---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: ACHR REVIEW <achr_review@achrweb.org>
Date: Fri, Feb 25, 2011 at 3:24 PM
Subject: [Fwd: Briefing Paper: Rethinking International Security Sector Assistance: British Assistance to the Rapid Action Battalion in Bangladesh]]
To: achr_review@achrweb.org
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Briefing Paper: Rethinking International Security Sector
Assistance: British Assistance to the Rapid Action Battalion in
Bangladesh]
From: "ACHR REVIEW" <achr_review@achrweb.org>
Date: Fri, February 25, 2011 2:55 am
To: achr_review@achrweb.org
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Asian Centre for Human Rights
[ACHR has Special Consultative Status with the UN ECOSOC]
C-3/441-C, Janakpuri, New Delhi-110058, India
Tel/Fax: +91-11- 45501889 25620583
Website: www.achrweb.org; Email: achr_review@achrweb.org
Embargoed for: 25 February 2011
Dear Sir/Madam,
Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) has the pleasure to release its latest
Briefing Paper: "Rethinking International Security Sector Assistance:
British Assistance to the Rapid Action Battalion in Bangladesh" dated
25.02.2011. It is available at:
http://www.achrweb.org/briefingpapers/Bangladesh-BP-01-11.html
The Briefing Paper examines assistance of the UK's Foreign and
Commonwealth Office to the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) of Bangladesh has
not been inaccurately described as the death squad. This assistance
programme has been subject to critical review.
The assistance programmes comes to an end in March 2011. The British High
Commissioner to Bangaldesh, Mr Stephen Evans, has refused to be drawn on
renewal of assistance.
Since the formation of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) in Bangladesh in
2004, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the United Kingdom
estimates that more than 1,300 persons have allegedly been killed by law
enforcement agencies. There is little dispute that the majority of the
killings has been carried out by the RAB.
After nearly 36 months of assistance, extrajudicial executions by the RAB
continue to rise. If UK's assistance is focused on human rights, as the
FCO claims, then the medium term data suggests there is cause for concern
over the UK's assistance.
The UK's defence of its position emphasises the centrality of human rights
in UK's foreign policy. The UK argues that they have raised human rights
concerns at the highest level. This is of course entirely accurate. But
experience elsewhere suggests, if words are not matched by changes to
actual assistance, then the message is, at best, ambiguous.
Experience elsewhere also forcefully demonstrates that the FCO's confident
assurances, that its assistance to the RAB will not be abused, are more
than misplaced. It suggests that FCO's support in Bangladesh appears to
share design flaws in common with other security sector work in the
region. This commonality should concern Ministers in the UK. It is
suggestive of a flawed intervention logic applied more widely than just in
South Asia.
ACHR is not opposed to engagement per se: 'support allows us to engage
with key agents of change within the institution' runs the defensive line.
Engagement is a means to an end, not an end. There is value in engagement
but not, as is so often the case, when it is mistaken for influence.
If a project focuses on rights then it is not unreasonable that outcomes
should be tied to measurable human rights indicators. This is the logic
that would be applied to any other UK's development assistance. This being
so, project logic would suggest that the rise in killings should lead to
changes in the assistance.
ACHR urges an immediate suspension of assistance. The British Government
needs to demonstrate that its assistance has a bottom line.
If assistance is to be provided, given the stakes, project design (the
framework for engagement) merits very stringent conditions to bring an end
to extrajudicial executions and torture. Without ensuring these
guarantees, further assistance will be construed as de facto political
support for further killings, at the expense of the British tax payers.
The FCO should bear in mind that the RAB's institutional use of murder and
torture is not the place for fuzzy and uncountable concepts of 'awareness'
and 'capacity built'.
We thought you would find the Briefing Paper of interest.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely
Suhas Chakma
Director
From: ACHR REVIEW <achr_review@achrweb.org>
Date: Fri, Feb 25, 2011 at 3:24 PM
Subject: [Fwd: Briefing Paper: Rethinking International Security Sector Assistance: British Assistance to the Rapid Action Battalion in Bangladesh]]
To: achr_review@achrweb.org
---------------------------- Original Message ----------------------------
Subject: Briefing Paper: Rethinking International Security Sector
Assistance: British Assistance to the Rapid Action Battalion in
Bangladesh]
From: "ACHR REVIEW" <achr_review@achrweb.org>
Date: Fri, February 25, 2011 2:55 am
To: achr_review@achrweb.org
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Asian Centre for Human Rights
[ACHR has Special Consultative Status with the UN ECOSOC]
C-3/441-C, Janakpuri, New Delhi-110058, India
Tel/Fax: +91-11- 45501889 25620583
Website: www.achrweb.org; Email: achr_review@achrweb.org
Embargoed for: 25 February 2011
Dear Sir/Madam,
Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) has the pleasure to release its latest
Briefing Paper: "Rethinking International Security Sector Assistance:
British Assistance to the Rapid Action Battalion in Bangladesh" dated
25.02.2011. It is available at:
http://www.achrweb.org/briefingpapers/Bangladesh-BP-01-11.html
The Briefing Paper examines assistance of the UK's Foreign and
Commonwealth Office to the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) of Bangladesh has
not been inaccurately described as the death squad. This assistance
programme has been subject to critical review.
The assistance programmes comes to an end in March 2011. The British High
Commissioner to Bangaldesh, Mr Stephen Evans, has refused to be drawn on
renewal of assistance.
Since the formation of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) in Bangladesh in
2004, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) of the United Kingdom
estimates that more than 1,300 persons have allegedly been killed by law
enforcement agencies. There is little dispute that the majority of the
killings has been carried out by the RAB.
After nearly 36 months of assistance, extrajudicial executions by the RAB
continue to rise. If UK's assistance is focused on human rights, as the
FCO claims, then the medium term data suggests there is cause for concern
over the UK's assistance.
The UK's defence of its position emphasises the centrality of human rights
in UK's foreign policy. The UK argues that they have raised human rights
concerns at the highest level. This is of course entirely accurate. But
experience elsewhere suggests, if words are not matched by changes to
actual assistance, then the message is, at best, ambiguous.
Experience elsewhere also forcefully demonstrates that the FCO's confident
assurances, that its assistance to the RAB will not be abused, are more
than misplaced. It suggests that FCO's support in Bangladesh appears to
share design flaws in common with other security sector work in the
region. This commonality should concern Ministers in the UK. It is
suggestive of a flawed intervention logic applied more widely than just in
South Asia.
ACHR is not opposed to engagement per se: 'support allows us to engage
with key agents of change within the institution' runs the defensive line.
Engagement is a means to an end, not an end. There is value in engagement
but not, as is so often the case, when it is mistaken for influence.
If a project focuses on rights then it is not unreasonable that outcomes
should be tied to measurable human rights indicators. This is the logic
that would be applied to any other UK's development assistance. This being
so, project logic would suggest that the rise in killings should lead to
changes in the assistance.
ACHR urges an immediate suspension of assistance. The British Government
needs to demonstrate that its assistance has a bottom line.
If assistance is to be provided, given the stakes, project design (the
framework for engagement) merits very stringent conditions to bring an end
to extrajudicial executions and torture. Without ensuring these
guarantees, further assistance will be construed as de facto political
support for further killings, at the expense of the British tax payers.
The FCO should bear in mind that the RAB's institutional use of murder and
torture is not the place for fuzzy and uncountable concepts of 'awareness'
and 'capacity built'.
We thought you would find the Briefing Paper of interest.
With kind regards,
Yours sincerely
Suhas Chakma
Director
--
Palash Biswas
Pl Read:
http://nandigramunited-banga.blogspot.com/
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