commitment and interest in expansion of India-US bilateral relations.
The Brazilian government says US vice president Joe Biden has telephoned President Dilma Rousseff in an effort to ease tensions created by the disclosure that the United States collected data on billions of telephone and email conversations in Latin America's biggest nation.
So what. America has done the same in India with active cooperation from government of India and it defines the strategic partnership very well which amounts to sedition, the charge which is framed against anyone who speaks of resistance against the reforms meaning to defend US stakes in India.The Brazilian presidency's website says Rousseff and Biden spoke for 25 minutes on Friday night.After the phone conversation, communications minister Helena Chagas told reporters that Biden called Rousseff to offer explanations and to "express his regret over the negative repercussions caused by the disclosures".
President Mukherjee, welcoming Biden, said India always gave high priority to its relations with the United States of Amercia and it appreciates the strong voice of support for India-related issues in the Senate, including the bilateral Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement.
"India accords the highest priority to its relationship with the United States. India-US relations are based on shared fundamental values and a growing convergence of interests," a Rashtrapati Bhawan statement, released after the meeting, quoting Mukherjee said.
Biden, according to the statement, said relations between the two countries were critical for the entire region.
"The issue is no longer what the US can do for India but what the two countries can do together in the world. No other two countries have so much at stake or in common in the emerging global scenario," the statement quoted Biden as saying.
This issue has been subverted with a newsflash rathe amusing.As BJP president Rajnath Singh is based in USA batting for visa for Narendra Modi, 65 Members of Parliament have written letters to President Barack Obama, urging the US administration to maintain the current policy of denying visa to him.Rajnath Singh told a press conference in New York on Sunday that he would appeal to the US lawmakers to impress on the Administration to remove the visa ban on Modi imposed after the 2002 post-Godhra riots. The denial came on grounds of human rights violations in Gujarat with Modi as chief minister.
The signatories to the letters include Sitaram Yechury of CPM and M P Achuthan of CPI, both Rajya Sabha members.
"We wish to respectfully urge you to maintain the current policy of denying Mr Modi a visa to the United States," the MPs belonging to 12 parties have said in identical letters to Obama.
One letter was signed by 25 Rajya Sabha members and the other by 40 Lok Sabha members written on November 26 and December 5, 2012 respectively and re-faxed to the White House on Sunday.
Copies of the letters were provided by the Indian American Muslim Council (IAMC) as Rajnath Singh, reached Washington to meet US lawmakers, thinktanks and US government officials during which he said he will urge the Americans to lift the ban on visa for Modi.
Mohammed Adeeb, Independent MP from Rajya Sabha, who took the initiative for this campaign, said they sent these letters to Obama again because of the current campaign and initiative being taken by Rajnath Singh for getting a US visa for Modi. The letters were being made public only now, he added.
Space Tech Cooperation On Agenda
Last Update: July 22nd, 2013 - IST
India's first Mars Orbit mission this year offers an "exciting opportunity" for Indo-US collaboration in the field of space technology.
Since the two sides are keen on increasing commercial space cooperation and create opportunities for the US and Indian companies, this would be on the agenda of discussions between the two countries when US vice-president Joe Biden begins India visit on Monday.
Building on the highly successful Chandrayaan-1 lunar mission, the Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Nasa) have agreed to explore further cooperation in such fields as planetary science and heliophysics, as well as potential future missions to the moon and Mars.
Infact, Nasa is providing deep space navigation and tracking support services to the Mars mission scheduled for October-November during the non-visible period of the Indian Deep Space Network.
According to analysts, the US-India space cooperation is sure to benefit those beyond the borders of both respective nations.
"Collaboration between India and the US into the sphere of deep space exploration would fuse talented agencies and experts in both nations to a degree not previously seen.
Through this partnership, new discoveries and accelerated progress are certain which will in turn serve to assist researchers in all spacefaring states," observed Boston-based foreign affairs and strategic policy expert Matthew Hoey.
"US-India relations have been generally disappointing since the civil-nuclear deal. Despite the great efforts by the Bush administration, the deal did not produce tangible benefits. Cooperation on space science and exploration is one area where we can pick up the pace," observed Michael Krepon, Co-founder, The Stimson Center, Washington DC.
With the removal of Isro subordinate entities from the US Entity List at the 2011 Civil Space Joint Working Group meeting and additional measures taken since have further expanded the possibilities for trade and cooperation in civil space.
The India-US space cooperation has become a signature aspect of this science, technology, and innovation cooperation, highlighting both the constancy of their mutual respect and appreciation for each other's capabilities through the decades, as well as the vast potential.
Biden's visit to India to keep up the 'momentum' in ties
July 20, 2013
WASHINTON/NEW DELHI
Arriving in India Monday on a four-day visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is expected to focus on four key areas – trade, energy and climate, defence and regional cooperation – during his talks here as the US seeks to keep up the momentum in ties with a strategic partner.
"India is obviously a key player and increasingly so in the Asia Pacific region," a senior administration official said in a White House teleconference call Friday ahead of the trip aimed at outlining the US vision of moving forward with its policy of Asia Pacific rebalance.
Biden's visit, his first to India after becoming vice president, comes a month after that of US Secretary of State John Kerry that was seen as a move to infuse momentum in India-US ties.
The Democratic Party politician, who is visiting India with his wife Jill Biden, is to meet Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on Tuesday. He will call on President Pranab Mukherjee and Vice President Mohammad Hamid Ansari as well as meet United Progressive Alliance chairperson Sonia Gandhi, opposition BJP leader Sushma Swaraj among other leaders, before travelling to Mumbai for the second leg of his tour.
"The visit is a continuation of high-level interactions between the two countries. There is also the possibility of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh visiting the US later this year," said a source in New Delhi.
The issues on the table would include enhancement of economic ties, greater defence cooperation, on taking forward their civil nuclear cooperation and Afghanistan, among other issues, said the source.
India and the US have still to work out the commercial details of a contract between Nuclear Power Corporation ofIndia Ltd. (NPCIL) and US' Westinghouse Electric for setting up the first US reactor in India.
Kerry, during a joint press conference with Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid last month had said that both sides were committed to "fully implement" the Indo-US civil nuclear deal and arrive at a common agreement "by September this year" for the first US reactor in India.
Asked whether it would be implemented by September, the Indian official said "it is early, we still have some time".India's nuclear-liability law, which puts the onus on the supplier, is a factor on which the US has been seeking clarifications.
India and the US would also discuss the recent FDI reforms and the prospect of India purchasing LNG from the US, following the findings of large deposits of shale gas in the US.
At present cooperation with the US in the field of LNG imports is held up because American law requires case-by-case exemptions to countries that do not have a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US, said the source. The US has now begun cooperation with Japan, a non-FTA partner, for export of LNG, which holds promise for India. American shale gas, liquefied gas found trapped between layers of shale, is cheap. "If this opens up, it will change the whole energy equation," said the source.
On Wednesday, Biden is to deliver a speech at the Bombay Stock Exchange on US-India partnership and on Thursday, he is scheduled to deliver a speech on women's empowerment at the Indian Institute of Technology in Mumbai.
Ahead of his visit, the US has welcomed India's decision to increase foreign direct investment in key sectors likedefence, telecom and insurance.
Both sides are also expected to discuss US concerns on India's intellectual property regime, which the US feels hampers India's ability to attract foreign investment.
A recent report by the US Chamber of Commerce had been critical of India's IP regime and said India needed to strengthen its intellectual property regime.
Immigration issues are also likely to figure in the talks, with New Delhi voicing its concerns over a bill passed recently by the senate that overhauls the H-1B provision severely impacting Indian tech firms operating in the US such as Infosys, Wipro, TCS and Satyam Mahindra.
Afghanistan, the drawdown of the US-led international forces in 2014 and the earlier proposed talks with the Taliban as well as the new regime in Pakistan are also likely to figure in the talks.
He leaves for Singapore on July 25.
http://www.canindia.com/2013/07/bidens-visit-to-india-to-keep-up-the-momentum-in-ties/
Ian Johnston, Staff Writer, NBC News writes:
Here are five reasons why India is feeling the love from the United States:
1. A bastion of democracy
Obama said the relationship between India and the U.S. would be one of the "defining partnerships" of the 21st century while visiting the country in 2010, praising its tradition of tolerance and its free market economy.
Ron Somers, president of the U.S.-India Business Council, went further.
"It's going to be these two democracies that shape the destiny of the 21st century," he said. "These are beacons of freedom and democracy on opposite sides of the planet and we've got to stick together with our close friends and believe in these principles."
It was a partnership based on "democracy" and "a love, demand and insistence on freedom," Somers added, while stressing these were not reasons to not trade with China.
Jody Venkatesan, national political director for the Republican Indian Committee in the U.S., said India's importance had been recognized by George W. Bush during his time in office.
"The Bush administration made great overtures to the Indian-American community and toward India in general," he said. "I think India has a strategic importance in terms of economic and intelligence purposes and freedom around the world."
Roberto Schmidt / AFP - Getty Images, file
Indian university students celebrate after hearing that President Barrack Obama had been re-elected during an election party at a hotel in Delhi on November 7, 2012.
He said he felt relations between ordinary Indian and American people were also in a good place. "The Indian-American community has never betrayed the trust of the American public — and that's huge," he said.
But some in India believe American commitment to democratic values is not quite as strong as it should be.
Brahma Chellaney, a former adviser to India's National Security Council, said India was concerned that the U.S. used its promotion of democracy as a political tool in some parts of the world "while staying quiet on China."
"The Americans don't speak about Tibet at all and don't speak much about human rights" in China, he said by phone from New Delhi.
2. Booming economy
India's economy has been growing at rates that rival the boom in China.
According to the World Bank, India's gross domestic product rose from $1.2 trillion in 2008 to more than $1.8 trillion in 2012 – a rise of 50 percent during a time when much of the world was going through the worst economic hardship for decades.
"Europe, unfortunately, is flat on its back economically and China is also having challenges with their economy," said Somers, of the U.S.-India Business Council. "The United States and India need to be developing a greater economic partnership now more than ever."
The amount of two-way trade between India and the United States has quadrupled in just seven years -- from $25 billion in 2006 to about $100 billion in 2013, he said.
A senior Obama administration official said there was "no reason" that the current level of trade between the two countries could not be "five times as much." Biden plans to raise issues about U.S. investment during his visit.
Ten years ago, defense trade between the two countries was worth just $100 million. Somers said this had since risen to $10 billion and stressed India had billions more to spend on defense, particularly as it seeks to expand its navy.
"In the recent floods in Uttarakhand, those were [U.S.-made] C-17 and C-130J aircraft that were helping bring in medical supplies and helping rescue people," he said.
The Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement of 2008 saw the United States agree "to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation" with India, effectively ending India's isolation as a nuclear state following its nuclear bomb test in 1974.
Achin Vanaik, a professor at the political science department of Delhi University, said the deal was hugely important to India, but suggested its government's later decision to spend about $20 billion on French fighter jets, rather than American ones, was a disappointment to Washington.
"The Americans thought after the U.S. nuclear deal the Indians would buy their fighter planes, but it ended up with the Indians buying from the French -- that's a huge thing," he said. "It obviously annoyed the Americans to some extent. They expected certain pay-offs."
Somers, who was closely involved in the nuclear deal, strongly denied any suggestion of a "quid pro quo" on arms sales.
However, he admitted there were other tensions, saying U.S. businesses had concerns about enforcement of intellectual property rights in India and also about regional differences about how taxes are applied.
And U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman has also expressed concern about efforts to stimulate the economy by forcing Indian companies to buy home-produced goods.
3. A key ally in the war on terror
India has become a close ally of the United States in the fight against Islamist militants after suffering its own terrorist attacks.
Three months after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, India's parliament in New Delhi was stormed by five men armed with guns, grenades and other explosives. Ten people died before the attackers were killed.
And in 2008, 166 people were killed when gunmen attacked a Jewish center and two five-star hotels in Mumbai. India has blamed the attack on Pakistan-based militants.
But recently the relationship has hit a rocky patch over the prospect of a U.S. peace deal with the Taliban in Afghanistan, something India fears would give its arch-rival Pakistan greater power in the region.
Chellaney, the former adviser to India's National Security Council who now professor of strategic studies at the Centre for Policy Research in New Delhi, said that India was "greatly troubled" by talk of a deal and believed the "political rehabilitation of the Taliban will be very injurious to regional security."
Parivartan Sharma / Reuters, file
Members of the All India Anti-Terrorist Front hold portraits of President Barack Obama and Osama bin Laden during a pro-U.S. rally as they celebrate the al Qaeda leader's death at Noida, India, on May 5, 2011.
"The Indians remain very concerned about the U.S. exit strategy, especially because these talks with the Taliban … are being conducted with the widespread support of the Pakistan army chief," he said.
Any deal that saw the Taliban regain some political power would benefit India's arch-rival Pakistan, giving them "a greater say in the future of Afghanistan," Chellaney said.
India does not have troops in Afghanistan, though the idea they could replace Western forces after the 2014 pullout has been raised recently.
India has been a major supplier of aid to Afghanistan, spendinga total of more than $750 million between 2002 and 2009. Afghan President Hamid Karzai met Indian Prime Minister Singh in May to discuss supplies of military equipment.
A senior Obama administration official said co-operation with India on "maritime security" and "counter terrorism" would be one of the issues at the top of the agenda. He spoke of a "strategic convergence" between India and the U.S.
Asked about Indian concern over talks with the Taliban, the official stressed the United States' view that the militant movement would have "to be breaking with al Qaeda, renouncing violence and abiding by the terms of the Afghan constitution" to be part of an Afghan-led peace process.
4. A counterweight to China
India and the United States are the world's two biggest democracies, but the world's most populous country is China.
And is its economy has surged, it has begun to flex its muscles, pursuing territorial disputes with many of its neighbors.
India and China fought a war in 1962 and in April and May this year there was a three-week standoff after Chinese troops "intruded in Indian territory," according to Indian officials.
Award-winning historian Margaret MacMillan — author of both "Nixon and Mao," about the two leaders' famous 1972 meeting, and "Women of the Raj," about India during British rule — said she thought U.S.-Chinese relations had "proved to be disappointing for the Obama administration."
The extended diplomatic push aimed at New Delhi might be a way of sending a message to Beijing, she said.
"It suggests to me the great Asian pivot with improved relations with China has turned out to be a bit of a bust," said MacMillan, who is a professor at St. Anthony's College, Oxford University.
However, she said the U.S. would probably try to avoid picking a side and stay in the middle.
"It's a tricky game, but if you can be the power at the center and tilt to one side and the other, it actually gives you a lot of influence," she said.
5. Biden might have some explaining to do
The somewhat gaffe-prone Biden declared in 2006 that "You cannot go to a 7-11 or a Dunkin Donuts unless you have a slight Indian accent ... I'm not joking."
Biden's staff later clarified he was praising the "vibrant" Indian-American community in Delaware, and making the point that along with engineers, scientists and physicians, there was a growing number of more middle-class people.
And then last year, he made headlines when he briefly appeared to imitate an Indian accent while talking about American job losses and overseas call centers last year.
Chellaney said Biden's attempt at mimicry had been "front-page news" in India, but doubted it would cause any problems on his trip.
"The public memory in India is really short. Most people will have forgotten these incidents. I think he will be warmly received in India," he said.
And Somers insisted Biden was "one of the best friends of India that has ever come from the United States," noting his championing of the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement.
And The Times of India was reasonably relaxed about Biden's apparent mimicry, noting his "penchant for bloopers" and saying it was "mild" by his usual standards.
U.S.-INDIA RELATIONS: NEW DELHI'S RESPONSIBILITY
Mar 01, 2013Written by Yogesh Joshi, Contributor
Email
While the U.S. presidential candidates were slugging it out during the debates on foreign policy, India remained conspicuously absent from the narrative. At face value, the omission of India from the debates gave an impression that the country hardly matters in U.S. foreign policy. However, the case was exactly opposite. If there was one foreign policy issue where the Republicans and Democrats had more or less similar views, it was the role of India in the future of U.S. Grand Strategy. In some sense, the presidential elections settled the debate on India's importance in the U.S.'s world view and future strategic plans. While the campaign was reaching its crescendo, India and the U.S. were engaged in their third annual strategic dialogue–an event of immense geo-political significance first started in 2010. The annual strategic dialogue clearly indicates the level of strategic convergence between New Delhi and Washington, DC.
It was therefore not surprising to see that during the recently concluded Asia-Pacific summit, President Obama called upon Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to reveal that India is a "big part" of his second term foreign policy plans. In his first term, President Obama continued the strategic engagement with India initiated by his predecessor, President George W. Bush. The highlight of U.S.-India relations during Obama's first term was his visit to India, in which for the first time the U.S. supported India's candidacy for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council (UNSC). However, for many critics, Obama has failed to capitalize on the momentum generated in the bilateral relationship by addressing the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal.
The reasons for such pessimism are multi-faceted. First, the promise of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal remains unrealised. Though the U.S was instrumental in manipulating the global nuclear regime to allow India to trade in nuclear material and technologies, its own nuclear industry has not benefited much out of the agreement. India's killer nuclear liability law, with provisions for supplier culpability, has hindered the participation of nuclear consortiums such as Westinghouse and General Electric in India's vast nuclear energy market.
Second, the strategic partnership has failed to convince India to tow the U.S. line on a number of issues, including a nuclear Iran and a more robust alliance against China. Though India has repeatedly declared that it opposes Iran's development of a nuclear bomb, the suggestion of military action against Iran finds no traction with Indian policymakers. Similarly, India remains cagey about consummating the military component of its strategic relationship with the U.S. insofar it wants to keep China in good humour.
Finally, President Obama has not been able to lift India-U.S. relations from the plateau on which the Bush administration had left it. With no grand plans or deals like the nuclear pact in sight, U.S.-India relations seem to just float around rather than gain altitude.
These criticisms, however, have a component of truth. But rather than putting the complete onus on President Obama, such obstacles do have an origin in India's domestic politics and its foreign policy strategy. Even though India's democratic polity makes it a natural partner for the U.S., it also ensures that certain policy issues will not always favour India-U.S. relations.
The nuclear liability law is a case in point. No democratically-elected government in India could have played deaf to the strong public outcry against U.S. multinational corporations after the Bhopal Gas tragedy. The Fukushima nuclear accident made it even harder for the government not to implement policies implicating the suppliers of nuclear material in case of a nuclear accident. Chaotic domestic politics also ensures that a number of important policy decisions remain suspended. Though India did liberalise its economy after the end of the Cold War, a number of economic measures such as the labour reforms still remain pending. The paralysing debate on Foreign Direct Investment in India's huge retail sector is just one example of how democratic processes impede bilateral relationships. Democracy, therefore, cuts both ways in U.S.-India relations.
Second, a more unnerving trend observed in Indian foreign policy thinking in recent years is the 'India is too big to fail' argument. The increase in India's global power and stature has created a mythical notion that India is just too important for the U.S. Unfortunately, the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal is often considered evidence to support this thesis. For some of the more sober thinkers on foreign policy, India's reluctance to engage constructively with the U.S. on issues which are peripheral to its interests, such as Libya and Syria, smacks of this rising power conceit.
There is hardly a doubt that Indo-U.S. relations have come a long way in the post-Cold War period. Strategically, India and the U.S. are much closer than they ever were in the history of their bilateral relations. To look at just one metric, in the last seven years, the number of military exercises U.S. defence forces have conducted with their Indian counterparts have outnumbered those with traditional allies such as NATO, South Korea, or Japan. On the other hand, India, which has always been reluctant to accept U.S. involvement in the Indian Ocean region, has actually welcomed President Obama's pivot strategy. These examples indicate that a qualitative change has taken place in India-U.S. relations.
However, as a growing power, India must realise that its rise also depends on the goodwill of the world's most dominant power. It is not a coincidence that global acceptance of India's rising power took place in an era of U.S. unilateralism. The U.S. single-handedly lifted India from the backwaters of international politics to the forefront of global power struggles through the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. However, for India to acquire its rightful place among the comity of nations, it has still a lot to ask and expect from the U.S. To give just one example, India's candidacy for permanent membership of the of UN Security Council–or for that matter the Nuclear Suppliers Group–hinges on the than active support of the U.S. Second, any strategic vacuum in relations with U.S. could actually backfire on India as the latter gets cosy with China. In such a case, the obvious fallout would be loss of strategic space for India, as China constitutes both a territorial threat and also a long-term competitor in terms of influence in Asia.
Rather than waiting for a new agenda to evolve automatically, New Delhi should take the lead. A free trade agreement with US would be a strategic step with wide ranging ramifications. While the U.S. is shaping a new economic policy, as is evident in the negotiations of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to replace the old Trans-Atlantic Partnership, the role of India in this new economic order is definitely going to rise. India-U.S. trade volume is already to the tune of $100 billion. A free trade agreement will further bolster India's economic growth and especially help its fledgling manufacturing sector to gain strength. India has already concluded FTAs with ASEAN and is negotiating free trade agreements with the European Union and other East Asian economies.
Second, the full potential of the vital agreement–Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)–signed in 2004 still remain underdeveloped, especially the Logistics Support Agreement, even when Indian Armed Forces are supportive of such a arrangement between the defence forces of India and U.S. A more robust military relationship between the armed forces of the two countries is a force for stability in the Asia-Pacific region and in the Indian Ocean.
The last time India took a major initiative to change the quality of the India-U.S. bilateral relationship, it was primarily motivated by the necessity to manage the political fallout of the 1998 nuclear weapons tests. The talks between Jaswant Singh, special envoy of Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and Under Secretary of State Strobe Talbott were the lynchpin of the negotiations and the future of the relationship. But in the present context, the principle driver for a bigger and better strategic relationship between the two countries is not the need to manage a crisis such as the 1998 nuclear weapons tests–rather it is the need to make use of a strategic opportunity that knocks on the door of nations only rarely.
Yogesh Joshi is a doctoral student in international politics at the Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi studying post-Cold War transitions in Indian foreign policy. He is a CSIS-Pacific Forum young leader and also represented India at Global Zero World Summits in Paris (2010) and London (2011). Recently, he joined the steering committee of the International Network of Emerging Nuclear Specialists (INENS) as a career and professional development liaison.
Official White House Photo by Pete Souza.
Nuclear power, unclear future
M. SOMASEKHAR
The India-US nuclear deal is all very well, but our ambitious programme needs indigenous uranium.
The recent announcement that the first unit of the Kudankulam nuclear power plant has gone critical will act as a shot in the arm for the country's nuclear establishment.
After a long-drawn battle, at both the ground level and the courts, the Russian-built, light water reactor is all set to produce electricity and provide some relief to the power-starved southern States. The nuclear power industry in India is poised between uncertainty and hope, the latter fuelled by the nuclear deal and the former by the climate after Fukushima, among other factors.
AMBITIOUS, UNCERTAIN
The Kudankulam 1&2 units of 1000 MW each are being built by Rosatom, a leading Russian nuclear conglomerate. Plans for setting up two more similar units at the site in Tamil Nadu have also been firmed up; this includes funding by the Russians. But commissioning them seems like a long way off.
The development means a step forward for the nuclear power programme through the imported, foreign reactor route. In the initial years of the Atomic Energy programme, the Americans set up the power plant at Tarapur, while the design for several others was based on the Canadians. Post-1974, Pokhran-1, India has been denied technology and resources.
Despite Kudankulam and the Indo-US nuclear agreement, the reality is that India has to depend largely on tapping indigenous sources of natural uranium to fuel its nuclear plants, locate new sites and find funds.
In the short term, one Kudankulam does not appear to trigger a rush of participation of big nuclear players in the growth of the sector. Such optimism, especially from the US and France, in fact, seems to have receded in recent times.
There is considerable opposition to the proposed French plants in Jaitapur, Maharashtra, while the US reactor at Kovvada in Andhra Pradesh is yet to take even 'baby steps'. The Civil Nuclear Liabilities for Nuclear Damage Act passed in 2010 has also become a bone of contention, with some of the clauses deterring foreign vendors.
POST-DEAL OPTIMISM
At the ground level, India's nuclear power programme has 20 reactors with an installed capacity of 4800 MW. Kudankulam 1 will add 1000 MW.
But the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) has ambitious plans. Four indigenous Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) of 700 MW totalling 2800 MW are being constructed by the NPCIL in other parts of the country; they are expected to be commissioned by 2016-17.
A further 10 of the same size are planned. Which means, domestic reactors of nearly 10,000 MW capacity are in the pipeline. Some of them will be in new locations such as Gorakhpur in Haryana, Mahi Banswara in Rajasthan and Chutka and Bhimpur in Madhya Pradesh. All these efforts demand a huge requirement of natural uranium.
The flurry of expansion of nuclear power has been triggered by the Indo-US nuclear agreement in 2006. It led to easing of restrictions on access to uranium from a few countries and considerable progress in access to technology from the Nuclear Supply Group. Buoyed by the support of the Manmohan Singh-led UPA Government, the DAE also raised its targets steeply.
The optimism came from a combination of imported reactors — US, France, Russia (of over 1000 MW) — and the clusters or `Nuclear Energy Parks' of domestic, 700 MW units, including new sites.
The uranium fuel was also to be tied up with supplies from different countries. With even Australia (the largest producer) and Canada showing signs of easing restrictions, the nuclear establishment was upbeat.
Within the country NTPC, BHEL, ONGC, IOC, Indian Railways, SAIL have evinced interest. In the private sector, Reliance, GVK Power, GMR Energy initiated firm steps with dialogues with foreign partners as well.
INDIGENOUS URANIUM
The situation has become difficult, especially after the tsunami-induced accident at the Fukushima nuclear plant in Japan.
Scepticism and opposition have risen again against nuclear power globally. In the Indian context, there is a visible slowdown. It is becoming difficult to find new places to set up reactors or open mines where the Atomic Minerals Division (AMD) has unearthed some uranium potential, due to opposition from non-governmental organisations and the local public.
According to the World Nuclear Association, the DAE now seems intent on attaining targets of 14,600 MW by 2020 and 27,500 MW by 2032. The department's dream is to build 50,000 MW by 2060.
The plan of having 8 PHWRs and 8 imported reactors of a capacity of 1000 MW or higher with foreign technical cooperation to be completed in the next 15 years would require $40 billion, it estimates.
To get anywhere near these figures, it looks certain now that indigenous uranium, especially from Tummalapalle, has to emerge as the mainstay.
Though India has nearly 19 per cent of the world's thorium and a programme to tap it through the Fast Breeder Reactor (the first is still under construction after three decades of research and trials), exploiting it looks unlikely in the immediate future.
The AMD identified 75,000 tonnes of uranium deposits during the XI Plan period, driven by the big discovery at Tummalapalle. With 72,000 tonnes established, it accounts for nearly half of the total of 150,000 tonnes identified in the country so far, which clearly highlights the criticality of the new finds.
Going by the AMD's explorations, the area has a further potential of one lakh tonnes.
In the last 50 years, the nuclear power programme has been fuelled mainly from uranium mined from Jaduguda, Bhatin, Narwaphar and Turamdih mines in the Jharkhand region. Imported uranium took care of the Tarapur units. Given all the limitations of resources, funds and opposition, the Nuclear Power Corporation of India ended year 2000 with less than 2000 MW established capacity.
By the time the Indo-US agreement was signed, the country was running out of domestic uranium. It could not open up potential mines in Khasi hills of Meghalaya or Gogi in Karnataka due to opposition. The Turamdih mines were still to start production.
In a way, the access to imports that followed the deal, not just fed the near-starving units but also gave impetus to the expansion programme. With imports from Russia and Kazhakstan, the present programme runs on 60 per cent domestic and 40 per cent imported uranium.
There are other options — to procure from Uzbekistan, Namibia and perhaps Canada and Australia. But here again, there are question marks, based on the political and nuclear relations between the countries. Therefore a clear policy on uranium usage is a must to run a practical and useful energy programme, argue the protagonists of atomic power.
TUMMALAPALLE HOPE
With over a Rs 1,000 crore investment, the Uranium Corporation of India Ltd (the mining arm of DAE), has established a mill, a processing plant, among other facilities, at Tummalapalle.
The plant uses an innovative alkali leaching technique developed by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre to convert the ore into yellow cake. Conventionally, acid leaching is employed in processing plants such as those in Jaduguda and Turamdih in Jharkhand.
The Hyderabad-based Nuclear Fuel Complex has received the first consignment from the mines in February. It got a recovery comparable with Jaduguda or Turamdih mines, but the processing time is more. The NFC converts this fuel into bundles that are sent to the PHWRs, the mainstay of the Indian programme.
With the capacity to produce 3,000 tonnes per day of low grade uranium ore, the optimists are confident of building a stockpile to feed the indigenous expansion programme. At present, the UCIL produces about 5,500 tonnes per day from its seven existing mines. A lot then depends on Tummalapalle.
(This article was published on July 23, 2013)
Keywords: Kudankulam nuclear power plant, nuclear power programme, Rosatom, Russia, natural uranium, Indo-US nuclear agreement, Atomic Minerals Division, Uranium Corporation of India Ltd, Tummalapalle, Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, Nuclear Fuel Complex
A lot depends on the uranium deposits at Tummalapalle. — R. Ragu
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/nuclear-power-unclear-future/article4945676.ece
Press Trust of India | Washington June 26, 2013 Last Updated at 06:15 IST
US company Westinghouse lauds Indo-US efforts on nuke deal
Aiming to profit from India's lucrative nuclear energy market soon, American company Westinghouse has lauded the efforts of India and the United States to try entering into a commercial agreement by September for establishing a nuclear power plant in India.
"Secretary Kerry's efforts to move discussions forward with an announced goal of reaching commercial agreement in the September timeframe to support licensing and site development of AP1000(R) reactors in India are proving to be invaluable," Westinghouse president and CEO Danny L Roderick said yesterday.
"We welcome particularly the attention of Westinghouse and the Nuclear Power Corporation of India to arrive at a commercial agreement, and we agreed that that commercial agreement should be arrived at by September of this year," Kerry said in New Delhiearly this week.
A joint statement issued after the India-US Strategic Dialogue between the US Secretary of State John Kerry and his Indian counterpart Salman Khurshid in New Delhi recently, encouraged the ongoing commercial discussions between NPCIL and Westinghouse towards setting up a nuclear power plant at Mithivirdi in Gujarat.
Westinghouse and Nuclear Power Company of India Limited had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) last year to negotiate an Early Works Agreement (EWA) supporting future construction of AP1000 nuclear power plants at the Mithivirdi site in Gujarat.
The Early Works Agreement includes preliminary licensing and site development work. The expectation is that this agreement will be finalised by this September, the company said in a statement.
"They encouraged the two companies to expedite these consultations. They also took note of the ongoing consultations between General Electric-Hitachi and NPCIL on setting up a nuclear power plant in Andhra Pradesh. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the full and timely implementation of the US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement," the joint statement said.
"Westinghouse and our partners within India are committed to providing the large amounts of safe, clean and reliable baseload electricity that India will need as its economy expands. Our agreement with Nuclear Power Company of India is one of many we will undertake as we move forward toward contract finalisation and actual construction," said Gary Urquhart, vice president and managing director of Westinghouse in India.
U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement
The 123 Agreement signed between the United States of America and the Republic of India is known as the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement orIndo-US nuclear deal.[1] The framework for this agreement was a July 18, 2005, joint statement by Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and then U.S. President George W. Bush, under which India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and to place all its civil nuclear facilities underInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and, in exchange, the United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India.[2]This U.S.-India deal took more than three years to come to fruition as it had to go through several complex stages, including amendment of U.S. domestic law, specially the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,[3] a civil-military nuclearSeparation Plan in India, an India-IAEA safeguards (inspections) agreement and the grant of an exemption for India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an export-control cartel that had been formed mainly in response to India's first nuclear test in 1974. In its final shape, the deal places under permanent safeguards those nuclear facilities that India has identified as "civil" and permits broad civil nuclear cooperation, while excluding the transfer of "sensitive" equipment and technologies, including civil enrichment and reprocessing items even under IAEA safeguards. On August 18, 2008 the IAEA Board of Governors approved,[4] and on February 2, 2009, India signed an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA.[5] Once India brings this agreement into force, inspections began in a phased manner on the 35 civilian nuclear installations India has identified in its Separation Plan.[6] The deal is seen as a watershed in U.S.-India relations and introduces a new aspect to international nonproliferation efforts.[7] On August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with India,[8]after which the United States approached the Nuclear Suppliers Group] (NSG) to grant a waiver to India to commence civilian nuclear trade.[9] The 45-nation NSG granted the waiver to India on September 6, 2008 allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries.[10] The implementation of this waiver made India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.[11]
The U.S. House of Representatives passed the bill to approve the deal on September 28, 2008.[12] Two days later, India and France inked a similar nuclear pact making France the first country to have such an agreement with India.[13] On October 1, 2008 the U.S. Senate also approved the civilian nuclear agreement allowing India to purchase nuclear fuel and technology from the United States.[14][15] U.S. President, George W. Bush, signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal, approved by the U.S. Congress, into law, now called the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, on October 8, 2008.[16] The agreement was signed by then Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on October 10.[17][18]
Contents
[hide]- 1 Overview
- 2 Background
- 3 Rationale behind the agreement
- 4 Passing of Agreement
- 5 Hyde Act Passage in the U.S.
- 6 Political opposition in India
- 7 Indian parliament vote
- 8 IAEA approval
- 9 NSG waiver
- 10 Consideration by U.S. Congress
- 11 Formal signing of the deal
- 12 Chronology of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal
- 13 See also
- 14 References
- 15 External links
Overview[edit]
The Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006, also known as the Hyde Act, is the U.S. domestic law that modifies the requirements of Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act to permit nuclear cooperation with India[19]and in particular to negotiate a 123 Agreement to operationalize the 2005 Joint Statement. As a domestic U.S. law, the Hyde Act is binding on the United States. The Hyde Act cannot be binding on India's sovereign decisions although it can be construed as prescriptive for future U.S. reactions. As per the Vienna Convention, an international agreement such as the 123 Agreement cannot be superseded by an internal law such as the Hyde Act.[20][21][22]
The 123 agreement defines the terms and conditions for bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation, and requires separate approvals by theU.S. Congress and by Indian cabinet ministers. According to the Nuclear Power Corporation of India, the agreement will help India meet its goal of adding 25,000 MW of nuclear power capacity through imports of nuclear reactors and fuel by 2020.[23]
After the terms of the 123 agreement were concluded on July 27, 2007,[24] it ran into trouble because of stiff opposition in India from thecommunist allies of the ruling United Progressive Alliance.[25] The government survived a confidence vote in the parliament on July 22, 2008 by 275–256 votes in the backdrop of defections by some parties .[26] The deal also had faced opposition from non-proliferation activists, anti-nuclear organisations, and some states within the Nuclear Suppliers Group.[27][28] In February 2008, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that any agreement would be "consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act".[29] The bill was signed on October 8, 2008.
Background[edit]
Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have a recognized right of access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and an obligation to cooperate on civilian nuclear technology. Separately, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has agreed on guidelines for nuclear exports, including reactors and fuel. Those guidelines condition such exports on comprehensive safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which are designed to verify that nuclear energy is not diverted from peaceful use to weapons programs. Though neither India, Israel, nor Pakistan have signed the NPT, India argues that instead of addressing the central objective of universal and comprehensive non-proliferation, the treaty creates a club of "nuclear haves" and a larger group of "nuclear have-nots" by restricting the legal possession of nuclear weapons to those states that tested them before 1967, who alone are free to possess and multiply their nuclear stockpiles.[30] India insists on a comprehensive action plan for a nuclear-free world within a specific time-frame and has also adopted a voluntary "no first use policy".
Led by the U.S., other states have set up an informal group, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), to control exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology.[31] Consequently, India was left outside the international nuclear order, which forced India to develop its own resources for each stage of the nuclear fuel cycle and power generation, including next generation reactors such as fast breeder reactors and a thorium breeder reactor[32][33] known as the Advanced Heavy Water Reactor. In addition to impelling India to achieve success in developing these new reactor technologies, the sanctions also provided India with the impetus to continue developing its own nuclear weapons technology with a specific goal of achieving self-sufficiency for all key components for weapons design, testing and production.
Given that India is estimated to possess reserves of about 80,000–112,369 tons of uranium,[34] India has more than enough fissile material to supply its nuclear weapons program, even if it restricted Plutonium production to only 8 of the country's 17 current reactors, and then further restricted Plutonium production to only 1/4 of the fuel core of these reactors.[35] According to the calculations of one of the key advisers to the US Nuclear deal negotiating team, Ashley Tellis:[35]
Operating India's eight unsafeguarded PHWRs in such a [conservative] regime would bequeath New Delhi with some 12,135–13,370 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium, which is sufficient to produce between 2,023–2,228 nuclear weapons over and above those already existing in the Indian arsenal. Although no Indian analyst, let alone a policy maker, has ever advocated any nuclear inventory that even remotely approximates such numbers, this heuristic exercise confirms that New Delhi has the capability to produce a gigantic nuclear arsenal while subsisting well within the lowest estimates of its known uranium reserves.
However, because the amount of nuclear fuel required for the electricity generation sector is far greater than that required to maintain a nuclear weapons program, and since India's estimated reserve of uranium represents only 1% of the world's known uranium reserves, the NSG's uranium export restrictions mainly affected Indian nuclear power generation capacity. Specifically, the NSG sanctions challenge India's long term plans to expand and fuel its civilian nuclear power generation capacity from its current output of about 4GWe (GigaWatt electricity) to a power output of 20GWe by 2020; assuming the planned expansion used conventional Uranium/Plutonium fueled heavy water and light water nuclear power plants.
Consequently, India's nuclear isolation constrained expansion of its civil nuclear program, but left India relatively immune to foreign reactions to a prospective nuclear test. Partly for this reason, but mainly due to continued unchecked covert nuclear and missile proliferation activities between Pakistan, China[36][37] and North Korea,[38][39] India conducted five more nuclear tests in May 1998 atPokhran.
India was subject to international sanctions after its May 1998 nuclear tests. However, due to the size of the Indian economy and its relatively large domestic sector, these sanctions had little impact on India, with Indian GDP growth increasing from 4.8% in 1997–1998 (prior to sanctions) to 6.6% (during sanctions) in 1998–1999.[40] Consequently, at the end of 2001, the Bush Administration decided to drop all sanctions on India.[41] Although India achieved its strategic objectives from the Pokhran nuclear tests in 1998,[42] it continued to find its civil nuclear program isolated internationally.
Rationale behind the agreement[edit]
Nuclear non-proliferation[edit]
The proposed civil nuclear agreement implicitly recognizes India's "de facto" status even without signing the NPT. The Bush administration justifies a nuclear pact with India because it is important in helping to advance the non-proliferation framework[43] by formally recognizing India's strong non-proliferation record even though it has not signed the NPT. The former Under Secretary of State of Political Affairs, Nicholas Burns, one of the architects of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal said "India's trust, its credibility, the fact that it has promised to create a state-of-the-art facility, monitored by the IAEA, to begin a new export control regime in place, because it has not proliferated the nuclear technology, we can't say that about Pakistan." when asked whether the U.S. would offer a nuclear deal with Pakistan on the lines of the Indo-U.S. deal.[44][45][46] Mohamed ElBaradei, former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would be in charge of inspecting India's civilian reactors has praised the deal as "it would also bring India closer as an important partner in the nonproliferation regime".[47] The reaction in the Western academic community was mixed. While some authors praised the agreement as bringing India closer to the NPT regime, others argued that it gave India too much leeway in determining which facilities were to be safeguarded and that it effectively rewarded India for continuously defying the Non-Proliferation Treaty by not acceding to it.[48]
Economic considerations[edit]
Financially, the U.S. also expects that such a deal could spur India's economic growth and bring in $150 billion in the next decade for nuclear power plants, of which the U.S. wants a share.[49] It is India's stated objective to increase the production of nuclear power generation from its present capacity of 4,780 MWe to 20,000 MWe in the next decade. However, the developmental economic advising firm Dalberg, which advises the IMF and the World Bank, moreover, has done its own analysis of the economic value of investing in nuclear power development in India. Their conclusion is that for the next 20 years such investments are likely to be far less valuable economically or environmentally than a variety of other measures to increase electricity production in India.[citation needed] They have noted that U.S. nuclear vendors cannot sell any reactors to India unless and until India caps third party liabilities or establishes a credible liability pool to protect U.S. firms from being sued in the case of an accident or a terrorist act of sabotage against nuclear plants. Although India's parliament passed The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages bill on August 25, 2010,[50][51] the legislation does not meet international standards for nuclear liability as set forth in the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, because it allows the operator to sue the supplier in case of an accident due to technical defects in the plant.[52] After theFukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Japan, issues relating to the safety of operating nuclear power plants, compensation in the event of a radiation-leak accident, disaster clean-up costs, operator responsibility and supplier liability has once again come into the spot-light.
Strategic[edit]
Since the end of the Cold War, The Pentagon, along with certain U.S. ambassadors such as Robert Blackwill, has requested increased strategic ties with India and a de-hyphenization of Pakistan with India, i.e. having separate policies toward India and Pakistan rather than just an "India-Pakistan" policy. The United States also sees India as a viable counter-weight to the growing influence of China,[citation needed] and a potential client and job creator.[53]
While India is self-sufficient in thorium, possessing 25% of the world's known and economically viable thorium,[54] it possesses a meager 1% of the similarly calculated global uranium reserves.[55] Indian support for cooperation with the U.S. centers on the issue of obtaining a steady supply of sufficient energy for the economy to grow. Indian opposition to the pact centers on the concessions that would need to be made, as well as the likely de-prioritization of research into a thorium fuel cycle if uranium becomes highly available given the well understood utilization of uranium in a nuclear fuel cycle.
Passing of Agreement[edit]
On March 2, 2006 in New Delhi, George W. Bush and Manmohan Singh signed a Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, following an initiation during the July 2005 summit in Washington between the two leaders over civilian nuclear cooperation.[56]
Heavily endorsed by the White House, the agreement is thought to be a major victory to George W. Bush's foreign policy initiative and was described by many lawmakers as a cornerstone of the new strategic partnership between the two countries.[57] The agreement is widely considered to help India fulfill its soaring energy demands and boost U.S. and India into a strategic partnership. The Pentagon speculates this will help ease global demand for crude oil and natural gas.
On August 3, 2007, both the countries released the full text of the 123 agreement.[58] Nicholas Burns, the chief negotiator of the India-United States nuclear deal, said the U.S. has the right to terminate the deal if India tests a nuclear weapon and that no part of the agreement recognizes India as a nuclear weapons state.[59]
Hyde Act Passage in the U.S.[edit]
On December 18, 2006 President George W. Bush signed the Hyde Act into law. The Act was passed by an overwhelming 359–68 in the United States House of Representatives on July 26 and by 85–12 in the United States Senate on November 16 in a strong show of bipartisan support.[60][61][62]
The House version (H.R. 5682) and Senate version (S. 3709) of the bill differed due to amendments each had added before approving, but the versions were reconciled with a House vote of 330–59 on December 8 and a Senate voice-vote on December 9 before being passed on to President G.W. Bush for final approval.[63][64] The White House had urged Congress to expedite the reconciliation process during the end-2006 lame duck session, and recommended removing certain amendments which would be deemed deal-killers by India.[65] Nonetheless, while softened, several clauses restricting India's strategic nuclear program and conditions on having India align with U.S. views over Iran were incorporated in the Hyde Act.
In response to the language Congress used in the Act to define U.S. policy toward India, President Bush, stated "Given the Constitution's commitment to the authority of the presidency to conduct the nation's foreign affairs, the executive branch shall construe such policy statements as advisory," going on to cite sections 103 and 104 (d) (2) of the bill. To assure Congress that its work would not be totally discarded, Bush continued by saying that the executive would give "the due weight that comity between the legislative and executive branches should require, to the extent consistent with U.S. foreign policy."[66]
Political opposition in India[edit]
The Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement was met with stiff opposition by some political parties and activists in India. Although many mainstream political parties including the Congress(I) supported the deal along with regional parties like Dravida Munnetra Kazhagamand Rashtriya Janata Dal its realization ran into difficulties in the face of stiff political opposition in India. Also, in November 2007, former Indian Military chiefs, bureaucrats and scientists drafted a letter to Members of Parliament expressing their support for the deal.[67]However, opposition and criticism continued at political levels. The Samajwadi Party (SP) which was with the Left Front in opposing the deal changed its stand after discussing with ex-president of India and scientist Dr A. P. J. Abdul Kalam. The SP then supported the government and the deal. The Indian Government survived a vote of confidence by 275–256 after the Left Front withdrew their support to the government over this dispute.[68] Incidentally, results showed ten MPs belonging to the opposing BJP party cross-voting in the favor of the government.
As details were revealed about serious inconsistencies between what the Indian parliament was told about the deal, and the facts about the agreement that were presented by the Bush administration to the US Congress, opposition grew in India against the deal. In particular, portions of the agreement dealing with guaranteeing India a fuel supply or allowing India to maintain a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel appear to be diametrically opposed to what the Indian parliament was led to expect from the agreement:
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's statement in parliament is totally at variance with the Bush Administration's communication to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which says India will not be allowed to stockpile such nuclear fuel stocks as to undercut American leverage to re-impose sanctions. To drive home this point, it says the 123 Agreement is not inconsistent with the Hyde Act's stipulation—the little-known 'Barack Obama Amendment' – that the supply of nuclear fuel should be "commensurate with reasonable operating requirements". The 'strategic reserve' that is crucial to India's nuclear program is, therefore, a non-starter.[69] Furthermore, the agreement, as a result of its compliance with the Hyde Act, contained a direct linkage between shutting down US nuclear trade with India and any potential future Indian nuclear weapons test, a point that was factually inconsistent with explicit reassurances made on this subject by Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, during final parliamentary debate on the nuclear deal. As professor Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic affairs and one of the authors of the Indian Nuclear Doctrine[70], explained:
While the Hyde Act's bar on Indian testing is explicit, the one in the NSG waiver is implicit, yet unmistakable. The NSG waiver is overtly anchored in NSG Guidelines Paragraph 16, which deals with the consequence of "an explosion of a nuclear device". The waiver's Section 3(e) refers to this key paragraph, which allows a supplier to call for a special NSG meeting, and seek termination of cooperation, in the event of a test or any other "violation of a supplier-recipient understanding". The recently leaked Bush administration letter to Congress has cited how this Paragraph 16 rule will effectively bind India to the Hyde Act's conditions on the pain of a U.S.-sponsored cut-off of all multilateral cooperation. India will not be able to escape from the U.S.-set conditions by turning to other suppliers.[71]
Indian parliament vote[edit]
On July 9, 2008, India formally submitted the safeguards agreement to the IAEA.[72] This development came after the Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh returned from the 34th G8 summit meeting in Hokkaido, Japan, where he met with U.S. President George W. Bush.[73] On June 19, 2008, news media reported that Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh threatened to resign his position if the Left Front, whose support was crucial for the ruling United Progressive Alliance to prove its majority in the Indian parliament, continued to oppose the nuclear deal and he described their stance as irrational and reactionary.[74] According to The Hindu, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee's earlier statement said "I cannot bind the government if we lose our majority,"[75] implying thatUnited Progressive Alliance government would not put its signature on any deal with IAEA if it lost the majority in either a 'opposition-initiated no-confidence motion' or if failing to muster a vote of confidence in Indian parliament after being told to prove its majority by the president. On July 8, 2008, Prakash Karat announced that the Left Front is withdrawing its support to the government over the decision by the government to go ahead on the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act. The left front had been a staunch advocate of not proceeding with this deal citing national interests.[76]
On July 22, 2008 the UPA faced its first confidence vote in the Lok Sabha after the Communist Party of India (Marxist) led Left Front withdrew support over India approaching the IAEA for Indo-U.S. nuclear deal. The UPA won the confidence vote with 275 votes to the opposition's 256, (10 members abstained from the vote) to record a 19-vote victory.[77][78][79][80]
IAEA approval[edit]
The IAEA Board of Governors approved the safeguards agreement on August 1, 2008, and the 45-state Nuclear Suppliers Group next had to approve a policy allowing nuclear cooperation with India. U.S. President Bush can then make the necessary certifications and seek final approval by the U.S. Congress.[81] There were objections from Pakistan, Iran, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland, and Austria at the IAEA meeting.[82]
NSG waiver[edit]
On September 6, 2008 India was granted the waiver at the NSG meeting held in Vienna, Austria. The consensus was arrived at after overcoming misgivings expressed by Austria, Ireland, and New Zealand and is an unprecedented step in giving exemption to a country which has not signed the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)[83][84] The Indian team who worked on the deal includesManmohan Singh, Pranab Mukherjee, Shivshankar Menon, Shyam Saran, M. K. Narayanan, Anil Kakodkar, Ravi Grover, and DB Venkatesh Varma.[83]
Versions of U.S. draft exemption[edit]
On August 2008 U.S. draft exemption would have granted India a waiver based on the "steps that India has taken voluntarily as a contributing partner in the non-proliferation regime".[85] Based on these steps, and without further conditions, the draft waiver would have allowed for the transfer to India of both trigger list and dual-use items (including technology), waiving the full-scope safeguards requirements of the NSG guidelines.[86]
A September 2008 waiver would have recognized additional "steps that India has voluntarily taken."[87] The waiver called for notifying the NSG of bilateral agreements and for regular consultations; however, it also would have waived the full-scope safeguards requirements of the NSG guidelines without further conditions.[86]
The U.S. draft underwent further changes in an effort to make the language more acceptable to the NSG.[88]
Initial support and opposition[edit]
The deal had initial support from the United States, the United Kingdom,[89] France,[90] Japan,[91] Russia,[92] and Germany.[93][94] After some initial opposition, there were reports of Australia,[95] Switzerland,[96] and Canada[97][98] expressing their support for the deal. Selig S. Harrison, a former South Asia bureau chief of The Washington Post, has said the deal may represent a tacit recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state,[99] while former U.S. Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Robert Joseph says the "U.S. State Department made it very clear that we will not recognize India as a nuclear-weapon state".[100]
Norway, Austria, Brazil, and Japan all warned that their support for India at the IAEA did not mean that they would not express reservations at the NSG. New Zealand, which is a member of the NSG but not of the IAEA Board of Governors, cautioned that its support should not be taken for granted.[28] Ireland, which launched the non-proliferation treaty process in 1958 and signed it first in 1968, doubted India's nuclear trade agreement with the U.S.[101] Russia, a potentially large nuclear supplier to India, expressed reservations about transferring enrichment and reprocessing technology to India.[102] China argued the agreement constituted "a major blow to the international non-proliferation regime".[103] New Zealand said it would like to see a few conditions written in to the waiver: the exemption ceasing if India conducts nuclear tests, India signing the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) additional protocol, and placing limits on the scope of the technology that can be given to India and which could relate to nuclear weapons.[104] Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Scandinavian countries proposed similar amendments.[105] The nuclear deal was opposed by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, who opined that the U.S. would be making "a dangerous deal with India"[106]
After the first NSG meeting in August 2008, diplomats noted that up to 20 of the 45 NSG states tabled conditions similar to the Hyde Act for India's waiver to do business with the NSG.[107] "There were proposals on practically every paragraph," a European diplomat said.[107] A group of seven NSG members suggested including some of the provisions of the U.S. Hyde Act in the final waiver.[108]Daryll Kimball, executive director of the Washington-based Arms Control Association, said the NSG should at a minimum "make clear that nuclear trade with India shall be terminated if it resumes testing for any reason. If India cannot agree to such terms, it suggests that India is not serious about its nuclear test moratorium pledge."[109]
Reactions following the waiver[edit]
After India was granted the waiver on September 6, the United Kingdom said that the NSG's decision would make a "significant contribution" to global energy and climate security.[110] U.S. National Security Council spokesman Gordon Johndroe said, "this is a historic achievement that strengthens global non-proliferation principles while assisting India to meet its energy requirements in an environmentally friendly manner. The United States thanks the participating governments in the NSG for their outstanding efforts and cooperation to welcome India into the global non-proliferation community. We especially appreciate the role Germany played as chair to move this process forward."[111] New Zealand praised the NSG consensus and said that it got the best possible deal with India.[112]One of India's strongest allies Russia said in a statement, "We are convinced that the exemption made for India reflects Delhi's impeccable record in the non-proliferation sphere and will guarantee the peaceful uses of nuclear exports to India."[113] Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith said that the NSG granted waiver because of "India's rise as a global power" and added, "If such a request was made for another country, I don't think it would have been cleared by the NSG members."[114] During his visit to India in September 2008, Smith said that Australia "understood and respected India's decision not to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty".[115]German Foreign Ministry spokesman Jens Ploetner called India a "special case" and added, "Does this agreement send an approving message to Iran? No, it absolutely does not."[116]
Initially, there were reports of the People's Republic of China analyzing the extent of the opposition against the waiver at the NSG and then revealing its position over the issue.[117] On September 1, 2008, prominent Chinese newspaper People's Daily expressed its strong disapproval of the civilian agreement with India.[118] India's National Security Advisor remarked that one of the major opponents of the waiver was China and said that he would express Indian government's displeasure over the issue.[119] It was also revealed that China had abstained during the final voting process, indicating its non-approval of the nuclear agreement.[120] In a statement, Chinese delegation to the NSG said the group should address the aspirations of other countries too, an implicit reference to Pakistan.[121] There were also unconfirmed reports of India considering the cancellation of a state visit by Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi.[122]However, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said the Chinese Foreign Minister will be welcomed "as an honored guest".[123]The Times of India noted that China's stance could have a long-term implication on Sino-Indian relations.[124]
There were some other conflicting reports on China's stance, however. The Hindu reported that though China had expressed its desire to include more stern language in the final draft, they had informed India about their intention to back the agreement.[125] In an interview to the Hindustan Times, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyue said that "China understands India's needs for civil nuclear energy and related international cooperation."[126] Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told India's CNN-IBN, "We didn't do anything to block it [the deal]. We played a constructive role. We also adopted a positive and responsible attitude and a safeguards agreement was reached, so facts speak louder ... than some reports".[127] During a press conference in New Delhi, Yang added, "The policy was set much before that. When consensus was reached, China had already made it clear in a certain way that we have no problem with the [NSG] statement."[128] Highlighting the importance of Sino-Indian relations, Yang remarked, "let us [India and China] work together to move beyond doubts to build a stronger relationship between us."[129]
Indian reactions[edit]
Indian PM Manmohan Singh visited Washington D.C. on September 26, 2008 to celebrate the conclusion of the agreement with U.S. President George W. Bush.[130] He also visited France to convey his appreciation for the country's stance.[131] India's External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee expressed his deep appreciation for India's allies in the NSG, especially the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, South Africa and Brazil for helping India achieve NSG's consensus on the nuclear deal.[132]
Bharatiya Janata Party's Yashwant Sinha, who also formerly held the post of India's External Affairs Minister, criticized the Indian government's decision to seek NSG's consensus and remarked that "India has walked into the non-proliferation trap set by the U.S., we have given up our right to test nuclear weapons forever, it has been surrendered by the government".[133] However, another prominent member of the same party and India's former National Security Advisor Brajesh Mishra supported the development at the NSG and said that the waiver granted made "no prohibition" on India to conduct nuclear tests in the future.[134]
A leading advocate of the agreement was India's most eminent strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam, also known for his long and controversial championing of an Indian nuclear deterrent.[135] He argued that the convergence of strategic interests between the two nations forced such a remarkable gesture from the US, overturning its decades-long stand on non-proliferation, and that it would be unwise on India's part to spurn such an overture.[136] He also argued that not recognizing new geo-political realities would be even more foolhardy on the part of the Indian elite.[137][138]
Former President of India and noted Indian scientist, A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, also supported the agreement and remarked that New Delhi may break its "voluntary moratorium" on further nuclear tests in "supreme national interest".[139] However, analyst M K Bhadrakumar demurred. He said that the consensus at NSG was achieved on the "basis" of Pranab Mukherjee's commitment to India's voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing and by doing so, India has entered into a "multilateral commitment" bringing it within "the ambit of the CTBT and NPT".[140]
The NSG consensus was welcomed by several major Indian companies. Major Indian corporations like Videocon Group, Tata Powerand Jindal Power saw a US$40 billion nuclear energy market in India in the next 10–15 years.[141] On a more optimistic note, some of India's largest and most well-respected corporations like Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, National Thermal Power Corporation andLarsen & Toubro were eyeing a $100 billion (U.S.) business in this sector over the same time period.[141] According to Hindustan Times, nuclear energy will produce 52,000 MW of electricity in India by 2020.[142]
Other reactions over the issue[edit]
More than 150 non-proliferation activists and anti-nuclear organizations called for tightening the initial NSG agreement to prevent harming the current global non-proliferation regime.[143] Among the steps called for were:[27]
- ceasing cooperation if India conducts nuclear tests or withdraws from safeguards
- supplying only an amount of fuel which is commensurate with ordinary reactor operating requirements
- expressly prohibiting the transfer of enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production items to India
- opposing any special safeguards exemptions for India
- conditioning the waiver on India stopping fissile production and legally binding itself not to conduct nuclear tests
- not allowing India to reprocess nuclear fuel supplied by a member state in a facility that is not under permanent and unconditional IAEA safeguards
- agreeing that all bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between an NSG member-state and India explicitly prohibit the replication or use of such technology in any unsafeguarded Indian facilities
The call said that the draft Indian nuclear "deal would be a nonproliferation disaster and a serious setback to the prospects of global nuclear disarmament" and also pushed for all world leaders who are serious about ending the arms race to "to stand up and be counted."[27]
Dr. Kaveh L. Afrasiabi, who has taught political science at Tehran University, has argued the agreement will set a new precedent for other states, adding that the agreement represents a diplomatic boon for Tehran.[144] Ali Ashgar Soltanieh, the Iranian Deputy Director General for International and Political Affairs,[145] has complained the agreement may undermine the credibility, integrity and universality of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Pakistan argues the safeguards agreement "threatens to increase the chances of a nuclear arms race in the subcontinent."[146] Pakistani Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi has suggested his country should be considered for such an accord,[147] and Pakistan has also said the same process "should be available as a model for other non-NPT states".[148] On July 19, 2010, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton countered Pakistan statements by saying that Pakistan's checkered history on nuclear proliferation "raises red flags" regarding nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.[149] Israel is citing the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear deal as a precedent to alter Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) rules to construct its first nuclear power plant in the Negev desert, and is also pushing for its own trade exemptions.[150]
Brahma Chellaney, a Professor of Strategic Studies at the New Delhi-based Centre for Policy Research, argued that the wording of the U.S. exemption sought to irrevocably tether New Delhi to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. He argued India would be brought under a wider non-proliferation net, with India being tied to compliance with the entire set of NSG rules. India would acquiesce to its unilateral test moratorium being turned into a multilateral legality. He concluded that instead of the "full" civil nuclear cooperation that the original July 18, 2005, deal promised, India's access to civil nuclear enrichment and reprocessing technologies would be restricted through the initial NSG waiver.[151]
Consideration by U.S. Congress[edit]
The Bush Administration told Congress in January 2008 that the United States may cease all cooperation with India if India detonates a nuclear explosive device. The Administration further said it was not its intention to assist India in the design, construction, or operation of sensitive nuclear technologies through the transfer of dual-use items.[152] The statements were considered sensitive in India because debate over the agreement in India could have toppled the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The State Department had requested they remain secret even though they were not classified.[153] Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also previously told the House Foreign Affairs Panel in public testimony that any agreement would "have to be completely consistent with the obligations of the Hyde Act".[29] Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs Richard Boucher and the Former Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Jeffrey Bergner also said the agreement would be in conformity with the Hyde Act.[154]
Howard Berman, chair of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee, in a letter to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warned that an NSG waiver "inconsistent" with the 2006 Hyde Act would "jeopardise" the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal in the U.S. Congress.[155]Edward J. Markey, co-chairman of the House Bipartisan Task Force on Non-proliferation, said that there needed to be clear consequences if India broke its commitments or resumed nuclear testing.[156]
Passage in Congress[edit]
On September 28, 2008 the US House of Representatives voted 298–117 to approve the Indo-US nuclear deal.[157] On October 1, 2008 the US Senate voted 86–13 to approve the Indo-US nuclear deal.[158] The Arms Control Association said the agreement fails to make clear that an Indian nuclear test would prompt the U.S. to cease nuclear trade;[158] however, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said that any nuclear test by India would result in the "most serious consequences," including automatic cut-off of U.S. cooperation as well as a number of other sanctions.[159]
After Senate approval, US President George W. Bush said the deal would "strengthen our global nuclear nonproliferation efforts, protect the environment, create jobs, and assist India in meeting its growing energy needs in a responsible manner."[160] Then-US presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain, as well as then-Vice Presidential candidate Joe Biden, voted in support of the bill.[161]
Formal signing of the deal[edit]
There was speculation the Indo-US deal would be signed on October 4, 2008 when U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was in India. The deal was to be inked by Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The two leaders were to sign the deal at 2 pm at the Hyderabad House in New Delhi.[162] But Mr. Mukherjee announced that India would wait for the U.S. President to sign the 123 agreement legislation first into law and address India's concerns on fuel supply guarantees and the legal standing of the 123 agreement in the accompanying signing statement.[163]
Ms Rice was aware of the Indian decision before she left Washington. But she was very hopeful that the deal would be signed as the U.S. State Department had said that the President's signature was not prerequisite for Rice to ink the deal.[164] Rice had earlier said that there were still a number of administrative details to be worked out even as she insisted that the US would abide by the Hyde Act on the testing issue:
"There are a lot of administrative details that have to be worked out. This (the deal) was only passed in our Congress two days ago. The President is looking forward to signing the bill, sometime, I hope, very soon, because we'll want to use it as an opportunity to thank all of the people who have been involved in this", said Rice.[165]
In Washington, a Senate Democratic aide said that such a delay was not that unusual because legislation needed to be carefully reviewed before being sent to the White House.[166]
US President George W. Bush signed the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into law on October 8.[16] The new law, called the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval and Non-proliferation Enhancement Act, was signed by President Bush at a brief White House function in the presence of the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, Vice-President Dick Cheney and the Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Ronen Sen besides a large gathering of other dignitaries.[167] The final administrative aspect of the deal was completed after Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed the bilateral instruments of the 123 Agreement in Washington on October 10 paving the way for operationalization of the deal between the two countries.[168] [169]
Chronology of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal[edit]
July 18, 2005: President Bush and Prime Minister Singh first announce their intention to enter into a nuclear agreement in Washington.
March 1, 2006: Bush visits India for the first time.
March 3, 2006: Bush and Singh issue a joint statement on their growing strategic partnership, emphasising their agreement on civil nuclear cooperation.
July 26, 2006: The US House of Representatives passes the 'Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006,' which stipulates that Washington will cooperate with New Delhi on nuclear issues and exempt it from signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
July 28, 2006: In India, the Left parties demand threadbare discussion on the issue in Parliament.
November 16, 2006: The US Senate passes the 'United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation and US Additional Protocol Implementation Act' to "exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 United States exports of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology to India."
December 18, 2006: President Bush signs into law congressional legislation on Indian atomic energy.
July 27, 2007: Negotiations on a bilateral agreement between the United States and India conclude.
Aug 3, 2007: The text of the 'Agreement for Cooperation between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy' (123 Agreement) is released by both governments.
Aug 13, 2007: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh makes a suo motu statement on the deal in Parliament.
Aug 17, 2007: The CPI(M) General Secretary Prakash Karat says the 'honeymoon (with government) may be over but the marriage can go on'.
Sept 4, 2007: In India, the UPA-Left committee to discuss nuclear deal set up.
Feb 25, 2008: Left parties in India say the ruling party would have to choose between the deal and its government's stability.
March 3–6, 2008: Left parties warn of 'serious consequences' if the nuclear deal is operationalised and set a deadline asking the government to make it clear by March 15 whether it intended to proceed with the nuclear deal or drop it.
March 7–14, 2008: The CPI writes to the Prime Minister Singh, warns of withdrawal of support if government goes ahead with the deal and puts political pressure on the Manmohan Singh government not to go with the deal.
April 23, 2008: The Indian Government says it will seek the sense of the House on the 123 Agreement before it is taken up for ratification by the American Congress.
June 17, 2008: External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee meets Prakash Karat, asks the Left to allow the government to go ahead with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement.
June 30, 2008: The Indian Prime Minister says his government prepared to face Parliament before operationalising the deal.
July 8, 2008: Left parties in India withdraw support to government.
July 9, 2008: The draft India-specific safeguards accord with the IAEA circulated to IAEA's Board of Governors for approval.
July 10, 2008: Prime Minister Manmohan Singh calls for a vote of confidence in Parliament.
July 14, 2008: The IAEA says it will meet on August 1 to consider the India-specific safeguards agreement.
July 18, 2008: Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon briefs the IAEA Board of Governors and some NSG countries in Vienna on the safeguards agreement.
July 22, 2008: Government is willing to look at "possible amendments" to the Atomic Energy Act to ensure that the country's strategic autonomy will never be compromised, says Prime Minister Singh.
July 22, 2008: The UPA government led by Manmohan Singh wins trust vote in the Lok Sabha in India.
July 24, 2008: India dismisses warning by Pakistan that the deal will accelerate an atomic arms race in the sub-continent.
July 24, 2008: India launches full blast lobbying among the 45-nation NSG for an exemption for nuclear commerce.
July 25, 2008: IAEA secretariat briefs member states on India-specific safeguards agreement.
Aug 1, 2008: IAEA Board of Governors adopts India- specific safeguards agreement unanimously.
Aug 21–22, 2008: The NSG meet to consider an India waiver ends inconclusively amid reservations by some countries.
Sep 4–6, 2008: The NSG meets for the second time on the issue after the US comes up with a revised draft and grants waiver to India after marathon parleys.
Sept 11, 2008: President Bush sends the text of the 123 Agreement to the US Congress for final approval.
Sept 12, 2008: US remains silent over the controversy in India triggered by President Bush's assertions that nuclear fuel supply assurances to New Delhi under the deal were only political commitments and not legally binding.
Sept 13, 2008: The State Department issues a fact sheet on the nuclear deal saying the initiative will help meet India's growing energy requirements and strengthen the non- proliferation regime by welcoming New Delhi into globally accepted nonproliferation standards and practices.
Sept 18, 2008: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee kicks off a crucial hearing on the Indo-US nuclear deal.
Sept 19, 2008: America's nuclear fuel supply assurances to India are a "political commitment" and the government cannot "legally compel" US firms to sell a "given product" to New Delhi, top officials tells Congressional panel.
Sept 21, 2008: US financial crisis diverts attention from N-deal as both the Bush Administration and the Congress are bogged down over efforts to rescue bankrupt American banks. financial crisis in the country.
Sept 26, 2008: PM Singh meets President Bush at the White House, but were not able to sign the nuclear deal as the Congress did not approve it.
Sept 27, 2008: House of Representatives approves the Indo-US nuclear deal. 298 members voted for the Bill while 117 voted against.
Oct 1, 2008: Senate approves the Indo-US civil nuclear deal with 86 votes for and 13 against.
Oct 4, 2008: Secretary of State Rice visits Delhi. India and the US unable to ink the nuclear agreement with New Delhi insisting that it would do so only after President Bush signs it into a law, an occasion when it expects certain misgivings to be cleared.
Oct 4, 2008: White House announces that President Bush will sign the legislation on the Indo-US nuclear deal into a law on October 8.
Oct 8, 2008: President Bush signs legislation to enact the landmark US-India civilian nuclear agreement.
Oct 10, 2008: The 123 Agreement between India and US is finally operationalized between the two countries after the deal is signed by External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee and his counterpart Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Washington D C.
See also[edit]
- India's three-stage nuclear power programme
- India–United States relations
- Energy policy of India
- Nuclear Liability Act
- Energy security
- Foreign relations of India
- Nuclear power in India
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External links[edit]
- U.S. Government links
- U.S. Government Printing Office: The text of the Hyde Act
- U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee: Questions for the Record submitted to Assistant Secretary Bernger by Chairman Tom Lantos
- U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee: Documents from the White House related to the U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation agreement
- India Government links
- Indian Ministry of External Affairs (August 2007): Text of the preliminary Indo-US nuclear agreement (meaindia.nic.in)
- IAEA links
- Nuclear Suppliers Group links
- Copy of Final NSG Agreement of September 6, 2008
- Nuclear Suppliers Group (September 4–6 2008): NSG Public Statement – Extraordinary Plenary Meeting, Vienna
- Nuclear Suppliers Group (August 21–22 2008): NSG Public Statement – Extraordinary Plenary Meeting, Vienna
- Nuclear Suppliers Group (November 2007): INFCIRC/254/Rev.9/Part 1
- Nuclear Suppliers Group (March 2006): INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2
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